LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL LAW – Rape – Evaluation of Evidence – Duty of Trial Court to Consider All Material Evidence
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
It cannot be over-emphasised that the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of the court of trial which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified in the witness box. See Akinloye and Another v. Eyiyola and others (1968) NMLR 92 at 95; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 at 320 etc. It is only where an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to evaluate evidence which has been given in a case, such as where the issue is essentially a matter of inference that can be drawn from proved facts, not resting on the credibility of witnesses as a result of their demeanour in the witness box or of the impression of them by the trial court that it must not hesitate to do so. See Okafor v. Idigo 111(1984) 6 C 1 at 36; The Registered Trustees of the Apostolic Faith Mission and Another v. James and Another (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.61) 556 at 567.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"It cannot be over-emphasised that the evaluation of evidence and the ascription of probative value to such evidence are the primary functions of the court of trial which saw, heard and assessed the witnesses as they testified in the witness box. See Akinloye and Another v. Eyiyola and others (1968) NMLR 92 at 95; Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) 5 SC 291 at 320 etc. It is only where an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial court to evaluate evidence which has been given in a case, such as where the issue is essentially a matter of inference that can be drawn from proved facts, not resting on the credibility of witnesses as a result of their demeanour in the witness box or of the impression of them by the trial court that it must not hesitate to do so. See Okafor v. Idigo 111(1984) 6 C 1 at 36; The Registered Trustees of the Apostolic Faith Mission and Another v. James and Another (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt.61) 556 at 567."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Trial courts primarily evaluate evidence and ascribe probative value based on seeing and hearing witnesses. Appellate courts defer unless the issue involves inferences from proved facts not dependent on credibility. Where the issue is inference from established facts, the appellate court is in as good a position. The principle respects the trial court’s advantage. The appellate court will not re-evaluate credibility-based findings. The exception applies to documentary evidence or undisputed facts. The appellate court may interfere if the trial court’s evaluation is perverse. The court must distinguish between credibility findings (deference) and inferences (re-evaluation). The principle ensures proper allocation of judicial functions. The appellate court must not hesitate to evaluate where the exception applies.
