PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Where a party has effectively ceased to be a party to the action at the time consent judgment was entered in the case, and the consent judgment was not binding on them by reason of that fact and because they were specifically excluded from its operation, such party has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Appeal ought to strike out the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Katsina-Alu, JSC, in Ogunkunle & Ors v. Eternal Sacred Order of the Cherubim and Seraphim & Ors (2001) NLC-1921997(SC) at pp. 8–9; Paras D–A.
"Where a party has effectively ceased to be a party to the action at the time consent judgment was entered in the case, and the consent judgment was not binding on them by reason of that fact and because they were specifically excluded from its operation, such party has no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Appeal ought to strike out the appeal for want of jurisdiction."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

A person who was not a party to a consent judgment—having ceased to be a party before entry or being specifically excluded—has no right to appeal that judgment. The Court of Appeal lacks jurisdiction over such an appeal and must strike it out. The right of appeal attaches only to those bound by the judgment. If the judgment does not affect the person because they were no longer in the action or were expressly excluded, they suffer no grievance. Allowing such appeals would permit strangers to litigation to challenge settlements. The requirement preserves finality and prevents abuse.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE