PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

There are however recognized exceptions to this basic principle of law. One of such exceptions is where the issue in controversy between the parties is simply a matter of inference that can be drawn from established facts on record, not resting on the credibility of witnesses as a result of their demeanour in court or of the impression of them by the trial court.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Iguh, JSC, in Nnorodim & Anor v. Ezeani & Ors (2001) NLC-1521995(SC) at p. 3; Paras C–E.
"There are however recognized exceptions to this basic principle of law. One of such exceptions is where the issue in controversy between the parties is simply a matter of inference that can be drawn from established facts on record, not resting on the credibility of witnesses as a result of their demeanour in court or of the impression of them by the trial court."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

An exception to trial court’s primary fact-finding role exists where the issue is a matter of inference from established facts, not dependent on witness credibility. In such cases, the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court. The trial court’s advantage—seeing and hearing witnesses—is irrelevant where credibility is not in question. The appellate court can draw its own inferences from undisputed or documentary evidence. The exception applies to inferences from proved facts, legal conclusions, or interpretation of documents. The appellate court must not hesitate to evaluate such evidence and draw necessary inferences. The exception preserves appellate review where the trial court’s advantage adds nothing.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE