PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Furthermore, for a delay in taking action, there must be knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of all the facts giving him a cause of action. See Mogaji v. Nuga (1960) 5 FSC 107, where it was held that laches is not delay alone; some other factors must exist such as knowledge.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Onu, JSC, in Kayode v. Odutola (2001) NLC-1451997(SC) at p. 10; Paras A–B.
"Furthermore, for a delay in taking action, there must be knowledge on the part of the plaintiff of all the facts giving him a cause of action. See Mogaji v. Nuga (1960) 5 FSC 107, where it was held that laches is not delay alone; some other factors must exist such as knowledge."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Delay alone does not constitute laches—the plaintiff must have knowledge of all facts giving rise to a cause of action. Time cannot run against a plaintiff who is unaware of the facts. Laches requires both delay and knowledge. The period of delay is measured from when the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known of the infringement of their rights. If the plaintiff lacked knowledge, delay is not unreasonable. The defence protects against prejudice from delay after knowledge, not before. The burden is on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff had the requisite knowledge during the delay period. Ignorance excuses delay.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE