PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

The test for whether an act is of a nature likely to endanger human life must depend on whether death or the loss of human life is a reasonably probable consequence of the act in question. The act must be one of such a nature as to be 'likely to endanger human life' and an act cannot be said to be likely to have a certain result if a reasonable man would not expect it to have such a result, even though, in the event, that result ensued.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Iguh, JSC, in Idowu v. State (2000) NLC-1931999(SC) at pp. 33–34; Paras B–D.
"The test for whether an act is of a nature likely to endanger human life must depend on whether death or the loss of human life is a reasonably probable consequence of the act in question. The act must be one of such a nature as to be 'likely to endanger human life' and an act cannot be said to be likely to have a certain result if a reasonable man would not expect it to have such a result, even though, in the event, that result ensued."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

The “likely to endanger human life” test under Section 316(3) is objective: would a reasonable person consider death or life-threatening harm a reasonably probable consequence? The test focuses on the inherent nature of the act, not its actual result. Even if death occurs, if a reasonable person would not have foreseen it as a probable consequence, the act does not satisfy the “likely” requirement. This objective standard distinguishes between acts that are inherently dangerous and those that become dangerous only due to unforeseen circumstances. Foreseeability is key.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE