PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

When it is alleged that defamatory meaning should be inferred beyond the literal meaning of words, there is no room for fanciful imagination... When a tribunal is urged to draw inference from facts, such inference must be such as a reasonable person would draw having regard to the totality of the circumstances, including the ordinary course of conduct, both personal and corporate.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ayoola, JSC, in Agbanelo v. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd. (2000) NLC-201997(SC) at p. 5; Paras A–B.
"When it is alleged that defamatory meaning should be inferred beyond the literal meaning of words, there is no room for fanciful imagination... When a tribunal is urged to draw inference from facts, such inference must be such as a reasonable person would draw having regard to the totality of the circumstances, including the ordinary course of conduct, both personal and corporate."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

In defamation, inferences of defamatory meaning must be reasonable, not fanciful. Courts adopt the reasonable person standard—what an ordinary, reasonable person would understand from the words in context. Inferences must be based on the totality of circumstances, including ordinary conduct. Fanciful or strained interpretations cannot support defamation claims. The reasonable person is not overly suspicious or imaginative. This objective standard ensures that only words genuinely capable of defamatory meaning attract liability, preventing trivial or hypersensitive claims from succeeding.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE