LEGAL PRINCIPLE: TORT LAW – Defamation – Innuendo Must Be Specifically Pleaded as Extrinsic Fact
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The words complained of may in their natural and ordinary meaning be defamatory, and unless innuendo is specifically pleaded to portray the plaintiff in certain terms, the plaintiff cannot be heard on that.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"The words complained of may in their natural and ordinary meaning be defamatory, and unless innuendo is specifically pleaded to portray the plaintiff as a secret society in terms stated in section 39(4) of the Constitution, the plaintiff cannot be heard on that."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Defamation cases involve two meaning types: Natural and ordinary meaning: What reasonable persons would understand from the words themselves—no special pleading required. Innuendo (extended meaning): Meanings arising from extrinsic facts known to some readers—must be specifically pleaded. Innuendo requires pleading: (1) the extrinsic facts giving words extended meaning; (2) the defamatory meaning arising from those facts; (3) identification of persons knowing the extrinsic facts. Without pleading innuendo: plaintiff can only rely on natural and ordinary meaning, extended meanings cannot be considered, and defamation based on special circumstances fails. This requirement serves: fair notice to defendants (they must know meanings alleged), issue definition (what meanings are contested), and preventing surprise claims of meanings not apparent from words themselves. Plaintiffs relying on innuendo must: plead it specifically, identify extrinsic facts, and prove those facts at trial. Failure to plead innuendo bars reliance on extended meanings even if words could bear such meanings with knowledge of extrinsic circumstances. This strict pleading rule ensures defendants know the defamatory case to meet.