PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

In an application for bail pending trial, there is good reason to believe or strongly suspect that the accused will jump bail thereby making himself unavailable to stand his trial and/or will interfere with witnesses thereby constituting an obstacle in the way of justice, the court will be acting within its undoubted discretion to refuse bail. It may be added that in such a situation, it will be desirable, as far as reasonably practicable, to accelerate the trial.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Uwaifo, JSC, in Bamaiyi v. State & Ors (2001) NLC-2922000(SC) at pp. 24–25; Paras D–A.
"In an application for bail pending trial, there is good reason to believe or strongly suspect that the accused will jump bail thereby making himself unavailable to stand his trial and/or will interfere with witnesses thereby constituting an obstacle in the way of justice, the court will be acting within its undoubted discretion to refuse bail. It may be added that in such a situation, it will be desirable, as far as reasonably practicable, to accelerate the trial."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Bail may be refused where there is good reason to believe the accused will jump bail or interfere with witnesses. The court has undoubted discretion to refuse bail in such circumstances. Witness interference includes intimidation, harassment, or influencing testimony—obstructing justice. The court balances the accused’s liberty against the integrity of the trial process. Where bail is refused on these grounds, the court should accelerate the trial as far as reasonably practicable. The principle protects the administration of justice from subversion. The prosecution must provide evidence supporting the risk of interference or absconding. Mere suspicion is insufficient; good reason or strong suspicion required.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE