LEGAL PRINCIPLE: PROFESSIONAL ETHICS – Bias – Real Likelihood of Bias – Governor’s Spouse Interpreting Legislation Signed by Governor
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
I cannot conceive of a real likelihood of bias on the part of the Honourable Justice Ige in this matter when, as a part of her official duty, she was merely to interpret a piece of subsidiary legislation which came into being in Oyo State when her husband was the Chief Executive of that State simply because of that marital relationship. I certainly will be unwilling to extend the reasonable apprehensions of a reasonable man fully apprised of the facts and circumstances of a matter. The standard of capricious and unreasonable people should not be allowed to determine and control the legal aphorism that justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to be done otherwise judicial or quasi-judicial functions would be almost impossible to perform.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Uwaifo, JSC, in Secretary, Iwo Central Local Government v. Adio (2000) NLC-1431994(SC) at p. 34; Paras B–D.
"I cannot conceive of a real likelihood of bias on the part of the Honourable Justice Ige in this matter when, as a part of her official duty, she was merely to interpret a piece of subsidiary legislation which came into being in Oyo State when her husband was the Chief Executive of that State simply because of that marital relationship. I certainly will be unwilling to extend the reasonable apprehensions of a reasonable man fully apprised of the facts and circumstances of a matter. The standard of capricious and unreasonable people should not be allowed to determine and control the legal aphorism that justice must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to be done otherwise judicial or quasi-judicial functions would be almost impossible to perform."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
A judge interpreting subsidiary legislation signed by her spouse (as Governor) does not create real likelihood of bias. Judicial interpretation of law is distinct from personal approval of the law. The reasonable person, fully apprised of facts, would not infer bias. Capricious or unreasonable standards should not control the “justice must be seen to be done” principle—otherwise judicial functions become impossible. The test is not hypersensitive suspicion but reasonable apprehension. Marriage alone does not disqualify a judge from interpreting legislation enacted during spouse’s tenure. Official duty differs from personal interest.