LEGAL PRINCIPLE: CRIMINAL LAW — Arson — Interpretation of Arson Offence Provisions — Dwelling House Not Restricted to Public Dwelling House Under Section 3(4)(a) of Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No. 20 of 1984 as Amended by Decree No. 22 of 1986
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The language of section 3(4)(a) of Decree No. 20 of 1984 as amended is plain and unambiguous; "dwelling house" is not restricted to "public" dwelling house, and it is doubtful if that adjective can be applied to dwelling house.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Ogwuegbu, JSC, in Onyeanusi v. Miscellaneous Offences Tribunal (2002) NLC-491996(SC) at p. 11; Paras A–C.
"The language of section 3(4)(a) is plain, precise and unambiguous and it is unnecessary for me to examine the intention of the decree as canvassed by the learned appellant's counsel. The plain and natural meaning of the words used should be expounded. 'Dwelling house' in the context of section 3(4)(a) of Decree No. 20 of 1984 as amended is not restricted to 'public' dwelling house and it is doubtful if that adjective can be applied to dwelling house."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
The statutory provision must be given its plain and natural meaning. “Dwelling house” includes both public and private residences. The adjective “public” does not modify “dwelling house” in the provision. The court will not restrict the meaning where the language is clear. The principle applies the literal rule of interpretation. The mischief rule may be used to confirm the meaning. The tribunal had jurisdiction to try arson of any dwelling house. The appellant’s argument that only public buildings are covered was rejected. The rule ensures that the statute is applied as written. The court will not read words into a clear provision. The principle promotes certainty in criminal law.