LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE — Discretion of Trial Judge — Exercise to Facilitate Hearing — Appellate Interference
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
A Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of a trial Judge, especially when exercised to facilitate the hearing of an action pending before him.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Ejiwunmi, JSC, in Jonason Triangles Ltd. v. Charles Moh & Partners Ltd. (2002) NLC-1561999(SC) at p. 11; Paras B–D.
"It is part of the duty of a Judge to see that everything is done to facilitate the hearing of an action pending before him. In so doing, he has to exercise his discretionary power, which undoubtedly belongs to the trial Judge. The exercise of this discretionary power to facilitate the hearing of the action pending before him may however be challenged on appeal. But it is settled principle that a Court of Appeal ought to be very slow indeed to interfere with the discretion of a trial Judge."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Trial judges have discretion to facilitate hearing. Appellate courts are slow to interfere with that discretion. Interference requires that the discretion was exercised on wrong principles or arbitrarily. The principle respects the trial judge’s position. The appellate court will not substitute its own discretion. The rule applies to case management decisions, adjournments, and procedural orders. The appellant must show that the trial judge acted unreasonably. The burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error. The principle promotes judicial efficiency and respect for trial courts. The appellate court will not interfere lightly.