LEGAL PRINCIPLE: EVIDENCE LAW – Admission – Nature and Evidentiary Value
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
Admissions per se do not constitute conclusive evidence of the matter admitted; the court must consider the circumstances under which they were made and the weight to be attached to them.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Kalgo, JSC, in Narindex Trust Ltd. & Anor v. Nigerian Inter-Continental Merchant Bank Ltd. (2001) NLC-1591997(SC) at pp. 8–9; Paras E–A.
"Section 19 of the Evidence Act defines 'admission' as 'a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any of the person, and in circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.' But such admission must be clear and unequivocal and not based on misapprehension as in this case... and although by the provisions of S. 75 of the said Act what is admitted needs no proof..., the proviso to that section gives the trial Court the discretion in relevant cases to require the fact admitted to be proved. Since in law, admissions per se do not constitute conclusive evidence of the matter admitted, the court in considering the worth of such admissions must take into account the circumstances under which they are made and the weight to be attached thereto."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Admissions are not conclusive evidence of the admitted fact. The court must consider the circumstances of the admission—whether it was clear, unequivocal, and free from misapprehension. Under Section 75 of the Evidence Act, admitted facts need no proof, but the proviso gives the court discretion to require proof. The weight to be attached to an admission depends on credibility. Admissions made under mistake, duress, or misapprehension may be disregarded. The principle prevents mechanical acceptance of admissions without scrutiny. The court evaluates admissions like any other evidence. Admissions are strong evidence but not irrebuttable. The party making the admission may explain or contradict it.