PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Liability for libel depends, not on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation. A person is liable for the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the words he used, whether he foresaw them or not, and if he scatters two-edged and ambiguous statements broadcast without knowing or making inquiry about facts material to the statements he makes and the inferences which may be drawn from the words he publishes.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ejiwunmi, JSC, in A.C.B. Ltd. & Ors v. Apugo (2001) NLC-1651995(SC) at p. 15; Paras C–D.
"Liability for libel depends, not on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of defamation. A person is liable for the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the words he used, whether he foresaw them or not, and if he scatters two-edged and ambiguous statements broadcast without knowing or making inquiry about facts material to the statements he makes and the inferences which may be drawn from the words he publishes."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Libel liability is objective—based on the fact of defamation, not the publisher’s intention. The publisher is liable for reasonable inferences drawn from the words, whether foreseen or not. Publishing ambiguous statements without inquiry into material facts carries the risk that readers may draw defamatory inferences. Ignorance or lack of intent is no defence. The reasonable reader standard applies: what would an ordinary, reasonable person understand? The publisher assumes the risk of ambiguity. This encourages responsible publishing and verification before publication. The defendant cannot escape liability by claiming they meant no harm. The test is effect, not intent.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE