PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

It is of course common ground that there was no direct evidence that connected the Appellant with the commission of the despicable murder of the innocent child. ... The trial court had only circumstantial evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence at the trial. And after due consideration of the evidence, the learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the Appellant must have been the one, and no other who introduced the corrosive acid into the deceased.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Ejiwunmi, JSC, in Ijioffor v. State (2001) NLC-2002000(SC) at pp. 10–11; Paras D–E and 18; Paras A–B.
"It is of course common ground that there was no direct evidence that connected the Appellant with the commission of the despicable murder of the innocent child. ... The trial court had only circumstantial evidence of the witnesses who gave evidence at the trial. And after due consideration of the evidence, the learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the Appellant must have been the one, and no other who introduced the corrosive acid into the deceased."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Murder can be proved by circumstantial evidence alone—direct evidence is not always available. The absence of direct evidence does not preclude conviction. The court must ensure that the circumstantial evidence is cogent, compelling, and excludes any other rational hypothesis. The trial judge must carefully consider the totality of circumstances. The standard remains proof beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be more reliable than direct evidence in some cases. The court must be satisfied that the accused, and no other person, committed the act. The principle recognises that many crimes are committed without eyewitnesses. The inference of guilt must be irresistible. The appellate court will review the sufficiency of the evidence but not re-evaluate credibility.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE