CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
The appellants were the claimants in Suit No. ID/1606/2007 before the High Court of Lagos State, holden at Ikeja, where they claimed damages for libel, breach of contract, and sought an injunction against the respondent, First Bank of Nigeria Plc. The 1st appellant, acting in person, wrote a letter to the Chief Judge of Lagos State on 19 October 2011, alleging loss of confidence in the trial judge and requesting that the case be transferred to another court. After an administrative inquiry, the Chief Judge refused the request on 7 March 2012, finding the petition lacked merit.
The appellants appealed the Chief Judge’s administrative decision to the Court of Appeal (Appeal No. CA/L/457/2012). On 2 December 2014, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the decision of the Chief Judge was administrative and not appealable. The appellants thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination
From the 1st appellant’s brief of arguments:
- Whether the rules of court allow the court below to resolve the conflict between fundamental rights, fundamental objective and directive principle of state policy in favour of the latter.
- Whether it is proper for the Court of Appeal to speculate on an issue which was not part of the grounds of appeal and was also not an issue for determination before the court.
- Whether the Supreme Court can depart from the rules of Order 11 procedure precedent in the circumstance of this appeal and deem the appellants’ appeal as being properly argued on the appellants’ brief of argument alone.
From the 2nd and 3rd appellants’ brief of arguments:
- Whether an admission made on a pleading requires further proof or if the party making the admission is estopped from denying the facts.
- Whether the courts have the competence to allow the respondent to re-litigate issues already resolved in the trial court.
- Whether the Supreme Court is competent to resolve the damages claim for libel against the respondent based solely on the briefs and records of appeal.
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the respondent’s preliminary objection, dismissed the appeal as incompetent and an abuse of court process, and awarded costs of N2,000,000.00 against the 1st appellant and a separate N2,000,000.00 against the 2nd and 3rd appellants, with the latter sum to be paid personally by their counsel, Abang Odok Ogar, Esq.
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
Obiter Dicta
“The Supreme Court, by virtue of its being the apex court and in exercise of the general powers conferred upon it by the constitution, the Supreme Court Act and the Rules, has a duty to arrest an unnecessary drift by any person pursuing a litigation before any court or courts against which a complaint has been brought to the apex court… The constitution can never be seen to be protecting the use of judicial process to undermine respect for law and order and the integrity of the courts. Any action or course of conduct that is seen designed to introduce anarchy into the judicial system must be dealt with appropriately.”
Per Adumein, JSC, in Tijjani & Ors v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2026) NLC-62015(SC) at pp. 18–19; Paras E–B.
Orders of Court
- The respondent’s preliminary objection is upheld.
- This appeal is dismissed as incompetent and an abuse of court process.
- Costs of N2,000,000.00 (two million naira only) are awarded against the 1st appellant and in favour of the respondent.
- Costs of N2,000,000.00 (two million naira only) are awarded in favour of the respondent and against the 2nd and 3rd appellants, to be paid personally by their counsel, Abang Odok Ogar, Esq.
- No further appeal or process prepared and signed by the 1st appellant shall be accepted and filed in the Registry of the Supreme Court for hearing.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
A.K. Tijjani (the 1st appellant appears in person); Anthony Ndunusa, Esq. (with Sarah Brendan Omini, Esq. and Tomiwa Ola Ogundele, Esq.) for the 2nd and 3rd appellants
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
Ibrahim A. Baba, Esq. (with Bala Nomau, Esq.) for the respondent
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
— (DELIVERED BY JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC))
The appellants were the claimants in Suit No: ID/1606/2007 instituted in the High Court of Lagos State,
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holden at Ikeja. The respondent was the defendant therein. In paragraph 16 of the appellants’ amended statement of claim, they claimed as follows:
“WHEREUPON the claimants claim against the Defendant.
- N5,000,000,000 (Five Billion Naira) as damages for libel committed(sic) against the Claimants by the Defendants for giving inaccurate and false reference about the Claimants’ financial standing to Unity Bank PLC.
- An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant by itself, its servants or otherwise from further publishing inaccurate and false reference about the Claimants to Unity Bank PLC or other companies or persons.
- N100,000,000 (One Hundred Million Naira) as damages(sic) breach of contract for giving(sic) reference to Unity Bank PLC without the consent of the Claimants.”
The appellants’ claim was contested by the respondent, which filed a statement of defence that was later amended. After some interlocutory decisions, including rulings on sundry applications in the matter, by the trial court – per Hon. Justice
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- O. Idowu, the 1st appellant – Alhaji Abdul-Rauf Tijjani – wrote a letter on the 19th day of October, 2011 to the Honourable Chief Judge of Lagos State stating that he “has lost confidence in his lordship based on the following obvious facts”, which he set out in the letter. He requested that the case be transferred “from that court to another court but not F. O. Atilade J.’s court”. After an administrative inquiry, through Mrs. A. Ipaye-Nwachukwu (Deputy Chief Registrar (Legal) of the High Court of Lagos State, the Honourable Chief Judge by a letter dated the 7th day of March, 2012 informed the 1st appellant, inter alia, that:
“Having read through the petition, the proceedings and the reaction of counsel on the other side, it is found that your petition lacks merit. Your request for transfer is accordingly refused.”
The appellants were not satisfied with the administrative decision of the Chief Judge of Lagos State and they filed an appeal in the Court of Appeal, holden at Lagos, on the 12th day of March, 2012. That appeal, identified as Appeal No:
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CA/L/457/2012, was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the 2nd day of December, 2014. This appeal is against that decision.
The 1st appellant filed his brief of arguments on 30/01/2015 in which he isolated for determination three issues as follows:
“1. WHETHER THE RULES OF COURT ALLOW THE COURT BELOW TO RESOLVED(sic) THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE AND DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF STATE POLICY IN FAVOUR OF LATTER?
- WHETHER IT IS PROPER FOR THE COURT OF APPEAL TO SPECULATE ON AN ISSUE WHICH WAS NOT PART OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND WAS ALSO NOT AND(sic) ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION BEFORE THE COURT?
- WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT CAN DEPART FROM THE RULES OF ORDER 11 PROCEDURE PRECEDENT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THIS APPEAL AND DEEMED(sic) THE APPELLANTS’ APPEAL AS BEEN PROPERLY ARGUED ON THE APPELLANTS’ BRIEF OF ARGUMENT ALONE ON THE 23rd OCTOBER, 2014 AND GIVE FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE MERIT OF THEIR CASE FROM THE RECORDS AND THEIR ARGUMENT AS EQUITY OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DONE ON THE 2ND DECEMBER, 2014 NOW DONE IN THE INSTANT APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT?”
On behalf of the 2nd and 3rd appellants a separate brief was filed on 13/11/2024 by Abang Odok Ogar, Esq. In the said brief, learned counsel formulated the following three issues for determination:
“1. Whether an admission made on a pleading requires further proof or if the party making the admission is estopped from denying the facts.
*2. Whether the courts have the competence to allow the Respondent to re-litigate issues already resolved in the trial court, specifically those that were dismissed through a motion in limine.*
- Whether the Supreme Court is competent to resolve the damages claim for libel against the Respondent based solely on the briefs and records of appeal.”
The respondent’s brief was settled by Ibrahim A. Buba, Esq; learned counsel who raised and argued a preliminary objection therein. The learned counsel urged the court to
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dismiss this appeal for being incompetent on the following grounds:
“1. The notice of appeal has no competent grounds upon which the Appellants initiates(sic) this appeal.
- The issues for determination are incompetent thereby making the entire brief of argument incompetent and thus the appeal ought to be struck out.
- That Appellants did not comply with Order 8 Rules 2, 3, and 4 of the Rules of this court when couching their notice and grounds of appeal.
- That the ground of appeal(sic) vague and contains legal arguments.
- That the Appellants proliferated issues for determination.”
Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant’s grounds of appeal did not comply with the provisions of Order 8 rules 2, 3 and 4 of the Rules of this court. Relying on several cases, learned counsel submitted that the grounds of appeal are not only vague, verbose and imprecise, they also contain legal arguments.
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In urging the court to uphold the respondent’s objection, learned counsel contended, inter alia, that:
“Coming to the next issue for determination ….
….there is proliferation of issues in the appellants’ brief of arguments as the appellants raised 4 issues out of two grounds of appeal…”
The appellants did not file any reply brief in response to the respondent’s preliminary objection. The law is settled that “the function of a reply brief is to refute … new arguments in the respondent’s brief, that is, a reply brief is, usually, filed in response to new issues raised in the respondent’s brief” – per Nweze, JSC in Onuwa Kalu v. State (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1586) 522 at 550. See also Ibrahim Sakati v. Jabule Bako & Anor. (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 531. Therefore, the failure by the appellants to file any reply brief, in response to the respondent’s preliminary objection, implies that they have not refuted the arguments of the respondent on its objection. See the case of Prince Kilani Adekeye & 2 Ors. v. Prince Summonu Adesina & Ors. (2010) 12 SCM 1 at 13, per Onnoghen, JSC; the court held thus:
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*”It is instructive to note that learned counsel for the 7th appellant refused and/or neglected to file a reply brief to the brief of the 1st and 2nd respondents which would have made it possible for him to confront the issues/points canvassed in the preliminary objection, neither did he make any oral presentation on the matter at the hearing of the appeal. I hold the considered view that the failure or neglect of the 7th appellant to file a reply brief or make oral presentation in response to the points/canvassed in the Objection means that the 7th appellant concedes the points so canvassed because he has no answer to them.”*
On the need for scope of and whether or not a reply brief is necessary in every appeal, this court elaborated in the case of The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors. v. Chief Isaac Osaro Agbara & 9 Ors. (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1496) 353 at 379 – 380, per Ibrahim Tanko Muhammad, JSC (later CJN) as follows:
“Suffice it to say however, that it is the general practice since the introduction of brief writing that there may be need for an appellant to file a reply brief when an issue of law or argument is raised in the respondent’s brief not necessarily
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*being a mere repetition of what the appellant’s brief contained. In other words, where a respondent’s brief raises issues on points of law not covered in the appellant’s brief, an appellant should file a reply to deal with such new points/matters. See: Nwali v. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 182) 663 at p. 671. Filing of a reply brief even by the appellant, where desirable, should not be used to either extend the scope of the arguments in the appellant’s brief or to raise issues that did not arise as new issues or matters in the respondent’s brief. It is to be noted generally, that although filing of a reply brief is not mandatory as held in Popoola v. Adeyemo (1992) 9 SCNJ 79 at p. 108, (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 257) 1, appellant’s failure to reply to an issue or point of law raised in the respondent’s brief and where he merely relies on or adopts his brief at the hearing of the appeal without an oral reply that may amount to a concession of the issue or point of law raised. See: Okonji v. Njokanma (1992) 12 SCNJ 259 at 277, (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 202) 131.”*
The appellants’ notice of appeal was filed on the 12th day of December, 2014 and it contains two grounds which are hereunder fully reproduced:
GROUNDS OF APPEAL
*1. The Learned Coram of Court Below Holden in Lagos are Justices and not Judges as in the case of High Court of Federal and the State therefore, have to adhere strictly to Constitutionality and Constitutional duty to arrest any conduct or course of conduct that is seem designed deliberately to introduce anarchy in to judicial system of the Nation and dealt with appropriately. And for the Learned Coram: Bage, Tijjani & Oseji JJCA to Suo-moto raised a question of law in answering the Appellants’ issue one raised for determination at page 22 of the instant judgment in this appeal and for ease of reference, the said question is herein state verbatim inter alia as follows;*
“The question then is, can an appeal lie from the administrative act of the Chief Judge who in the exercise of his discretion refused the Appellants request through a letter, to transfer a matter from one court to another?” This with all due respect, is a question raised by the Coram to deploy a doctrine of technicality to fly the justice in the instance judgment on one wing in favour of the Respondent that did not filed any written argument to contradict nor controvert the legal position of the Appellants therefore, rendered the judgment
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delivered against the Appellants by the Court below null and void that is bound to be set aside.
PARTICULARS
a.) The Appellants issue one raised for determination is; “whether the Appellants Constitutionally have Right to seek redress in the Court of Appeal on the reason stated in ground one and two before un-repairable damages could be done to the Justice of their case?”
The grounds 1 & 2 of the appeal are pined on opened bias displayed by the dual of Chief Judge, the Respondent’ counsel and the trial Judge with the influence of power of financial ascendancy of the Respondent over the Appellants that is so fundamental in the administrative of justice that on no account should it be gloss over.
*In Falodun v. Ogunse (2009) LPLEP – 3735 (CA) what “allegation of bias” in a proceeding entails.*
*”…the Supreme Court has described allegation of bias as “a very serious thing because it is capable of affecting or destroying the confidence enjoyed by the judiciary, Arcon Fasasi (No 4) (1987) 3 NWLR (pt 59) 42; Bakare v Apena (1986) 4 NWLR (pt 33) 1, 21; Edun v Odan Community (1980) 8 – 11 SC 103. Thus, to save the judiciary from public odium and contempt,*
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*Judges of whatever description must not, in the conduct of proceedings before them, be seen either by words or actions to scandalize the public by displaying partiality in favour of one of the parties against the others, Deduwa and Ors v. Okorodudu and Ors (1976) 10 NSCC 329. Afro-Continental v. Coop Association (2003)17 WRN 109. Such is the consequence of the breach of this constitutional safeguard that if an appellate court makes a finding that there was a breach of fair hearing by a trial court, such a finding renders the whole trial a nullity.”*
- The Administrative act of the Chief Judge is within the purview of adjectival law or procedural law that is not justiciable. The Appellants’ Rights that seek protection at the Court below fell under Section 46(1), S. 36(1), S. 34 & S.35 of extant 1999 Constitution of Federation of Nigeria.
“In FRN v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR Pt. 842 Pg. 113 the Supreme Court held that an error committed in a judicial capacity could not be protected as it was not subject to time limit…. The Supreme Court upheld the nature of Fundamental Human rights under the Constitution and the need for the courts to protect them from abuse…. This is a case in which it was an unconstitutional deprivation of the rights of the individual by an act of the judiciary and the executive. The judiciary cannot escape where in its official
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certain things are done to compromise the rights of individuals.
*IN MISS YETUNDE ZAINAB TOLANI V. KWARA STATE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS CITATION: (2009) LPELR-8375(CA) AT RATIO DECIDEDI ‘5’ ON whether the fundamental rights of a Nigerian can be subsumed in favour of other law which is contrary to the Constitution? and the Appellant Court held that;*
“Consequently, the courts guard these fundamental human rights very jealously. Therefore law or Act that is perpetrated against the provisions of the fundamental rights of any individual which is against the spirit of the constitution would not be allowed to stand. The spirit of the constitution must stand firm at all times and to ensure that the human rights of the individual should on no account be subsumed or swept under the carpet in favour of other laws no matter how well pivoted that law may be.” See NASIRU BELLO & ORS VS A. G. OYO STATE (1986) 5 NWLR (PT. 45) 828.
*IN FAYOSE V. THE STATE (2010) LPELR – 4842 (CA) where the Appellate Court held on the Statutory duty of Court that;*
“What the court is enjoined by the provisions of section 36 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is to create a conducive atmosphere for the parties to exercise their right of
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*fair hearing. See Bill Construction Co. Ltd., v. Imani & sons Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (pt. 1013) 11 @ 4; Ajaokuta Steel Co. v. O.O. Biosah & Co. Ltd., (1997) 11 NWLR (pt. 527) 145 @ 158; Kaduna Textile Ltd., v. Umar (1994)00 1 NWLR (pt.319) 143 @ 159.” Per Aji, J.C.A. (Pp. 28-29, Paras F-A)*
2 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – LITIGATION:
What is litigation?
“Litigation is a straight forward legal matter of adjudication which does not or better still, should not admit of pretence or tricks. Litigation is not a game of vain rhetoric or insincere polemics but on reciprocal sincerity of the parties by placing their cards openly before the court for adjudication and final decision….
The principles of equity and justice will not allow any party to play prank in litigation in court. In other words, litigation is not a game of cleverness, smartness or tricks. It is not a hide and seeks game. Neither is it a game of chess where one of the parties attempts to trap the opponent’s king to obtain a victory.
On the contrary, litigation has an inbuilt dispute setting mechanism where the parties come out in the open to make their cases frankly and not cunningly or craftily. See Chief of Air Staff v. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR
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*(pt. 922) 496; Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt.1025) 423; Chedi v. A.G. Federation (2008) 1 NWLR (pt.1067) 166.” per Aji, J.C.A. (P. 26, Paras. A-E)*
*From the contents of the correspondences between the Appellants, Chief Judge of Lagos State and Respondent’s counsel that were reproduced from pages 4 – 16 of the Judgment and the totalities of the legal positions articulated in the above cited decided Authorities it therefore become an established evidence that the so called administrative decision of the Chief Judge of Lagos State and the judgment of the Court below were indeed based on biasness against the 1st Appellant who is not a legal practitioner that is conducting the Appellants’ appeal in person and the Appellate Court’s neglect and refusal to resolved the 1st fundamental constitutional issue contained in Appellants issue one for determination that asked “whether the administrative decision of the Chief Judge of Lagos State can be allowed to wept under the carpet and subsumed the fundamental Rights of the Appellants? This is a clear breach of fair hearing therefore, the judgment of the court below is indeed perverse and it is trite that it cannot stand on these fundamental errors thus, stand to be set aside.*
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*2. The learned Court below at pages 24 – 25 of the judgment appeal against erred in law when it relied on the Appellate Court decisions in the following cases to dismissed the Appellants’ appeal;*
a.) ALIYU V. IBRAHIM (1992) 7NQLR Pt. 253 at 361
*b.) ALHAHI TIJJANI V. FIRST BANK IN CA/L/39/12 where the dictum of IYIZOBA JCA was adopted to dismissed the Appellants’ appeal by the Court below. The said dictum is herein under states inter alia as follows;*
“Following the reasoning in this case, I am of the view that the decision of the Learned Chief Judge of Lagos State in response to the application made by the Appellants herein to have their matter consolidated was an administrative decision and is therefore not appealable.”
The two decided authorities are not applicable to the determination of the issue of fundamental Rights of the Appellants as contained in issue one for determination but a judicial noticeable evidence that need no further proof that the instant judgment and five other judgments delivered against the Appellants as in favour of the Respondent in six consolidated appeals filed by the Appellants against the same Respondent mainly to recovering monies fraudulently removed from the Appellants’ current accounts that stood as at 28th May,
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*2014 at total Sum of N5,021,188,958.91 (One Billion, twenty Million, one hundred and eighty eight thousand Naira Ninety one kobo) and damages for series of breach of contract in Banker/Customers Relationship with the Appellants were deliberately based on fraud and discrimination against the 1st Appellant that is acting in Pro se in prosecuting their appeal against the Respondent.*
PARTICULARS
*A. The judgment of this Hon. Court of Appeal dated 19th April, 2013 Coram: SAULAWA, IKYEGH AND PEMU JJCA in respect of 1st appeal No. CA/L/39/12 gave these specific Consequential Orders as follows;*
*1. That the entire proceedings of the lower court in suit No ID/730/2003, inclusive of the pre-trial conferences are hereby set aside.*
- That the ruling of the court below delivered on October 18, 2011 is hereby set aside.
*3. That the suit No. ID/730/2003 is hereby remitted to the lower court for reassignment by the chief Jude to another Judge for trial deno vo. (at pp. 1 of the Records)*
*B. The Appellants/Claimants Appeal No.2 CA/L/39/13 was as a result of the chief Judge of Lagos State disobedience to the valid order of Hon. Court of Appeal*
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Lagos Division that compelled his lordship to reassign the case back to another Judge in Lagos State for trial deno vo And upon been served with the Chief Judge of Lagos State Hon. Justice Ayo Philips’ letter dated 1st July, 2013 where she Order the Parties to go back to the Court of F.O. Atilade J. to conclude the case in flagrant disobedience to the valid Order of Appellate Court in Lagos and breach of Constitutional Law under S. 287 of extant 1999 Constitution of Federation of Nigeria.
*C. The same Court below Holden in Lagos delivered it judgment on Wednesday, the 28th May, 2014 in respect of the above mentioned appeal No.2 by the Coram: IKYEGH, IYIZOBA & OSEJI JJCA on fraudulent incompetent preliminary objection filed by the Respondent to struck out the Appellants’ appeal thereby denied them hearing on the substantive appeal in gross violation of their Fundamental Rights and that the Appellants being dissatisfied with the judgment appeal to the Supreme Court vide Appeal No.SC 523/2014.*
- The Coram: IKYEGH, IYIZOBA & OSEJI JJCA delivered their judgment on Wednesday, the 28th May, 2014 struck out the Appellants’ Appeal in preference to illegality of contempt of their valid order by the Chief
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Judge of Lagos State. FORM 48 AND 49 have been served on the two Chief Judge of Lagos State.
- The Coram: ANYANWU, IKYEGH & IYIZOBA JJCA delivered the Rulings in respect of the applications filed by the Appellants to set aside the four judgment delivered on fraud dated 28th May, 2014 by the Coram: IKYEGH, IYIZOBA & OSEJI JJCA against the Appellants on the 17th Oct. 014.
- The Coram: BAGI, TIJJANI & OSEJI JJCA, delivered on Tuesday, the 2nd day of Dec, 2014 the judgment the Appellants are appealing against in the instant notice of appeal.
- SUMMARY/ANALYSIS OF LIKELIHOOD OF THE CORAMS OF BEEN BIASED.
- IKYEGH JCA was involved in the judgment dated 19th April, 013 that the Chief Judge of Lagos State flout it order contained therein.
- IKYEGH JCA was also involved in the judgment dated 28th May, 2014 where his Lordship failed to protect the valid order of the Appellate Court and the law.
- IKYEGH JCA was also involved in the Ruling delivered on the 17th Oct. 014 that refused to set aside the judgment delivered on error and fraud.
- OSEJI JCA that delivered the leading judgment that is the subject of the instant appeal had the privilege at
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three occasions to know as Justice of the Court of Appeal that administrative decision of the Chief Judge of Lagos State that flouted the valid order of the Appellate Court cannot be protected and thus, appealable.
*”Judicial bias is an opinion or feeling in favour of one side in dispute or argument resulting in the likelihood that the court so influenced, will be unable to hold the scale of justice evenly. It is the instinct which causes the mind to incline towards a particular object or cause. When a court appears to give more favour or consideration to one of the parties to a case before it, either in utterances, attention or actions which is open and capable of preventing the cause of justice, covertly or overtly, then judicial bias may be said to exist. See Kenon v. Tekam (2001) 14 NWLR (732) 12; Elike v. Nwankwoala (1984) 12 SC. 301; Womiloju v. Anibire (2010) 10 NWLR (1203) 545, 571; Bamboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (622) 290 at 355.” per GARBA, J.C.A (Pp. 45-46) paras. D-A)*
*DINGYADI Vs. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 18 NWLR (pt.1224) 154 SC at (pp. 72 – 74, paras. D – F where he held on; Duty of the Supreme Court as the apex court to arrest an unnecessary drift by any person pursuing a litigation before any court or courts against which a complaint has been brought to the apex court that;*
“The Supreme Court, by virtue of its being the apex court and in exercise of the general powers conferred upon it by the
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constitution, the Supreme Court Act and the Rules, has a duty to arrest an unnecessary drift by any person pursuing a litigation before any court or courts against which a complaint has been brought to the apex court…. The constitution can never be seen to be protecting the use of judicial process to undermine respect for law and order and the integrity of the courts. Any action or course of conduct that is seen designed to introduce anarchy into the judicial system must be dealt with appropriately…. In my view this court will be remiss in its duties if it does not bring it home to parties that while all sorts of unethical behavior may be regarded as cleverness in the market place, such is not permissible in the legal system of our country.”
IN ADAMU V. A.G BORNU STATE (1996) 8NWLR pt. 465 at 203 where the Apex Court held that; “that where a local Authority as in that case, in the implementation of the fundamental objective and directive principles of state policy adopted a system which infringes on the Citizen’s fundamental right of freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination on ground of religion, that breach of the Citizen’s fundamental right is justiciable.”
The Rules of this court, applicable to this appeal, are the Supreme Court Rules, 1985 (as amended). Order 8 rule 2(1) to 2 (4) of the said Rules provided as follows:
“2. (1) All appeals shall be by way of rehearing and shall be brought by notice (hereinafter called
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‘the notice of appeal’) to be filed in the Registry of the court below which shall set forth the grounds appeal, state whether the whole or part only of the decision of the court below is complained of (in the latter case specifying such part) and state also the exact nature of the relief sought and the names and addresses of all parties directly affected by the appeal, and shall be accompanied by a sufficient number of copies for service on all such parties. It shall also have endorsed on it an address for service.
(2) If the grounds of appeal allege misdirection or error in law the particulars and the nature of the misdirection or error shall be clearly stated.
(3) The notice of appeal shall set forth concisely and under distinct heads the ground upon which the appellant intends to rely at the hearing of the appeal without any argument or narrative and shall be numbered consecutively.
(4) No ground which is vague or general in terms which disclose no reasonable ground of appeal shall be permitted, save the general ground that the judgment is against the weight of evidence, and any ground of appeal or any part thereof which is not permitted under this rule may be struck out by the Court of its own motion or on application by the respondent.”
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By the above rules of this court, the grounds of appeal must be numbered, concise and without arguments or narratives. The grounds of appeal must also not be vague or general in terms, except the omnibus ground which alleges or claims that “the judgment is against the weight of evidence”.
In this case, the two grounds of appeal are numbered. However, they are obviously rambling, verbose, argumentative and contain wordy narratives.
On the features of a competent ground of appeal, this Court, in the case of Set Success Enterprises and Company Limited v. Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council & Anor. (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1825) 251 at 280 – 281, per Mary Ukaego Peter-Odili, JSC; held as follows:
“It is to be noted that grounds of appeal as a strict rule must not be verbose, argumentative and vague, as these features rob it of its substance. To achieve its object, it must be concise, straight to the point. It must convey a message. Where this is not the case, it is tantamount to a pipe without a sound, a distinct sound the error contained in the said judgment prolix, argumentative and vague. Such grounds are not
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permitted under the rules of this court. That is why this court wont say that drafting of grounds of appeal require special expertise because the consequence of non-compliance is that the grounds of appeal may be struck out thereby making the issues formulated thereon incompetent. The rationale of this rule of court has been adequately explained in a long line of judicial authorities.
*In Aigbobahi v. Aifuwa (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 270 per Mohammed, JSC at page 314 paras. G-H said thus:*
“The whole purpose of a ground of appeal is to appraise or put the other side on notice of the nature of complaint being raised therein, and the overriding consideration is whether the ground, is clearly stated vague.”
*See also Anie v. Ugagbe (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 425 at 432, as follows:-*
“A ground of appeal must be so succinctly couched and specifically described that the other side will know the exact complaint against the judgment. It should also avoid repetition, narration or arguments.
The whole purpose of grounds of appeal is to give notice to the side as to what case he is going to meet
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on appeal. There should be no ambiguities or roundabout arguments in a ground of appeal.”
See also Aderonmu Investment v. Olowu (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 652) 253 SC; National Investment & Properties Co. Ltd. v. Thompson Organisation (1969) 6 NSCC 161 at 164.”
The law is settled that “an appellate court lacks jurisdiction, in the sense of competence, to entertain an appeal which is not fought on valid grounds of appeal” – per Okay Achike, JSC; in the case of Calabar East Co-operative v. Etim Emmanuel Ikot (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) 225 at 247 and Aigbekan Osas v. Mrs. Faith Tuedor-Matthews (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1956) 509 at 534. Therefore, the court can even suo motu raise the issue of incompetence of an appeal, where no objection has been raised. See Alhaji Kabiru Abubakar v. John Joseph (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 307 and Set Success Enterprises and Company Limited v. Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council & Anor (supra) at 288 – 289.
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The grounds of appeal, in the appellants’ notice of appeal, are grossly incompetent and constitute a clear mockery of the process of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. This Court is not meant for filing gravely incompetent processes, such as the appellants’ purported notice of appeal, which contains no comprehensible or understandable ground of appeal. I do not think that even a reasonable village customary court would sit to entertain gibberish, illogical, nonsensical or unintelligible complaints or grievances as those contained in the appellants’ notice of appeal.
Another devastating aspect of this appeal is that a learned counsel filed a brief on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd appellants, who did not file any separate notice of appeal from that signed and filed by the 1st appellant for and on behalf of all the three appellants. The learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd appellants distilled three issues for determination, without linking any of them to a ground of appeal. Is it not an elementary or a settled principle of law that an issue for determination, in any brief of arguments, must arise from the grounds of appeal?
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In our jurisprudence, any issue formulated from an incompetent ground or grounds of appeal will be struck out. See Uzor Idika & Ors. v. Ndukwe ‘Erisi & Ors. (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 78) 563 and Management Enterprises Ltd. v. ABC Merchant (Nig.) Ltd. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 249. It is also settled that “Two issues cannot be raised from one (a) ground of appeal, as a ground of appeal is supposed to encompass a single complaint” – per Christopher Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC; in the case of Lasisi Ogbe v. Sule Asade (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 106 at 123-124.
The law is clear that an issue not covered by a ground of appeal is incompetent. See Rear Admiral Francis Echie Agbiti v. The Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1236) 175; Dr. Roy Pedro Ugo v. Augustina Chinyelu Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218 and Mr. Patrick Okechukwu Ubabuike v. Guaranty Trust Bank PLC (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 427 at 459 to 461, per Garba, JSC.
Finally, an issue for determination must arise from and relate to a ground or grounds of appeal. See Attorney-General,
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Bendel State & 2 Ors. v. P.L. A. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646; State v. Dr. Olu Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33 and David Amadi v. Attorney-General of Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt.1575) 92 at 108, per Eko, JSC.
The need for persons skilled in the practice, procedure and jurisprudence, in the administration of justice, was emphasized by Brougham, LC; in the case of Greenough v. Gaskell (1833), 1 Myl. & K. 98, as follows:
“The interests of justice cannot be upholden, the administration of justice cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practices of the Court, and in those matters affecting the rights and obligations which form the subject of all proceedings”.
In this case the 1st appellant is not a legal practitioner but, from the processes and information in the record of appeal – which he personally compiled and transmitted to this court – he has been filing and prosecuting all manner of incongruous, senseless and unreasonable cases, causes, matters, motions and appeals in our courts of law – the High Courts, the Court of
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Appeal and the Supreme Court. The record of this appeal shows clearly that he has the tendency of acting or playing as an overlord over our courts, judiciary workers, judges, heads of courts and justices. Why should an individual arrogate to himself the power or right to file processes, in court, without due compliance with laid down rules for filing such legal processes?
The learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd appellants is a legal practitioner who, by his brief of arguments in this appeal, seems to have aided and abetted the 1st appellant in his disregard for due process of law. I must remind the learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd appellants of the case of Chief Ambrose Owuru & Anor. v. President Mohammed Buhari & 3 Ors. (Appeal No. SC/CV/667/2023) whereby this Court ruled, on the 16th day of December, 2024, inter alia, that:
*”We agree with learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent and the learned SAN for the 4th Respondent that this application filed on the 26/2/2024 is incompetent and same is hereby dismissed. I also agree with the senior counsel that no further process if any be filed by the*
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Appellant shall be accepted for hearing by the court. The processes filed by Chief Owuru are frivolous, vexatious and unbecoming of a counsel with the years of his experience as he stated. This is an abuse of Court process. The counsel shall and ought to be penalized because of his conduct before us.”
Just as in the case of Chief Ambrose Owuru & Anor. v. President Mohammadu Buhari & 3 Ors. (supra), it is hereby ordered that no further appeal or process prepared and signed by the 1st appellant shall be accepted and filed in the Registry of this court for hearing.
The respondent’s preliminary objection is meritorious and it is hereby upheld. To say the least, this appeal is not only incompetent, it is also an abuse of the process of this court. Consequently, this appeal is hereby dismissed.
The sum of N2,000,000.00 (two million naira only) is hereby awarded as costs against the 1st appellant and in favour of the respondent. The same sum of N2,000,000.00 (two million naira only) is, separately, awarded as costs in favour of the respondent and against the 2nd and 3rd appellants and
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which costs shall be paid personally by the learned counsel – Abang Odok Ogar, Esq.
Appeal dismissed.
Concurring Opinion(s)
— JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, JSC)
My learned brother, the Hon. Justice Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein, JSC, has accorded me the opportunity of previewing the draft of the judgment. I am in agreement with the reasoning postulated therein, to the conclusive effect that the
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instant appeal is grossly incompetent and a sheer abuse of process of the Court.
Hence, having adopted the said reasoning and conclusion reached in the judgment as mine, I too hereby dismiss the appeal and abide all the consequential orders made therein.
— JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, JSC)
I had a preview of the draft judgment of my learned brother, Lord Justice MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC. I completely agree with the reasoning, conclusion, decisions, and orders therein.
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— JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY CHIDIEBERE NWAOMA UWA, JSC)
I had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein, JSC, just delivered and I am in agreement with his lordship’s reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is incompetent. The issues emanating from the appeal have been adequately determined by my learned brother. I
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adopt his lordship’s reasoning as mine in dismissing the appeal.
— JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JSC)
I had a preview of the judgment delivered by my learned brother Lord Justice, Moore Aseimo Abraham Adumein,
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JSC. I completely agree with the reasoning, conclusions, decisions and orders therein.
Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement — dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
1. Adamu v. A.G. Bornu State (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 203 — cited at p. 19; Paras A–B
2. Aderonmu Investment v. Olowu (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 652) 253 SC — cited at p. 23; Para A
3. Afro-Continental v. Coop Association (2003) 17 WRN 109 — cited at p. 10; Para A
4. Aigbobahi v. Aifuwa (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 976) 270 — cited at p. 22; Paras G–H
5. Aigbekan Osas v. Mrs. Faith Tuedor-Matthews (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1956) 509 — cited at p. 23; Paras A–B
6. Ajaokuta Steel Co. v. O.O. Biosah & Co. Ltd. (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 527) 145 — cited at p. 12; Para D–E
7. Alhaji Kabiru Abubakar v. John Joseph (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 307 — cited at p. 23; Paras C–D
8. Aliyu v. Ibrahim (1992) 7 NQLR (Pt. 253) 361 — cited at p. 14; Para A
9. Anie v. Ugagbe (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 402) 425 — cited at p. 22; Paras C–D
10. *Attorney-General, Bendel State & 2 Ors. v. P.L.A. Aideyan* (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 118) 646 — cited at pp. 25–26; Paras E–A
11. Bamboye v. University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (622) 290 — cited at p. 18; Para D–A
12. Bakare v. Apena (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 33) 1 — cited at p. 9; Para A
13. Bill Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imani & Sons Ltd. (2006) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1013) 11 — cited at p. 12; Paras C–D
14. Calabar East Co-operative v. Etim Emmanuel Ikot (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 638) 225 — cited at p. 23; Paras A–B
15. Chedi v. A.G. Federation (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) 166 — cited at p. 13; Paras A–E
16. Chief of Air Staff v. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 922) 496 — cited at p. 12; Para A–C
17. Chief Ambrose Owuru & Anor. v. President Mohammed Buhari & 3 Ors. (unreported, Appeal No. SC/CV/667/2023, ruling 16 December 2024) — cited at pp. 27–28; Paras E–A
18. David Amadi v. Attorney-General of Imo State (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 92 — cited at p. 26; Paras A–C
19. Deduwa & Ors. v. Okorodudu & Ors. (1976) 10 NSCC 329 — cited at p. 10; Para A
20. Dingyadi v. INEC (No. 2) (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 154 SC — cited at pp. 18–19; Paras D–F
21. Dr. Roy Pedro Ugo v. Augustina Chinyelu Ugo (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1597) 218 — cited at p. 25; Paras C–E
22. Edun v. Odan Community (1980) 8–11 SC 103 — cited at p. 9; Para A
23. Elike v. Nwankwoala (1984) 12 SC 301 — cited at p. 18; Para B
24. Falodun v. Ogunse (2009) LPLEP-3735 (CA) — cited at p. 9; Para C–D
25. Fayose v. The State (2010) LPELR-4842 (CA) — cited at p. 11; Paras F–A
26. FRN v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 842) 113 — cited at p. 10; Paras C–D
27. Greenough v. Gaskell (1833) 1 Myl. & K. 98 — cited at p. 26; Paras C–E
28. Ibrahim Sakati v. Jabule Bako & Anor. (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 531 — cited at p. 6; Paras C–D
29. Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423 — cited at p. 13; Para A–B
30. Kaduna Textile Ltd. v. Umar (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 319) 143 — cited at p. 12; Paras E–A
31. Kenon v. Tekam (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 12 — cited at p. 18; Paras A–B
32. Lasisi Ogbe v. Sule Asade (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1172) 106 — cited at p. 25; Paras A–C
33. Management Enterprises Ltd. v. ABC Merchant (Nig.) Ltd. (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 249 — cited at p. 25; Paras A–B
34. Miss Yetunde Zainab Tolani v. Kwara State Judicial Service Commission & Ors. (2009) LPELR-8375(CA) — cited at p. 11; Paras A–D
35. Mr. Patrick Okechukwu Ubabuike v. Guaranty Trust Bank PLC (2025) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1993) 427 — cited at p. 25; Paras D–A
36. Nasiru Bello & Ors. v. A.G. Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828 — cited at p. 11; Para D
37. National Investment & Properties Co. Ltd. v. Thompson Organisation (1969) 6 NSCC 161 — cited at p. 23; Para A–B
38. Nwali v. State (1991) 3 NWLR (Pt. 182) 663 — cited at p. 8; Para A–B
39. Okonji v. Njokanma (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 202) 131 — cited at p. 8; Para C–D
40. Onuwa Kalu v. State (2017) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1586) 522 — cited at p. 6; Paras A–C
41. Popoola v. Adeyemo (1992) 9 SCNJ 79, (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 257) 1 — cited at p. 8; Paras A–C
42. Prince Kilani Adekeye & 2 Ors. v. Prince Summonu Adesina & Ors. (2010) 12 SCM 1 — cited at pp. 6–7; Paras E–A
43. Rear Admiral Francis Echie Agbiti v. The Nigerian Navy (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1236) 175 — cited at p. 25; Paras A–C
44. Set Success Enterprises and Company Limited v. Ibeju-Lekki Local Government Council & Anor. (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1825) 251 — cited at pp. 21–22; Paras E–A, and p. 23; Paras C–D
45. State v. Dr. Olu Onagoruwa (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33 — cited at p. 26; Paras A–B
46. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited & 2 Ors. v. Chief Isaac Osaro Agbara & 9 Ors. (2016) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1496) 353 — cited at pp. 7–8; Paras E–A
47. Uzor Idika & Ors. v. Ndukwe ‘Erisi & Ors. (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 78) 563 — cited at p. 25; Paras A–B
48. Womiloju v. Anibire (2010) 10 NWLR (1203) 545 — cited at p. 18; Paras C–D
Referenced Statutes
• Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) — Sections 34, 35, 36(1), 46(1), 287 — cited at pp. 10–12, 16