PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Whether a quasi-corporation has the right to sue or be sued eo nomine depends on whether the statute creating it expressly or by implication gives it such power; considering the nature of functions and powers conferred, where third-party rights would necessarily be affected, it would be unjust if such third parties cannot seek redress.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ogundare, JSC, in Carlen (Nig.) Ltd v. University of Jos (1994) NLC-741992(SC) at pp. 16--17; Paras D--B.
"Whether a quasi corporation has the right to sue or be sued eo nomine depends on whether the statute creating it expressly or by implication gives it such power… Considering the nature of these functions and other powers, duties and responsibilities conferred by other sections of the Act… it cannot be doubted that in their exercise of these functions and powers rights of third parties would necessarily be affected and it will amount to injustice if such third parties cannot seek redress for any wrong done to them."
View Judgment

EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Quasi-corporations (statutory bodies without full corporate status) may sue and be sued in their own names if: (1) expressly authorized by statute; or (2) impliedly authorized—when statute grants functions/powers necessarily affecting third parties. Implication arises from: the entity’s functions (regulatory, commercial, service provision), powers granted (contracting, property ownership), and practical necessity (third parties need redress). Without sue/be-sued capacity, the entity couldn’t enforce rights or be held accountable—creating injustice. Courts examine enabling statutes to determine capacity. The principle ensures statutory bodies exercising significant powers can be parties to litigation, promoting accountability and access to justice. It recognizes that express authorization isn’t always necessary—functional analysis may imply litigation capacity.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE