PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

The express mention of the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff in the second part, excludes the possibility of the name and address of the agent as was done in the first part; the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies; the name and address of the agent having been excluded, only that of the intending plaintiff is required and is directory.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Karibi-Whyte, JSC Amadi v. NNPC (2000) NLC-1141997(SC) at p. 38; Paras. D–F.
"The express mention of the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff in the second part, excludes the possibility of the name and address of the agent as was done in the first part — The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies. The name and address of the agent having been excluded, only that of the intending plaintiff is required and is directory."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

This applies the interpretative maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to statutory construction. Maxim meaning: “Expression of one thing excludes another”—when statute expressly mentions one thing, it excludes others not mentioned. Application here: Statute’s first part mentions: name and address of agent. Second part mentions: name and place of abode of intending plaintiff (not agent). Interpretation: Express mention of plaintiff (not agent) in second part excludes agent possibility—different language shows different requirement. First part allows agent details; second part requires plaintiff details (not agent). Effect: Only plaintiff’s name/address required—not agent’s, statute deliberately distinguished, and expressio unius applies. Directory nature: Since requirement is plaintiff’s details (substantively different from agent requirement), it’s directory—substantial compliance with plaintiff identification suffices. This serves: giving effect to statutory language differences, recognizing deliberate distinctions, and applying interpretative canons consistently. Why maxim applies: Legislature used different language in different parts—first part (agent allowed), second part (plaintiff required). This deliberate distinction: excludes what’s not mentioned (agent in second part), requires what’s mentioned (plaintiff), and shows intentional limitation. Courts applying this maxim: identify what’s expressly stated, determine what’s excluded by omission, and give effect to legislative choice. This prevents: reading into statute what’s not there, ignoring deliberate language differences, and treating different provisions identically. The principle: express statutory mention of one thing demonstrates intention to exclude others—courts must respect these distinctions.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE