LEGAL PRINCIPLE: LAND LAW — Proof of Title — Traditional History — Duty to Resolve Conflicting Traditional Histories
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
A trial judge has a duty to resolve conflicting traditional histories, but failure to do so is not fatal where the plaintiff succeeds on another method of proving title, such as acts of ownership.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Ogundare, JSC, in Irolo & Ors v. Uka & Anor (2002) NLC-1301998(SC) at p. 33; Paras B–C.
"To the extent that he was wrong in abdicating his responsibility to resolve the issue of the conflicting traditional history placed before him, I agree with their Lordships of the Court below. To say however, that this lapse was fatal to the judgment of the trial court, I must, with due deference to their Lordships, differ. On the principles of law enunciated in such cases as Idundun v. Okumagba (supra); Piaro v. Tenadi (supra); Balogun v. Akanji (supra); Onwugbufor v. Okoye (supra); and Akpan v. Otong (supra), it is enough that a plaintiff pleads and succeeds on one of the five methods of proving title, even where he pleads more than one method."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
While a trial judge should resolve conflicting traditional histories, failure to do so is not automatically fatal. If the plaintiff succeeds on another method of proving title (e.g., acts of ownership), the judgment may stand. The principle applies the rule that proof of one method suffices. The court will not reverse a judgment for failure to resolve traditional history if other grounds support the decision. The appellant must show that the failure caused a miscarriage of justice. The rule promotes judicial efficiency. The trial judge’s error is not fatal if the outcome would be the same. The principle balances procedural correctness with substantial justice.