LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CIVIL PROCEDURE – Estoppel per rem judicatam (Res Judicata) – Identity of Parties Requirement
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
A successful plea of res judicata requires identity of parties or their privies; where one suit is a representative action and the other is a personal action involving different individuals, the parties are not the same.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"A successful plea of res judicata requires identity of parties or their privies. Where one suit is a representative action and the other is a personal action involving different individuals, the parties are not the same."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
This principle addresses a specific scenario in the identity of parties requirement for res judicata: the distinction between representative and personal actions. In representative actions, one or more persons sue or are sued on behalf of a larger group sharing common interests, and the judgment binds all members of the represented class. In personal actions, parties sue or are sued individually in their own right, and judgments bind only those specific individuals. The principle establishes that these two types of actions involve different parties for res judicata purposes, even if some individuals appear in both. For example, if Person A sues in a representative capacity “for himself and on behalf of all members of the Smith Family” in the first case, and later Person B (a member of that family) sues in their personal capacity, the parties are not identical. A brought the first suit representatively for the group; B brings the second suit personally. The legal character and scope of representation differ fundamentally. This distinction matters because: (1) different individuals have different rights—a representative judgment may not adequately address individual circumstances; (2) the issues may differ—representative actions typically address common questions, while personal actions may involve individual-specific matters; (3) procedural protections differ—individual plaintiffs have greater control over personal actions than they do over representative suits brought by others. The principle prevents representative judgments from being used to bar subsequent personal claims by individuals who may not have been adequately represented or whose specific circumstances were not addressed in the representative action. It maintains the distinction between collective and individual vindication of rights while recognizing that true privies (those in privity of interest with original parties) remain bound by earlier judgments.