LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – Government Liability – State Immunity from Liability in Tort at Common Law
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Before the 1979 Constitution, earlier Constitutions contained no provisions annulling the common law principle of state immunity from liability in tort; this common law principle was received into Nigerian law and remained a valid defense.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"Before the 1979 Constitution none of the earlier Constitutions contained provisions which could be construed as annulling the common law principle of the states immunity from liability in Tort. The common law principle of state immunity was received into Nigerian Law... The defendants were right to have relied on the defence."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
This principle addresses a fundamental issue in public law: whether the state can be sued in tort for wrongs committed by its officers or agents. The common law maxim “the King can do no wrong” established sovereign immunity—the Crown could not be sued in tort without its consent. This principle was received into Nigerian law as part of the common law heritage. The principle establishes that: (1) State immunity existed as received common law; (2) Pre-1979 Constitutions did not abolish this immunity; (3) Absent constitutional or statutory abolition, the immunity remained valid; (4) Defendants (presumably public officers or government) could rely on this defense to bar tort claims. The immunity served (controversial) policy objectives: (1) protecting public funds from depletion through tort judgments; (2) preventing interference with government operations through litigation; (3) encouraging officials to act without fear of personal liability; (4) channeling remedies through statutory compensation schemes rather than common law tort. However, the principle notes the temporal limitation: this immunity existed “before the 1979 Constitution.” This suggests the 1979 Constitution may have altered the position (Section 6 establishing judicial power and Section 46 on enforcement of rights potentially limited immunity). Post-1979, the immunity became more restricted or abolished in various contexts. The principle’s contemporary relevance is limited because: (1) The 1979 Constitution and subsequent constitutions likely modified state immunity; (2) Statutory provisions in various jurisdictions have waived immunity in specific contexts; (3) Modern jurisprudence increasingly favors accountability over immunity. However, understanding the historical immunity principle remains important for: (1) cases arising from pre-1979 events; (2) understanding the evolution of government liability; (3) identifying contexts where immunity may still apply; (4) interpreting statutes that preserve limited immunity. The principle demonstrates that legal rights against the state are creatures of constitutional and statutory authorization, not automatic common law entitlements