LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE – Concurrent Findings – Interference by Supreme Court
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Where there are concurrent findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeal and there is sufficient evidence in support thereof, then unless those findings are found to be perverse or are not supported by evidence or were reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence or as a result of a wrong application of a principle of substantive law or of procedure, this court, even if disposed to come to a different conclusion upon the printed evidence cannot do so.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Abimbola v. Abatan (2001) NLC-2061994(SC) at p. 12; Paras B–D.
"Where there are concurrent findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeal and there is sufficient evidence in support thereof, then unless those findings are found to be perverse or are not supported by evidence or were reached as a result of a wrong approach to the evidence or as a result of a wrong application of a principle of substantive law or of procedure, this court, even if disposed to come to a different conclusion upon the printed evidence cannot do so."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
The Supreme Court will not interfere with concurrent findings supported by sufficient evidence unless they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or reached through a wrong approach to evidence or wrong application of law or procedure. Even if the Court would have reached a different conclusion, it cannot substitute its view. The appellant must demonstrate a fundamental error. Concurrent findings carry great weight because two courts independently reached the same conclusion. Interference is reserved for exceptional cases. The principle promotes finality and respects the fact-finding roles of lower courts. The appellant bears a heavy burden. Perversity means no reasonable tribunal could have so found.
