PRINCIPLE STATEMENT

Recognition evidence from a witness who knew the accused before the incident is stronger than identification of a stranger; the witness's prior knowledge adds weight to the identification.

RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)

Per Katsina-Alu, JSC, in Akpan v. State (2002) NLC-2092000(SC) at pp. 9–10; Paras E–C.
"The eye witness evidence of P.W. 3 Friday Ben clearly fixed the appellant at the scene of crime. Although P.W. 2, P.W.3 and P.W. 4 saw the deceased's assailants, only P.W. 3 had known them before that fateful morning. He said he recognized them. It was in broad daylight. In his evidence at the trial he stressed the fact that he knew the accused persons (including the appellant) before the day of the incident. That they sold and bought in the same market. P.W. 3 also disclosed that he gave their names to the police soon after the incident in his statement to the police."
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EXPLANATION / SCOPE

Recognition evidence is generally more reliable than identification of a stranger. The witness’s prior acquaintance with the accused reduces the risk of mistake. The court must still exercise caution. The witness should provide details of prior acquaintance. The principle applies to both day and night identifications. The witness’s prompt disclosure of names to the police strengthens the evidence. The trial court may rely on recognition evidence without corroboration if satisfied. The rule is based on the Turnbull guidelines. The court must still examine the circumstances of the recognition. The appellant may challenge the recognition.

CASES APPLYING THIS PRINCIPLE