PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

A criminal trial commences with arraignment (reading the charge and taking the plea); the period of delay contemplated by constitutional fair hearing provisions relates to trial after arraignment, not the period between arrest and arraignment.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Uwais, JSC, in Asakitikpi v. State (1993) NLC-161992(SC) at pp. 5–6; Paras A–B.
"A criminal trial commences with the arraignment of the accused, which consists of reading the charge and taking his plea. The period of delay contemplated by section 33(4) of the 1979 Constitution relates to the trial after arraignment, not to the period between arrest and arraignment."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Constitutional guarantees of trial “within reasonable time” begin at arraignment, not arrest. Pre-arraignment delay (investigation, charging decisions) isn’t covered by trial delay provisions, though may violate other rights (liberty, speedy determination of charges). This interpretation recognizes that “trial” means formal judicial proceedings, not investigative processes. However, unreasonable pre-trial detention may violate other constitutional protections. The principle focuses reasonable time requirements on the trial process itself: from arraignment through judgment. Courts assess reasonableness based on case complexity, witness availability, and court schedules. Delays caused by accused (continuance requests, absconding) don’t count. This principle clarifies when constitutional trial delay protections apply

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE