PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Having regard to what I have stated above, I think it is self evident that in Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen (supra), the court in that case was mainly concerned with whether the court can properly grant declaratory relief which would, if granted, amount to having two parallel decisions in respect of the same matter. ... It is therefore my humble view that the facts and issues raised in the instant appeal are not the same as the facts which fell for consideration in the Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen case (supra).

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ejiwunmi, JSC, in Odugbo v. Abu & Ors (2001) NLC-1121996(SC) at p. 39; Paras A–D.
"Having regard to what I have stated above, I think it is self evident that in Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen (supra), the court in that case was mainly concerned with whether the court can properly grant declaratory relief which would, if granted, amount to having two parallel decisions in respect of the same matter. ... It is therefore my humble view that the facts and issues raised in the instant appeal are not the same as the facts which fell for consideration in the Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen case (supra)."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Previous authorities must be distinguished based on their specific facts and issues. Eguamwense v. Amaghizemwen concerned whether a declaratory relief would create two parallel decisions on the same matter. That case does not apply where the facts and issues differ. The court must examine the ratio decidendi of prior cases—the legal principle derived from the specific factual context. Precedents are binding only on similar facts. The party relying on a precedent must show factual and legal similarity. Distinguishing authorities is a legitimate judicial technique to avoid mechanical application of inapposite precedents. The court’s duty is to apply the correct law to the facts before it. Distinguishing prevents error from misapplication.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE