Lt. General Ishaya Rizi Bamaiyi (Rtd.) v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors

I have read the leading judgment of my learned brother, Uthman Mohammed, JSC, in this appeal. I agree with his conclusion that this appeal should be dismissed. I only wish to add my contribution in amplification of the reasoning leading to the conclusion.

The only issue in this appeal is whether there is a discretion in the Court of Appeal whether or not to answer a question of the interpretation of a provision of the Constitution referred to it by the Federal High Court. The question sought to be answered was whether the Attorney-General has power by section 174 of the Constitution 1999 to constitute a special panel that investigated the Appellant and the Report of which was the basis of the prosecution of the Appellant before the Magistrates Court.

The facts of the case are undisputed, simple and short. Appellant was alleged to have facilitated the procurement of arms used in the attempted murder of Mr. Alex Ibru. He was accordingly detained in a house at Forte IBB Barracks, Abuja on 13th October, 1999. On the 5th November, 1999, Appellant by application to enforce his fundamental right challenged his detention and sought the following declaratory reliefs and orders in the Federal High Court.

“A. A declaration that the arrest of the applicant on 13th October, 1999 by the respondents, their officers, servants, privies is without justification, illegal, unlawful and consequentially, a violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as secured to the applicant by sections 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Acts Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.

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1990. A declaration that the detention, house arrest, restriction of movement and continued detention and restriction of movement of the applicant since the 13th of October, 1999 by the respondents at the Chief of Army Staff’s Guest House, Forte IBB, Abuja, is illegal, unlawful and consequentially, a violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as secured to the applicant by sections 35 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4, 5, 6, and 12 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap.  10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.
1991. A declaration that the A.-G., of the Federation (1st respondent) is without power to constitute a Special Investigation Panel (S.I.P) to investigate an alleged commission of a crime by the applicant.
1992. A declaration that the A.-G.,’s Special Investigation Panel (S.I.P.) constituted to investigate alleged commission of a crime by the applicant is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void and consequentially a usurpation of the statutory powers of the Nigeria Police Force.
1993. A declaration that the proceedings, report and the recommendation of the A.-G’s Special Investigation Panel (S.I.P.) dated 26th October, 1999 is illegal, void and cannot form the basis upon which the Attorney General of the Federation (1st respondent) or any other authority can lay a charge against the applicant.
1994. A declaration that the conduct of the A.-G’s Special Investigation Panel in its proceedings, utterances, deeds and leakage of misleading information to the media is illegal, unlawful, reprehensible, ultra vires, malicious and constitutes a gross violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as guaranteed under section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the African Charter on Human and People Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Acts Cap. 10 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990.

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1. An order of mandatory injunction compelling the respondents whether by themselves or their officers, servants, privies or otherwise howsoever, to forthwith release the applicant.
   H. An order of injunction restraining the respondents whether by themselves, servants, privies or otherwise howsoever from further arresting, detaining, arraigning the applicant in any court of law upon the findings of the Attorney-General’s Special Investigation Panel or in any other manner infringing on the fundamental rights of the applicant.
2. An order quashing the establishment, proceedings, reports, and findings and recommendation of the Attorney-General’s Special Investigation Panel.
   J. Such consequential or other orders including the payment of N100,000,000 (One hundred million Naira) as compensation 10 the applicant for the purpose of securing his fundamental rights under the 1999 Constitution, to which the applicant may be entitled to.”

GROUNDS UPON WHICH THE RELIEFS ARE SOUGHT
A. The arrest of the applicant on 13 October, 1999 by the respondent is an infringement of the applicant’s constitutional rights and therefore ultra vires, illegal, and unlawful within the meaning of Sections 35, 36 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution, and Articles 4, 5, 6 and 12 of the African Charter.
B. The continuous detention, house arrest and custody of the applicant by the respondents is an infringement of the applicant’s constitutional rights and therefore ultra vires, illegal, and unlawful within the meaning of Section 35, 36 and 41 of the 1999 Constitution and Articles 4,5,6, and 12 of the African Charter.

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1. The Attorney-General of the Federation is without power to establish a Special Investigation Panel for the purpose of investigating an alleged commission of a crime.
   D. The establishment of the Special Investigation Panel is illegal, unlawful and unconstitutionalAfter the hearing of the application, the learned trial Judge refused prayers C and D. Appellant was still not released, but was instead arraigned before a Chief Magistrate in Lagos on a two count charge of conspiracy and attempted murder. Appellant was remanded in Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison, Lagos.

   Relying on the ruling of the learned trial Judge with respect to Appellant’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights, Mr. Mike Okoye learned counsel filed an application before the Federal High Court seeking to commit the 1st respondent, the Attorney-General of the Federation to prison for contempt of the order of the Court. He also filed an application seeking release of the appellant from Kirikiri Maximum Security Prison. He brought an application for stay of proceedings in charge No. MIKI A/912/99 Commissioner of Police v. Lt. General Ishaya Bamaiyi (Ltd) & 4 ors pending the hearing of Appellant’s application for the enforcement of his fundamental rights.

   Respondents filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the ruling of the Federal High Court ordering the immediate release of the appellant from the House detention at No. 12 Forte IBB Barracks, Abuja.

   On the 3rd December, 1999, the suit came before the learned trial Judge of the Federal High Court for argument of various interlocutory applications.

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Counsel for the appellant relying on section 295 of the Constitution, 1999 made an oral application to refer to the following constitutional question aforesaid for the interpretation of the Court of Appeal.
“Whether by the provisions of section 174 of the Constitution or any provisions, the Federal Attorney-General has the power to constitute the special investigation panel that investigated the applicant and the report which forms the basis of the charge against them {sic} before the Magistrate Court”

The learned trial Judge considering that a substantial question of interpretation of the provision of the Constitution was involved, referred the question to the Court of Appeal for interpretation in compliance with the provisions of section 295(1) of the Constitution 1999.

The Court of Appeal, after arguments of counsel of the parties, considered their submissions on the question and declined to answer the question on the ground that it did not arise from the proceedings before the Federal High Court. They sent back the case to the Federal High Court for continuation of hearing and determination of the application before it. Appellant dissatisfied has appealed to this Court. This is the appeal now before us.

Appellant has challenged the decision of the Court of Appeal, alleging six grounds of errors of law. Learned counsel for the appellant has formulated five issues, as against four by the respondents’ counsel, from the grounds of appeal. The Appellant’s issues would seem to me to be comprehensive and adequate for the purpose, covering the grounds of appeal. They are as follows-

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“1. Whether the Court of Appeal has any discretion under section 295(2) of the 1999 Constitution to refuse to answer the question referred to it.

2. Whether the Court of Appeal is entitled in a reference under section 295(2) of the 1999 Constitution to review a decision on fact made by the trial court not appealed against.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal was right to have determined the substantive issue pending before the Federal High Court in a matter of reference.
4. Whether an applicant seeking to enforce his fundamental rights requires any additional leave over and above that prescribed in Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Right (Enforcement Procedure) Rules for reliefs sought in the statement accompanying his application.
5. Whether the reason given by the Court of Appeal in refusing to answer the question is justified in law.”Although issues 1, 2, 3, and 5 and more particularly 1 and 5 are directly concerned with the question referred to the Court of Appeal. Issue 4 is completely outside the question and irrelevant. For the determination of the question, only directly related issues 1 and 5 are relevant. Issue 2 and 3 though obliquely relevant to the consideration of the question are not necessary for the determination of the question.

The question was referred to the court below by virtue of section 295(1) (a) (b) and (2) (3) of the Constitution 1999, which provides as follows:
“295(1) Where any question as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in any court of law in any part of Nigeria (other than in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, the Federal High Court or a High Court) and the court is of the opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if any of the parties to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Federal High Court or a High Court having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria and the Federal High Court or the High Court shall

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(a) if it is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, refer the question to the Court of Appeal or

(b) if it is of opinion that the question does not involve a substantial question of law, remit the question to the court that made the reference to be disposed of in accordance with such directions as the Federal High Court or the High Court may think fit to give.

(2) Where any question as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in the Federal High Court, or a High Court, and the court is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Court of Appeal; and where any question is referred in pursuance of this subsection, the court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision.

(3) Where any question as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the court is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Supreme Court which shall give its decision upon the question and give such directions to the Court of Appeal as it deems appropriate”.

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The scope and ambit of the constitutional provisions above reproduced is as clearly stated in section 295(1). The section can only correctly be relied upon in proceedings in any Court of law in Nigeria, where

(i) any question of interpretation or application of the Constitution, has arisen, and

(ii) the court is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law.

The section has also prescribed when and by whom the provision can be invoked. The court is vested with discretion to invoke the provision suo motu and also if the parties to the proceedings so request. Thus the Court may suo motu and must make the reference on the parties’ request. An important element is that the question must arise in the proceedings before the court, and it must involve a substantial question of law. This last mentioned ingredient is the overriding factor in determining whether a reference of a constitutional question should be made.

In recognition of the crucial importance and utility of the provision, it has formed part of every Constitution since 1960. It was section 108(2) of the 1960 Constitution, Section 259 of the 1979 Constitution and section 295 of the 1999 Constitution. With minor and insubstantial verbal differences, the provisions have in substance remained the same as they are intended to achieve the same objective, namely interpretation of difficult provisions of the Constitution in the adjudication of a pending litigation before the Court for the benefit of the parties.

The purpose is to solve a difficult, constitutional interpretation impeding the continuation of the proceedings before the trial Court. This is the rationale for the reference back of the decision of the Court to which the question was referred.

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It is necessary for a proper appreciation of the import of the provision to understand the meaning of the expression “substantial question of law” within the section.

A construction of the section shows that the expression covers the situation and applies whether the court acts suo motu or at the instance of a party to the action. It is an essential condition for the exercise of the power in the constitutional provision that the question must genuinely arise in the proceedings. For the question to arise genuinely, it must be one, which must necessarily be decided in the cause or matter and not a matter which may prove unnecessary to be decided. See Gamioba & Ors. v. Esezi II & Ors. (1961) All NLR 584.

The phrase “a substantial question of law”, is difficult to define exhaustively. What amounts to a “substantial question of law” has been stated to be a matter “on which arguments in favour of more than one interpretation might reasonably be adduced”.

“It must also be one which is incapable of being formulated with precision.” See Gamioba & Ors v. Esezi II & Ors (Supra) at p.588. In Olawoyin & Others v. Police (No.2) (1961) 2 SCNLR 278; (1961) 1 All NLR at p.625 the Federal Supreme Court has formulated a guide and provided the test as follows:
“It will be difficult to attempt an exhaustive definition of what is a substantial question of law. A useful guide in determining whether an issue of law is substantial is provided in a number of Indian decisions dealing with a similar phrase in the Indian Constitution.

There it has been held that in order to be substantial, the issue must be such that there may be some doubt or difference of opinion as to what the law is. When no such doubt exists, or the law is well established by a final Court of Appeal, or by all over whelming consensus of judicial decisions the mere application of it to a particular set of facts does not constitute a substantial question of law, however important the issue may be for the decision of the particular case. Oheara v. C. P Syndicate (1949) 4 D.L.R. 20; Abdur Rahman v. Raghbir (1951) 6 D.L.R. 107 (Simla)”.

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I adopt this dictum of the Federal Supreme Court, which is a correct interpretation of the expression “substantial question of law”.

Learned counsel to the Appellant at whose instance the reference was made in his submission contended that the provisions of Section 295(2) is mandatory on the Court to which a question has been referred to answer a question. It was submitted that the court had no discretion not to answer a question referred to it.

The contention of counsel was that section 295(2) required that the court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision. Learned counsel relied on the construction of the word “shall in Section 9(1) and 13 of the University Teaching Hospital Reconstitution of Boards, etc. Act, Cap.463 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 in UNTHMB v NNOLI (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.363) 376 where the word “shall” was held to be mandatory and did not allow for the exercise of any discretion, variation or circumvention of the prescribed procedure to be followed.

It was the contention of learned counsel that the clear and unambiguous words of section 295(2) did not allow any discretion in the court below to refuse to answer the question referred to it. In his view to refuse to answer a question referred is tantamount to abdication of constitutional responsibility to refuse to answer a question as to the interpretation or application of the Constitution before it.

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It is true that the word shall in the ordinary meaning of the word, connotes a command, and that which must be given a compulsory meaning. It has a peremptory meaning which is generally imperative and mandatory. It has the significance of excluding the idea of discretion to impose a duty. Where a provision provides that a thing shall be done, the natural meaning is that a peremptory mandate is enjoined Achineku v. Ishagba (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt.89) 411.

The issue raised by learned counsel for the Appellant is more appropriately expressed in the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 295 already reproduced in this judgment. It is pertinent to observe the words used in the section, which provides that,
” … where any question is referred in pursuance of this sub-section, the court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision”

It is an elementary but fundamental principle of interpretation of the words of a statute that the words used where clear and unambiguous should be given their ordinary meaning. Niger Progress Ltd. v. N. E. L. Corp. (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 68; Garba v. Federal Civil Service Commission (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 71) 449. It is not in such situations to infer from the words used meanings other that used in the provision. It is clear from the use of the words “any question” and “decision” in section 295(2) that they are neither interchangeable, synonymous nor meant to refer to the same thing or situation.

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It is obvious therefore that the intention of the provision was to refer to two different situations. I agree with the submission of Mr. Rotimi Jacobs, learned Counsel for the Respondent that it is wrong to construe the expression, “shall give its decision upon the question” under section 295(2) to mean shall answer the question. What the express words of section 295(2) requires the Court to do is to give its decision on the question. It did not require the Court to which a question is referred to answer the question. If that was the intention it should have had no difficulty in saying so.

The word “decision” as defined in Section 318 of the Constitution 1999, “means in relation to a court, any determination of that court and includes judgment, decree, order, conviction, sentence or recommendation”. This definition is very wide and encompasses every judicial determination pronounced in the settlement of a controversy made by way of authoritative answer to the questions raised before it.

It is therefore accepted to postulate that any pronouncement made by a court which stands as its verdict whether final or interlocutory to a question brought before it for determination is a decision. Akande & Ors. v. Adesanwo & Ors. (1962) All NLR 206, Aduke v. Longe (1962) 2 All NLR 201. I think the expression merely means giving a determination on the reference. It does not mean answering the question. The mandatory nature of the constitutional provision applies only where parties resort to it and request a reference. It does not apply when the court applies the provision suo motu.

I have stated the facts of the case in the Federal High Court leading to the reference in this case of the question to be determined in the Court of Appeal.

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It is not disputed that the issue before the learned trial Judge of the Federal High Court was for declaratory reliefs and orders, A-J in which the following reliefs “C” and “D” were refused. The reliefs refused are as follows-
“C. A declaration that the Attorney-General of the Federation (1st Respondent) is without power to constitute a special Investigation Panel (S.I.P.) to investigate an alleged commission of a crime by the applicant.

1. A declaration that the Attorney -General’s Special Investigation Panel (S.I.P.) constituted to investigate alleged commission of a crime by the applicant is illegal, unconstitutional null and void and consequently a usurpation of the statutory powers of the Nigeria Police Force”

These two prayers having been refused were not part of reliefs in respect of which the claims of the appellant were granted, and were not part of the claims and reliefs granted from the material on which the question for reference to the Court of Appeal could have been formulated.

These were the facts and the material on which the Court of Appeal was asked to answer the question referred to it by the Federal High Court. In a well considered ruling, the court in my considered opinion correctly answered that the subject matter of the reference having not arisen from the proceedings before the referring court; there was no basis to interpret the constitutional question before it.

Mr. Rotimi Jacobs referred us to Olawoyin v. Commissioner of Police (No.2) (1961) 2 SCNLR 278, (1961) All NLR 622 where the Federal Supreme Court refused to answer a question on the issue of fair trial guaranteed under the 1960 Constitution, referred to it by the High Court of Northern Nigeria.

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In that case, the Federal Supreme Court stated at p.625.
“As we are of the opinion that the questions put to us do not arise under section 108(2) of the Constitution, we shall send the matter back to the High Court of Northern Nigeria for it to proceed with the appeal before it.”

In the instant case, the proceedings before the Federal High Court which was seeking declaratory reliefs relating to the human rights of the appellant did not concern the question of the interpretation of section 174 of the 1999 Constitution. Section 174 of the Constitution 1999 which relates to the powers of the Attorney-General of the Federation, which was not an issue before the trial Judge in the Federal High Court. The question referred to the Court of Appeal for interpretation therefore did not arise from the proceedings before the Federal High Court, but rather relates to proceedings before the Magistrate court.

It is therefore not a question which arises from the proceedings within the meaning of section 295(2) of the Constitution – See Obayogie v. Oyowe (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt.346) 637, 643. The Court of Appeal was therefore right in declining to answer the question referred to it. The Court correctly referred the question back to the referring trial Federal High Court for continuation of the proceedings before it.

In the circumstances where the reliefs relating to the constitutional questions referred was founded on issues no longer part of the declaratory reliefs and the proceedings before the learned trial Judge, it will be completely inappropriate to formulate a question unsupported by any material before him, and not constituting any of the issues in dispute before him. See Olawoyin v. Commissioner of Police (1961) 1 All NLR 203, (1961) 2 SCNLR 278.

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The above reasons have determined the issues Nos.1 and 5 formulated from the grounds of appeal and is a comp1ete answer to the appeal of the appellant. The appeal of appe1lant is accordingly dismissed. Appellant shall pay N10,000 as costs to the respondents.

I am privileged to have read in advance, the lead judgment of my learned brother Uthman Mohammed JSC, and I agree with his reasoning and conclusion for dismissing the appeal.
For the same reasons ably stated in the lead judgment, I also hereby dismiss this appeal and affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeal. I award N10,000.00 costs to the respondents.

I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed, JSC and I am in complete agreement with him that this appeal is without substance and ought to be dismissed.

It cannot be disputed that the question referred to the Court of Appeal for the resolution of the appeal did not arise from the proceedings before the trial court. Any consideration of the same would therefore amount to an exercise in academics which no court of law should concern itself with.

In this regard, this court has repeatedly made the point that where a question before the court is entirely academic, speculative or hypothetical, the appellate court in accordance with well established principles must decline to decide such a point. See Nkwocha v. Governor of Anambra State (1984) 6 SC 302, (1984) 1 SCNLR 634; Governor of Kaduna State v. Dada (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt.38) 687; Richard Ezeanya and Others v. Gabriel Okeke & Ors. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.388) 142 etc.

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It is therefore clear to me that the Court of Appeal was quite right by declining to give any consideration to the question before it. This appeal is devoid of merit and it is hereby dismissed by me with costs as assessed in the leading judgment.

I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Uthman Mohammed, JSC. in this appeal. I entirely agree with it.
The main question for determination is whether the Court of Appeal has any discretion under Section 295(2) of the 1999 Constitution to refuse to answer a question referred to it by the Federal High Court. The section is as follows:
“Where any question as to the interpretation or application of this Constitution arises in any proceedings in the Federal High Court, or a High Court, and the court is of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law, the court may, and shall if any party to the proceedings so requests, refer the question to the Court of Appeal; and where any question is referred in pursuance of this sub-section, the court shall give its decision upon the question and the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision.”

(Italics for emphasis).
I cannot imagine any language more explicit. The sub-section says “the court shall give its decision upon the question” so referred to the court. It is to be observed that this is not the same as saying “the court shall answer the question.” The condition for referring any question to the Court of Appeal is that the question must arise in the proceedings before the Federal High Court or the High Court as the case maybe.

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Now, in the present case, the Court of Appeal had considered the question referred to it by the Federal High Court and given its decision. Its decision was that the subject matter of the reference had not arisen in the proceedings before the Federal High Court and as a result refused to answer it.

In Olawoyin v. Commissioner of Police (1961) 2 SCNLR 278; (1961) 1 All NLR 622 this court refused to answer questions referred to it by the High Court of Northern Nigeria on the ground that the questions did not arise under Section 108(2) of the 1960 Constitution, which is in pari material  with S.295(2) of the 1999 Constitution.

For this reason and the fuller reasons given by my learned brother Uthman Mohammed. JSC. I, too. would dismiss this appeal with N10,000.00 costs to the respondents.

I have had the privilege of reading the leading judgment of my learned brother, Uthman Mohammed, JSC. I agree with his reasoning and the conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and the same ought to be dismissed. Accordingly, I, too would dismiss the appeal with N10,000.00 cost in favour of the respondent.

I have had the privilege of reading in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uthman Mohammed, JSC. I agree that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.
Subsection 2 of Section 295 of the Constitution predicated the exercise of the power of the High Court to refer a question as to the interpretation or application of the Constitution on:

(i) the question as to interpretation or application of the Constitution arising in the proceedings; and

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(ii) the court being of opinion that the question involves a substantial question of law,
Where question of interpretation or application of the Constitution does not arise in the proceedings a consideration of the second condition does not arise.

A question arises in any proceeding where the question must necessarily be decided in the proceeding, In Gamioba v. Esezi II & Ors. (1961) 2 SCNLR 237; (1961) NSCC 238, 584 court, per Brett, JSC, said at p. 241:
“As to when a question arises for the purpose of exercising the power of reference, we would adopt the reasoning and the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in England in Weed v. Ward (1889) 40 Ch. D 555,where it was held, to cite the head note, that “The power given by the Judicature Act, 1873, S.56, to refer” any question  arising in any cause or matter’ to an Official or Special Referee applies only to questions which must necessarily be decided in the cause or matter, and not to questions which it may prove unnecessary to decide.”

Section 108 of the 1960 Constitution which was considered in the Gamioba case is in identical terms with Section 295(2) of the 1999 Constitution.
The provision of Section 295(2) that “the court shall give its decision upon the question” does not remove from the Court of Appeal the power to decide whether in the first place there was such question fit to be referred pursuant to Section 295(2). The Court of Appeal exercises power under Section 295(2) to give its decision “upon the question” that arises in the proceedings and not on any question that may have been referred to it at large, whether it arose from the proceedings or not, or, referred to it on an erroneous view held by the High Court that it has arisen. A question which has not arisen in the proceedings cannot be a question properly “referred in pursuance of this subsection” fit to evoke an answer from the Court of Appeal.

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The Court of Appeal is as much a judge of whether a question as to interpretation or application has arisen in the proceedings as the High Court.
The consequence of any decision of the Court of Appeal pursuant to S.295(2) being that “the court in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision,” any interpretation of Section 295(2) that would compel the Court of Appeal to give a decision in accordance with which the High Court cannot dispose of the case, because the question and answer would have no consequence to the proceedings, is erroneous and absurd. Courts do not answer academic questions, Section 295(2) does not provide an exception to that rule.

My learned brother, Uthman Mohammed, JSC, has dealt more extensively and in greater details with these points in his judgment. I am in entire agreement with his reasoning and his conclusion in the matter. In the result, I too would dismiss the appeal and award N10,000 costs in favour of the respondents.
Appeal dismissed.

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