Chief Okechukwu Ambrose Ahiwe & Anor v. Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) & Ors

CASE IDENTIFICATION

Court

Supreme Court

Judicial Division

Abuja

Suit / Appeal Number

SC.CV/1250/2023

Date of Judgment

12/01/2024

NLC Citation

AHIWE & ANOR v. INEC & ORS (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC)

Coram
  • John Inyang Okoro, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
  • Uwani Musa Abba Aji, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
  • Helen Moronkeji Ogunwumiju, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
  • Adamu Jauro, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria
  • Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria

EDITORIAL SUMMARY

Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered

Facts of the Case

The 1st Respondent conducted an election for the Governorship seat of Abia State on 18 March 2023. On 22 March 2023, INEC declared the 2nd Respondent, who was sponsored by the 3rd Respondent (Labour Party), as the winner of the election. The 1st Appellant, sponsored by the 2nd Appellant (PDP), came second. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the Appellants filed a petition before the Abia State Governorship Election Tribunal challenging the return of the 2nd Respondent on three grounds: non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent, lack of majority of lawful votes cast, and corrupt practices/non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022.

The Appellants alleged that the 2nd Respondent was not a member of the 3rd Respondent at the time of the election because his name was not contained in the Membership Register of the 3rd Respondent submitted to INEC 30 days before its primary election. They also contended that the 2nd Respondent had defected from APC to Labour Party few days before the Labour Party’s primary election. The Tribunal dismissed the petition. The Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Being further dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues for Determination

ISSUE 1:
Whether the lower Court was wrong to hold that the Appellants did not prove the issue of disqualification of the 2nd Respondent.

ISSUE 2:
Whether the decision of the lower Court on the Matters of Pleadings, Evidence, and Formulation of Issues for Determination in an appeal are correct in law and not perverse.

ISSUE 3:
Whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Appellants can be rightly said to have had a fair hearing and or a fair trial at the Honourable Tribunal.

 

Decision / Holding

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the Appellants lacked locus standi to challenge the nomination and sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent, that the issues raised were pre-election matters over which the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction, and that the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts were not perverse. Parties were ordered to bear their respective costs.

 

Ratio Decidendi / Principles

APPELLATE PRACTICE — Ground(s) of Appeal — Effect of a Ground of Appeal from Which No Issue for Determination Is Formulated “Noticeable in the record, particularly page 9063, Vol. 6, is that the Appellants at the lower Court complained against the striking out of the evidence of PW1, PW16, PW17 and PW22. Nevertheless, this was bereft and not distilled in their issues for determination. Since no issues were distilled from the said grounds of appeal, they are deemed abandoned. It is trite that formulation of the issues must be circumscribed by the grounds of appeal and contains only such issues as have been raised.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 13–14; Paras F–E.

APPELLATE PRACTICE — Interference with Concurrent Findings of Fact — Instances Where the Supreme Court Will Not Interfere with Concurrent Findings of Fact Made by Lower Courts “It must be noted that this appeal sprang from the concurrent findings of the two Courts below. I have not discovered perverseness in the two judgments to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court. Besides, no proof of substantial non-compliance has been done to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 18–19; Paras F–A.

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Application(s)/Motion(s) — Effect of a Motion Not Moved “Although all applications or motions ought to be considered by the Court one way or the other, no matter how frivolous they may be, lawyers or parties must bring them to the attention of the Court, otherwise, they are considered abandoned, if not moved.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 17; Paras C–D.

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Preliminary Objection — Effect of a Preliminary Objection Not Moved “Although all applications or motions ought to be considered by the Court one way or the other, no matter how frivolous they may be, lawyers or parties must bring them to the attention of the Court, otherwise, they are considered abandoned, if not moved.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 17; Paras C–D.

ELECTION PETITION — Election Petition Proceedings — Effect of Written Statement on Oath of Witness(es) Not Frontloaded/Filed Within the Time Prescribed for Filing a Petition; Whether Subpoenaed Witness(es) Is an Exception “Election petition, being sui generis and time bound does not permit piecemeal filing and presentation of petition. Election petition is akin to going to war prepared and equipped with all your weapons and bullets ready for battle or shooting the opponent. All witnesses, whether subpoenaed or not, should have their statements and evidences ready before the petition is filed since there will not be time again to allow for such substantial amendments. This is in fact the intent and spirit in Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Paragraph 4 (5), 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 15–17; Paras D–A.

ELECTION PETITION — Jurisdiction of Election Petition Tribunal — Whether Election Tribunals Have Jurisdiction to Hear and Determine Claims Based on Pre-Election Matters and Internal Affairs of Political Party Filed by Another Political Party/Candidate “All the events or incidents groused by the Appellants are events that predated the election of 18/3/2023. If the Appellants felt aggrieved with the sponsorship or fielding of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent, they would have gone to the Federal High Court to contest such and not to make it a ground for an election that has already taken place. … When family members fight, as in the case of party members, they can be settled within themselves or they go to Court by themselves, but it does not lie in the Appellants, who are strangers to their squabbles to interfere or go to Court on their behalf.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 10–11; Paras E–D.

ELECTION PETITION — Jurisdiction of Election Petition Tribunal — Whether Election Tribunals Have Jurisdiction to Hear and Determine Claims Based on Pre-Election Matters “Another reason why the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint about the 2nd Respondent’s qualification is that the nature of the complaint, being issues of nomination and sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent, are firmly within the realm of a pre-election matter. See Section 285(14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).” Per Jauro, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 44; Paras D–E.

ELECTION PETITION — Qualification of a Candidate — Whether the Name of a Candidate Being in the Voters Register of the Political Party Sponsoring Him, Submitted to INEC at Least 30 Days Before the Primary Election of the Party Is a Requirement for Qualification for Election “There is no requirement of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) to the effect that a candidate may only qualify as such if his name was in the Register of Voters of the political party which sponsored him or her, at least thirty (30) days before the primary election. Being extraneous to the 1999 CFRN (as altered), it will amount to an atrocious violation of the Constitution for a Court to read the provision of Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022 into the Constitution and bend same to conform to Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered).” Per Ogunwumiju, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 32–33; Para D.

ELECTION PETITION — Substantial Compliance — When Will the Issue of Substantial Compliance Be Considered in an Election Petition “The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioners have succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act etc or, in the alternative, substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the said Act etc no matter how minuscule the transgression may be.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 18; Paras D–E.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Membership of a Political Party — Whether Membership of a Political Party Is the Internal Affair of a Party and Same Is Not Justiciable “My Lords, it is indeed the prerogative of a political party to determine who its members are. … This Court has consistently stated in a plethora of authorities that membership of a political party is a matter that is strictly within the domestic affairs of a political party and the Courts have no jurisdiction to determine who the members of a political party are. It is not justiciable.” Per Ogunwumiju, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 34–35; Paras B–A.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Nomination and Sponsorship of Candidate — Whether a Political Party/Its Candidate Can Challenge the Nomination/Sponsorship Process of Another Party/Its Candidate “I suppose here that the Appellants have made the issue of the sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent their issue. Whether there was the need to submit the name of the candidate of the 3rd Respondent within 30 days or not as provided by Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022, it is not the Appellants that should complain or cry out since they were not in internal contest with the Appellant. In essence, the 1st Appellant was not in contest with the 2nd Respondent for the party sponsorship and nomination. Thus, he cannot be making a case for the Respondents.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 9–10; Paras F–D.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Nomination and Sponsorship of Candidate — Whether a Political Party/Its Candidate Can Challenge the Nomination/Sponsorship Process of Another Party/Its Candidate “The Appellants were not aspirants within the ambit of Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022. The entire section which deals with nomination is pre-election in context. Thus, where sub-section (13) provides that the name of a political party in breach of Section 84 shall not be on the ballot, the right to enforce same enures to an aspirant within the context of Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act 2022 and Section 285 (14) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). The Appellants are excluded from such enterprise.” Per Ogunwumiju, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 33–34; Paras E–A.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Nomination and Sponsorship of Candidate — Who Can Challenge the Nomination of a Candidate “It is now settled that it is only a member of a political party who was an aspirant that participated in the primary election that can challenge the sponsorship and nomination of the candidate who emerged from the primary election.” Per Jauro, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 44; Para F.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Political Party Primary — Whether a Person Is Precluded from Participating in More Than One Political Party Primary Election “There is no doubt, from the evidence before the trial Court that the 1st Respondent moved from party to party in search of a place to perch in order to secure a nomination for the 2023 Gubernatorial election in Benue State. While such an act might have moral implications, there is no provision in the Electoral Act that precludes a candidate from participating in more than one primary. What is forbidden is his nomination by more than one political party at the same time and to his knowledge.” Per Ogunwumiju, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 35–36; Paras A–C.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Pre-Election Matters — Time Within Which to File a Pre-Election Matter “Assuming the Appellants had the locus standi to raise the issue, same had become statute-barred at the time of the filing of the Petition as, by dint of Section 285(9) of the Petition, a pre-election matter must be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.” Per Jauro, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 45; Paras A–B.

ELECTORAL MATTERS — Qualification/Disqualification — Requirement for Qualification for Election into the Office of a Governor “The ratio of Oni v. Oyebanji (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt 1902) 544, referred to by the Respondents, if applied to Issue Nos. 1 and 2 of the instant appeal, as it should be, leads to the conclusion that once a person satisfies the criteria prescribed in Section 177 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), such person becomes automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor. … Section 177(c) which provides that a person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party does not provide for consideration of how a political party arrives at the decision to sponsor a person as its candidate or the validity of the decision to sponsor or the validity of the sponsorship itself.” Per Okoro, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at pp. 19–20; Para D.

EVIDENCE LAW — Admissibility of Evidence — Effect of Legally Inadmissible Evidence “No matter how vital and potent a document or Exhibit may be, it must lose its power when rejected or rendered inadmissible.” Per Aji, JSC, in Ahiwe & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1250-2023(SC) at p. 15; Para B.

Orders of Court

Appeal dismissed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/OW/EP/GOV/AB/31/2023 delivered on 2 December 2023 was affirmed. Parties to bear their respective costs.

 

     

    APPEARANCES

    Counsel for the Appellant(s)

    Alade Agbabiaka, SAN with him, Dr. Joseph Nwobike, SAN, Prof. Paul Ananaba, SAN, Uche Iheduwa, SAN and Chief Theo Nkure, Esq.

    Counsel for the Respondent(s)

    J. T. U. Nnodum, SAN with him, K. C. Nwufo, SAN and K. A. John Nwosu, SAN - for 1st Respondent A. J. Owonikoko, SAN with him, Prof. J. O. Olatake, SAN, Chief Hakeem Afolabi, SAN, Ken Ahia, SAN and Olusola A. Dare, Esq. - for 2nd Respondent Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu, SAN with him, Chief Umeh Kalu, SAN, Dr. Sunny Ajala, SAN, Echezona Etiaba, SAN and Valentine Ofia, Esq. - for 3rd Respondent

    Amicus Curiae

    None

    JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT

    Authoritative judicial text as delivered

    Lead / Majority Opinion

    — (DELIVERED BY UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C. (DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT):)

    On 18/3/2023, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the 1st Respondent, conducted an election for the Governorship seat of Abia State. On 22/3/2023, it declared the 2nd Respondent, who was sponsored by the 3rd Respondent, as the winner of the election. The 1st Appellant, sponsored by the 2nd Appellant came second. Dissatisfied with the outcome of the election, the Appellants on 11/4/2023 presented a petition challenging the return of the 2nd Respondent on the three grounds, to wit: (1). The non-qualification of the 2nd respondent, (2). Lack of majority of lawful votes cast, (3). Corrupt practices and non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022. Hearing commenced on 26/7/2023. The Petitioners called 22 witnesses and tendered exhibits P1 to P191. The 1st and 2nd Respondents called one witness each. The 2nd Respondent tendered exhibits D1 to D16. The 3rd Respondent did not lead evidence. On 6/10/2023, the Honourable Tribunal delivered a judgment dismissing the petition of the Appellants. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the lower Court on

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    2/12/2023 dismissed the appeal. Miffed, the Appellants have filed this appeal before the Apex Court.

    After exchange of briefs by parties, the Appellants through their lead Counsel, Alade Agbabiaka, SAN, nominated these issues for determination in the brief filed on 23/12/2023:
    1. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the Honourable Tribunal’s decision that the Appellants failed to prove that the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the Elections?
    2. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the striking out by the Honourable Tribunal of paragraphs 30-44 of the Petition on the ground that they are pre-election complaints?
    3. Whether the decision of the lower Court on the Matters of Pleadings, Evidence and Formulation of Issues for Determination in an appeal are correct in law and not perverse?
    4. Whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Appellants can be rightly said to have had a fair hearing and/or a fair trial at the Honourable Tribunal.

    J. T. U. NNODUM, SAN, the lead Counsel to the 1st Respondent formulated these issues for determination in their brief of argument filed on 30/12/2023:<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; scrollbar-color: var(–thumbBG) var(–scrollbarBG);”>

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    (a) Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the tribunal’s decision that paragraphs 30 to 44 of the petition were incompetent being concerned with pre-election matters and, in the alternative, that the appellants did not prove nonqualification of the 2nd Respondent.
    (b) Whether the lower Court was right, when it affirmed, the tribunal’s decision that PW4, PW16, PW’17, PW18 and PW22 were incompetent witnesses and that the appellants did not prove the second and third grounds of their petition.
    (c) Whether the lower Court infringed on the appellants’ right to fair hearing in the determination of their appeal.

    A. J. OWONIKOKO, SAN, with his team representing the 2nd Respondent, filed their brief of argument on 6/1/2024 and distilled these issues:
    1. Whether the Court of Appeal was not right when it affirmed the trial Tribunal’s decision striking out paragraphs 30-41, 43-44 of the Petition for being preelection issues and, in the alternative ultimately dismissed the Appellants’ complaint on the merit against the qualification of the 2nd Respondent to contest in the gubernatorial election held on 18th day of March, 2023 for want of

     

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    credible evidence in proof of same?
    2. Whether having regard to the prescription of the law on allegations of non-scoring of majority of lawful votes, corrupt practices and noncompliance, failure of the Appellants to (I) tender and demonstrate relevant documents; and (ii) call necessary/credible witnesses who can give direct evidence on the allegations, the Court of Appeal did not rightly affirm the decision of the trial Tribunal that the Appellants did not prove these allegations and establish how they substantially affected the outcome of the election?
    3. Whether upon proper consideration and resolution of all the relevant issues raised in the Petition and on appeal before the lower Court, the Court of Appeal infringed on the Appellants’ right to fair hearing when it affirmed the decision of the Election Tribunal which dismissed the Petition for lacking in merit?

    DR ONYECHI IKPEAZU, SAN, on behalf of his legal team representing the 3rd Respondent nominated its issues thus in the brief filed on 29/ 12/2023:
    1. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to affirm the decision of the Tribunal striking out paragraphs 30 to 44 of the Petition on

     

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    the ground that the allegations of disqualification therein contained were founded on facts over which the Tribunal had no jurisdiction.
    2. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to affirm the decision of the Tribunal to the effect that the Appellants failed to prove that the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the election.
    3. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to affirm the decision of the Tribunal that the Appellants abandoned the complaint against the striking out of the evidence of PW4, PW16, PW17, and PW22 by the Tribunal and failed to prove the acts of non-compliance and corrupt practices alleged in the Petition.
    4. Whether the Court of Appeal was correct to hold that the Appellants did not identify the applications which they claimed the Tribunal failed to pronounce upon, and did not show how the length of the 2nd Respondent’s Final Written Address occasioned a miscarriage of justice and affected the judgment of the Tribunal.

    Resultantly, the Appellants separately filed reply briefs on point of law to the Respondents’ briefs on 5th and 10th January, 2024.

    ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION:
    I shall consider the

     

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    Appellants’ issues one and two together while their issues three and four shall be considered together. Issues one and two shall be retouched as follows:
    ISSUE ONE:
    Whether the lower Court was wrong to hold that the Appellants did not prove the issue of disqualification of the 2nd Respondent.
    The learned Silk to the Appellants submitted that by the decision in ENGR NELSON OSELOKA ONUBOGU V IFEYINWA ANAZONWU & 2 ORS (2023) LPELR 60288 (SC), where however the complaint borders on non-qualification on account of breach of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act, Party Guidelines, it can be accommodated. He argued that the 2nd Respondent was not a member of the 3rd Respondent when he ran for the office of Governor of Abia State and could not have been sponsored by the 3rd Respondent. In other words, the Appellants’ contention is that there was a breach of Section 177 (C) of CFRN 1999, as amended. That the pivotal importance of this qualifying factor made the Electoral Act 2022 to donate the locus standi on a petitioner to challenge the qualification of a declared winner of the election as provided for under

     

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    Section 134(1) of the Electoral Act, 2022.

    Furthermore, that the lower Court fell into a grave error, when it classified the Appellants’ challenge to the qualification of the 2nd Respondent as arising from the non-compliance by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents with the mandatory provisions of Sections 77(2) and (3), 82(1) and 84(1) and 7 of the Electoral Act, as a specie of pre-election matter within the internal affairs of the 3rd Respondent.

    That the lower Court failed to appreciate that the allegation or question as to whether or not the 2nd Respondent, who had contested the election, is a duly registered member of the 3rd Respondent in compliance with S. 77(2) and (3) of the Act, is founded on the constitutional requirement of membership of political party as a qualifying factor under Section 177(c) of the Constitution and Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral and so outside the internal affairs of the 3rd Respondent. He therefore urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.

    The learned senior Counsels to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents, in their respective turns submitted that although the 2nd Respondent duly participated

     

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    in the APC governorship primary election and lost it, he defected to the Labour Party few days to the Labour Party’s Governorship primary election in Abia State which was held on 8th June, 2022. That the grouse of the Appellants squarely relate to events which happened prior to the governorship election of 18th March, 2023. He submitted that this Honourable Court in APP V. OBASEKI (2022) 13 NWLR (PT. 1846) 1 held that an election petition whose sole ground is based on events that occurred prior to the election day is squarely a pre-election matter by the provision of Section 285(14) (c) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and not election matter to which Section 138(1)(d) of the Electoral Act 2010 is applicable. Finally, that the Appellants not being members of the 3rd Respondent have no locus standi to question it. They placed reliance on ONI V. OYEBANJI (2023) 13 NWLR (PT. 1902) 554 PARAS A-D. They prayed that this issue be resolved against the Appellants.

    RESOLUTION OF ISSUE:
    The summary of the gravamen of the Appellants in paragraphs 30-44 of their petition is that 2nd Respondent was not a member of the 3rd Respondent at the time of the

     

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    election since his name was not contained in the Membership Register of the 3rd Respondent, which the 3rd Respondent failed to submit to the 1st Respondent 30 days before the conduct of its primary election. That the 2nd Respondent was a governorship aspirant under the All Progressives Congress (APC) and participated in the Governorship primary election of that party on the 26/5/2023. Their case is that the 2nd Respondent defected to and joined the 3rd Respondent few days before the 3rd Respondent conducted its primary election on 8/6/2023. That unless the name of the 2nd Respondent was on the Membership Register submitted by the 3rd Respondent (Labour Party) to the 1st Respondent (INEC) 30 days before the holding of its primary election, the 3rd Respondent could not validly and lawfully sponsor the 2nd Respondent as its candidate for Abia State Governorship election.

    It is on record that the 2nd Respondent duly participated in the APC governorship primary election and lost it, he defected to the Labour Party few days to the Labour Party’s Governorship primary election in Abia State which was held on 8th June, 2022. I suppose here that the Appellants have

     

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    made the issue of the sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent their issue. Whether there was the need to submit the name of the candidate of the 3rd Respondent within 30 days or not as provided by Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022, it is not the Appellants that should complain or cry out since they were not in internal contest with the Appellant. In essence, the 1st Appellant was not in contest with the 2nd Respondent for the party sponsorship and nomination. Thus, he cannot be making a case for the Respondents. If the 2nd and 3rd Respondents were also in default and disobedience to the provision of Section 77 of the Act, it is for them to go after the 2nd and 3rd Respondents, and not for the Appellant to cry more than the bereaved.

    Furthermore, all the events or incidents groused by the Appellants are events that predated the election of 18/3/2023. If the Appellants felt aggrieved with the sponsorship or fielding of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent, they would have gone to the Federal High Court to contest such and not to make it a ground for an election that has already taken place. Of course, the lower Court was right to

     

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    affirm the discountenance and striking out of paragraphs 30-44 of the Appellants’ petition because they are bordered only on pre-election matters and issues, dealing exclusively with the internal affairs of the 3rd Respondent. When family members fight, as in the case of party members, they can be settled within themselves or they go to Court by themselves, but it does not lie in the Appellants, who are strangers to their squabbles to interfere or go to Court on their behalf. Actually, the Courts will have no jurisdiction over the membership of a political party that has been fielded for general election except the issue of membership is within and internal. See ENANG VS ASUQUO (2023) LPELR 60042(SC), SANI V. GALADIMA (2023) LPELR 60183(SC), ONUBOGU V. ANAZONWU (2023) LPELR 60288(SC).

    This issue must be resolved against the Appellants and is hereby held so.

    ISSUES THREE AND FOUR:
    Whether the decision of the lower Court on the Matters of Pleadings, Evidence, and Formulation of Issues for Determination in an appeal are correct in law and not perverse?
    Whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, the Appellants can be rightly said to

     

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    have had a fair hearing and or a fair trial at the Honourable Tribunal.
    The learned Silk to Ilie Appellants signed that the lower Court failed Io avail its mind to a critical aspect of Exhibit P38 tendered by PW4, being, the original counterpart, copy of the result in Obingwa LGA, and dial it carries a higher probative value than Exhibit P188, being a certified true copy. Thus, that by Exhibit P38, the original number of votes credited to the Appellant was 108,000 votes, while the original number credited to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents was 27,000 votes. That it was wrong for the lower Court to rely on the technical point that the witness statement on oath of PW4 did not accompany the petition at the date of filing pursuant to Paragraph 4 (5) of the 1st Schedule of the Electoral Act., 2022. Again, that the lower Court, was wrong to refuse the motions dated 3/8/2023 filed by the Appellant, thereby denying them fair hearing. He urged this issue to be resolved in their favour.

    The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ learned senior Counsels argued that PW4, PW16, PW17 and PW22 were subpoenaed witnesses, whose statements on oath were not

     

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    filed with the petition within 21 days after the declaration of election result, thus making their evidence incompetent. That the Appellants did not establish the allegations made in their petition since they did not show the existence of 2 sets of results emanating from same election Io indicate failure to score majority of lawful votes cast. It was submitted that on Obingwa LGA, the Appellants called PW4, who tendered Exhibit P38, professed to be the duplicate result, and meant to belie Exhibit P188, the official CTC of INEC. That the Appellants on appeal abandoned them and did not raise any issues therefrom. On denial of fair hearing, that the Appellants did not state which applications of the Appellants were dismissed, hence abandoned them. They prayed these issues to be resolved in their favour.

    RESOLUTION OF ISSUES:
    The Appellants have queried the evaluation of the evidence done by the lower Court, bordering especially on “pleadings, Evidence and Formulation of Issues for Determination in an appeal”. Noticeable in the record, particularly page 9063, Vol. 6, is that the Appellants at the lower Court complained against the striking

     

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    out of the evidence of PW1, PW16, PW17 and PW22. Nevertheless, this was bereft and not distilled in their issues for determination. Since no issues were distilled from the said grounds of appeal, they are deemed abandoned. It is trite that formulation of the issues must be circumscribed by the grounds of appeal and contains only such issues as have been raised. See Per KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC in ONYESOH V. NNEBEDUN & ORS (1992) LPELR-2742(SC) (pp. 16 PARAS. B). This did not escape the prying eyes of the lower Court, when it held at page 9063 of the record that “none of the six issues for determination was formulated from the complaints of the Appellants in Grounds Eleven, Twelve, eighteen and Nineteen of the Notice of Appeal. The necessary consequence of this failure to formulate issue from these four grounds of appeal are deemed abandoned and they are hereby struck out..Achonu vs. Okuwobi (2017)LPELR 42102(SC), Adeokin Records vs. Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria (Ltd.) (2018) LPELR 45300 (SC)”.

    The Appellants again attacked the ratio decidendi of the lower Court, stating that Exhibit P38 tendered by PW4, being the original counterpart copy of the

     

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    result in Obingwa LGA, carries a higher probative value than Exhibit P188, being a certified true copy. It is possible for Exhibit P38 to be an original document but may be infected with the virus of inadmissibility. No matter how vital and potent a document or Exhibit may be, it must lose its power when rejected or rendered inadmissible. This was actually the case with Exhibit P38. It does not have the foundation to stand or be admitted by the Court, thus the lower Court was right to accord pride of place and more probative value to Exhibit P188, although a certified true copy.

    Exhibit P38 tendered by PW4 is said to be the result of the election in Obingwa Local Government Area (LGA) of Abia State. However, it has been on record that the witness statement on oath of PW4, though a subpoenaed witness, who tendered the said Exhibit P38, was filed without accompanying the petition. Election petition, being sui generis and time bound does not permit piecemeal filing and presentation of petition. Election petition is akin to going to war prepared and equipped with all your weapons and bullets ready for battle or shooting the opponent. All witnesses, whether

     

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    subpoenaed or not, should have their statements and evidences ready before the petition is filed since there will not be time again to allow for such substantial amendments. This is in fact the intent and spirit in Section 285(5) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Paragraph 4 (5), 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022. This Court in SC/CV/935/2023: ABUBAKAR ATIKU & ANOR V.I.N.E.C & OTHERS(unreported) delivered on 26/10/2023 settled on the incompetence and impropriety of a petitioner calling witnesses, by subpoena, whose written statements on oath did not accompany the petition. At page 81 of the judgment, it held among others that “a combined, reading of Section 285(5) of the Constitution shows that the time limit for the filing of written statement on oath of witnesses in election petition proceedings is 21 days from the date of declaration of the results due to the sui generis nature of election proceedings, amendment to the petition or calling of witnesses will not be entertained after the statutory time limit for the filing of the petition has expired. Thus, a petitioner cannot present his case in bits, otherwise the Respondents’

     

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    right to fair hearing will he breached”.
    Consequently, Exhibit P38, having been rejected and expunged as inadmissible, and the time no longer available for its admissibility or consideration, this Court does not have the power to reconsider or pry into it.

    On the alleged breach of the Appellants’ right to fair hearing in not considering their motions elated 3/8/2023, it is on record that the motions were never elated or brought to the attention of the lower Court. Although all applications or motions ought to be considered by the Court one way or the other, no matter how frivolous they may be, lawyers or parties must bring them to the attention of the Court, otherwise, they are considered abandoned, if not moved. In the instant case, the lower Court explained:
    However, neither in the issue for determination nor in the arguments canvassed thereon did the Appellants identify the specific interlocutory applications refused and granted by the lower Court by their dates of filing or by the prayers sought on them. Counsel merely referred to them as the Appellants’ applications and the Respondents’ applications. The records of appeal show that the

     

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    parties filed, several applications and which were heard and ruled upon by the lower Court. It is not for this Court to go searching in the records for applications of the Appellants that were refused by the lower Court and those of the Respondents that were granted. It was for the Appellants to identify the specific applications complained about. The fourth issue for determination formulated by Counsel to the Appellants is imprecise and does not make for easy comprehension. It is hereby struck out along with the arguments canvassed thereon by the parties.

    The doctrine of substantial compliance is that its consideration will only arise where the petitioners have succeeded in establishing substantial non-compliance with the principles of the Electoral Act etc or, in the alternative, substantial effect on the election result of any infraction of the said Act etc no matter how minuscule the transgression may be. See Per NWEZE, JSC in OMISORE & ANOR V. AREGBESOLA & ORS (2015) LPELR-24803(SC) (PP. 69 PARAS. B).

    It must be noted that this appeal sprang from the concurrent findings of the two Courts below. I have not discovered perverseness in the

     

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    two judgments to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court. Besides, no proof of substantial non-compliance has been done to tamper with the judgment of the lower Court.

    This issue is resolved against the Appellants. The appeal is hereby dismissed and the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed. Parties are to bear their respective costs.

     

    Concurring Opinion(s)

    — JOHN INYANG OKORO, J.S.C.:

    I had the advantage of reading the leading judgment of my learned brother, Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC, before now. I wholly agree with His Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion.

    The ratio of Oni v Oyebanji (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt 1902) 544, referred to by the Respondents, if applied to Issue Nos. 1 and 2 of the instant appeal, as it should be, leads to the conclusion that once a person satisfies the criteria prescribed in Section 177 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), such person becomes automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor. See also the cases of: Shinkafi v. Yari (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt 1511) 340; Jegede v. I.N.E.C. [2021] 14 NWLR (Pt 1797) 409.
    Section 177(c) which provides that a person shall be qualified for election

    19
    to the office of Governor of a State if he is a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party, does not provide for consideration of how a political party arrives at the decision to sponsor a person as its candidate or the validity of the decision to sponsor or the validity of the sponsorship itself. The fact that a political party sponsored its member as its governorship candidate for the general election makes such a person automatically qualified for election to the office of Governor of the State. Any criterion not provided for in Section 177 or any factor not listed under Section 182 is not valid as a qualifying criterion under Section 177 or disqualifying factor under Section 182. See: A.P.P. v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt 1846) 1; Jegede v INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt 1797) 409; Faleke v I.N.E.C. (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt 1543) 61. I will leave it just at that.

    I concur with my learned brother and direct that the appeal, being devoid of merit, be dismissed. The judgment of lower Court delivered on December 2nd, 2023, is hereby affirmed. I also abide by the order as to costs in the leading judgment.
    Appeal Dismissed.

    20

    — HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, J.S.C.:

    I have read in draft, the judgment just delivered by my learned brother UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC. I agree with the view that this appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. I will add a few words.

    This is an appeal by the Appellants against the concurrent findings of facts and law against the decision of the Court of Appeal Coram: Hon. Justice Habeeb Adewale Olumuyiwa Abiru, JCA (as he then was), Hon. Justice Abubakar Mahmud Talba, JCA and Hon. Justice Hannatu Azumi Laj’a-Balogun, JCA (the Court below) delivered on the 2nd December, 2023 in APPEAL NO: CA/OW/EP/GOV/AB/31/2023 between Chief Okechukwu Ambrose Ahiwe & Anor v. Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors.

    The Appellants had, by their said appeal, appealed against the judgment of the ruling and decision of the Abia State Governorship Tribunal Holden at Umuahia Coram: Hon. Justice H.T.D. Gwadah (Chairman), Hon. Justice Omolara Adeyemi (Member 1) and Hon. Justice Boniface .S. Ngyou (Member 2) in Petition No: EPT/AB/GOV/01/2023 (Between: Chief Okechukwu Ambrose Ahiwe & Anor v. Independent National Electoral Commission & Ors) delivered on the 6th day

     

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    of October, 2023.

    By the said judgment of the Court below, the said appeal filed against the judgment of the Honourable Tribunal was dismissed and the judgment of the Election Petition Tribunal for Abia State sitting in Umuahia, Abia State and delivered on the 6th of October, 2023 was affirmed.

    The facts leading to this appeal are that on the 18th day of March, 2023, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the 1st Respondent herein conducted an election for the Governorship seat of Abia State. On the 22nd day of March, 2023, INEC declared the 2nd Respondent who was sponsored by the 3rd Respondent as the winner of the election. The 1st Appellant who was sponsored by the 2nd Appellant came second.

    In the Appellants’ Petition at the Tribunal, they raised three grounds for its presentation. The grounds are set down in paragraph 24 thereof as follows:
    “24. The Petitioners state that the Grounds upon which this Petition is based are as follows:
    a) The 2nd Respondent was at the time of the election not qualified to contest the election.
    b) The 2nd Respondent was not duly elected by majority of lawful votes cast at the

     

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    election.
    c) The election of the 2nd Respondent was invalid by reason of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022.”

    In paragraph 162 of the Petition, the Appellants stated the reliefs they sought from the Tribunal.

    In order to avoid prolixity, reliefs “a” to “c” which are indeed the principal reliefs are reproduced hereunder, viz:
    102. “WHEREFORE the Petitioners pray jointly and severally against the Respondents as follows:
    a) That it may be determined that at the time of the Abia State Governorship Election of 18th March, 2023, the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the said election.
    b) That it may be determined that all the votes recorded for the 2nd Respondent in the said election are wasted votes as a result of the non-qualification of the 2nd Respondent.
    c) That it may be determined that on the basis of the remaining votes after discounting the votes recorded for the 2nd Respondent, in the said election, the 1st Petitioner has a majority of lawful votes and has satisfied the constitutional requirement by obtaining the required spread, that is 25% of votes in each of at least

     

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    two thirds (2/3) of all the Local Government Areas of Abia State.”

    The Appellants identified four (4) issues for determination in the brief settled by George Eche Ikemu, Esq., and they are set out below as follows:
    1. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the Honourable Tribunal’s decision that the Appellants failed to prove that the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the Elections? (Distilled from grounds 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 & 21 of the Notice of Appeal).
    2. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the striking out by the Honourable Tribunal of paragraphs 30- 44 of the Petition on the ground that they are pre-election complaints? (Distilled from grounds 2, 4, 8, 18 & 19 of the Notice of Appeal).
    3. Whether the decision of the lower Court on the Matters of Pleadings, Evidence and Formulation of Issues for Determination in an Appeal are correct in law and not perverse? (Distilled from grounds 9, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of the Notice of Appeal).
    4. Whether in the particular circumstances of this case, the Appellants can be rightly said to have had a fair hearing and or a fair trial at the Honourable Tribunal?

     

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    (Distilled from grounds 15, 16, 17 & 20 of the Notice of Appeal).

    Similar issues were identified in the 1st Respondent’s brief settled by E.A. John-Nwosu, Esq., in the 2nd Respondent’s brief settled by Omosanya Popoola, Esq., and in the 3rd Respondent’s brief settled by Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu, OON, SAN. There is no doubt that issues 1 & 2 which are related and when combined together suffice to determine this appeal.

    What the Appellants asked the Tribunal & lower Court to do was to hold that the 2nd Respondent was not a member of the 3rd Respondent when he ran for the office of Governor of Abla State and that being an uncontroverted fact, he could not have been sponsored by the 3rd Respondent. In other words, the Appellants’ contention is that there was a breach of Section 177 (c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered) hereinafter referred to as 1999 CFRN. While it is agreed that with respect to the membership of a political party, it is settled that it is a domestic; affair of a political party but Counsel submitted that this Court and the Court below have both been consistent in holding that a challenge

     

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    to membership and sponsorship of a candidate by a political party can be ventilated before the Tribunal. This is because Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered), regards the subject of membership and sponsorship as a qualifying requirement and equally, Section 134 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2022 donates locus standi to a candidate in an election if he wishes to contest this Issue at the Tribunal. Counsel cited ENGR. NELSON OSELOKA ONUBOGU v. IFEYINWA ANAZONWU & 2 ORS (2023) LPELR-60288 (SC). Counsel argued that once the issue of membership is raised, the onus would then shift to the Respondent to adduce minimal evidence to show he was a member of the political party at the material time In question. Counsel argued that it was wrong of the two lower Courts to find that the Appellants had conceded the membership of the 2nd Respondent in the 3rd Respondent’s brief in paragraphs 30-44 of their Petition. Counsel insisted that the 2nd Respondent having not tendered his membership card, shown his name in the party register, it means there is no evidence to show that indeed the 2nd Respondent was a member of the 3rd Respondent. The main claim of the

     

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    Appellants which they sought to prove through PW2 and Exhibits P42 and P43 is that as at the time of the election even though the 2nd Respondent had defected from APC to LP, he was still de jure a member of the APC even if de facto he was a member of LP. Counsel for the Appellants maintained that the 3rd Respondent is in violation of Section 77 (2)- (3) of the Electoral Act, 2022 by failing to make its register available 30 days before the primary election of the party. Counsel submitted that the lower Court failed to appreciate that the allegation or question as to whether or not the 2nd Respondent who had contested the election, is a duly registered member of the 3rd Respondent in compliance with Section 77 (2) – (3) of the Electoral Act, 2022, is founded on the constitutional requirement of membership of political party as a qualifying factor under Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) and Section 134(1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 and so outside the internal affairs of the 3rd Respondent.

    The Respondents’ all argued that the Tribunal was correct when it struck out paragraphs 30 to 44 of the Petition on the ground that the challenge to the

     

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    2nd Respondent’s qualification was founded principally on his membership of the 3rd Respondent, outside the ambit of the Constitution. This is an internal affair of the 3rd Respondent over which the Tribunal had no jurisdiction. Indeed, the foundation of the Appellant’s challenge in this regard was laid in paragraphs 30, 32, and 33 of the Petition, where the Appellants pleaded thus:
    “30. The Petitioners state that the 2nd Respondent was not a registered card-carrying member of the 3rd Respondent political party at the time of the conduct of the election and his name was not contained in the Membership Register of the 3rd Respondent which the 3rd Respondent was required by law to submit to the 1st Respondent 30 days before the conduct of its primary election; thus rending the candidacy of their candidate null and void for the purposes of the 18th March, 2023 Abia State Governorship election.
    32. The Petitioners state that the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the election on the platform of the Labour Party (LP) under the law, in that the 2nd Respondent’s name was not in the Register of Members of the Labour Party ought to have been submitted

     

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    to the 1st Respondent 30 days before the Labour Party purportedly conducted its Gubernatorial Primary Election in Abia State in 2022 that purportedly nominated the 2nd Respondent as the Labour Party’s Governorship candidate for the Abia State Governorship Election that held on 18th March, 2023.
    33. Notice is hereby given to the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Respondents to produce at the trial, the 3rd Respondent’s membership register containing the name of the 2nd Respondent submitted to the 1st Respondent 30 days before the 3rd Respondent’s Governorship primary election for Abia State”.

    It was contended that the Appellants, under the guise of employing the combined provisions of Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered), which requires a candidate to be sponsored by a Political party, and Section 134 (1) (a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 which allows a Petitioner to question an election on the ground of qualification of the person elected, have strayed into the realm of a Political question which is not justiciable.

    Learned Respondents’ Counsel submitted that it must be stressed that the Appellants in this case are not contending that the 2nd Respondent did

     

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    not in fact participate at all the stages of the election. It is only if they did, that the limited jurisdiction recognized by Section 285(13) 1999 CFRN (as altered) might arise. Their case is founded strictly on membership. That is to say, that the only contention of the Appellants is that the 2nd Respondent who was of APC, defected and contested the primary and the general election on the platform of the 3rd Respondent and won, when he was not a member of the 3rd Respondent. They also contend that the name of the 2nd Respondent was not in the 3rd Respondent’s Register of members at least thirty (30) days before the 3rd Respondent’s primary election. Respondents’ Counsel submitted that in as much as the Appellants had stated that the 2nd Respondent was a candidate of the 3rd Respondent, they had practically conceded that the 3rd Respondent projected the 2nd Respondent as its sponsored candidate. In this context, the issue of independent candidature did not arise. Counsel argued that the Appellants were wrongly trying to bend the provisions of Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022 to conform with Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered).
    Learned

     

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    Respondents’ Counsel further argued that in a bid to sustain an otherwise deplorable situation, the Appellants have sought solace in Sections 14(1) and 228(a) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) and Sections 77 (2) and (3), 82 (1) and 84 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2022. Section 14 (1) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) prescribes that “the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be a state based on the principles of democracy and social justice”. This section besides not being justiciable, does not deal with the issue of membership of a political party, and neither does it deals with qualification for election. Besides, Section 14(1) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) comes under Chapter 2, dealing with Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. With respect to Section 228(a) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered), it is only an enabling provision which empowered the National Assembly to make such laws with respect to elections, one of which is the Electoral Act, 2022. The Supreme Court made it categorical that the National Assembly lacked the vires to add to or modify the qualification provisions already covered by the 1999 CFRN (as altered). See AG ABIA v. AG FEDERATION

     

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    (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264 AT 391 TO 392.

    OPINION
    My Lords, paragraph 36 of the Petition by the Appellants states inter alia that the 2nd Respondent defected to the 3rd Respondent a few days before and stood for election at the primary election of the 3rd Respondent. The complaint in itself means that the Appellants conceded that the 2nd Respondent was no longer a member of the PDP and had joined Labour Party. The other case being made by the Appellants is that the 2nd Respondent’s name was not on the Register of Labour Party which is the political party which sponsored him.

    There is no requirement of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) to the effect that a candidate may only qualify as such if his name was in the Register of Voters of the political party which sponsored him or her, at least thirty (30) days before the primary election. Being extraneous to the 1999 CFRN (as altered), it will amount to an atrocious violation of the Constitution for a Court to read the provision of Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022 into the Constitution and bend same to conform to Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). See AG ABIA v. AG FEDERATION

     

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    (2002) 6 NWLR (PT. 763) 264 AT 368, ALLIED PEOPLES MOVEMENT v. INEC (2023) 9 NWLR (PT. 890) 419 AT 441.
    There is no doubt that with respect to Section 77 (2) and (3), all that it required was for a political party to “maintain a register of its members in both hard and soft copy”. Subsection 3 further requires the political party to “…make such register available to the commission not later than 30 days before the date fixed for the party primaries, congresses or convention”. The section did not provide much as the Appellants may wish that it is so, that only those whose names are on the register within 30 days to the primaries, that may qualify to contest the primaries. Sadly, it is this non-existent requirement even for the primary election, that the Appellants wish to donate to and read into the 1999 CFRN (as altered) and to use same to void the general election.

    The Appellants were not aspirants within the ambit of Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act, 2022. The entire section which deals with nomination is pre-election in context. Thus, where sub-section (13) provides that the name of a political party in breach of Section 84 shall not be on

     

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    the ballot, the right to enforce same enures to an aspirant within the context of Section 84(14) of the Electoral Act 2022 and Section 285 (14) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered). The Appellants are excluded from such enterprise.

    My Lords, it is indeed the prerogative of a political party to determine who its members are. See ANYANWU v. OGUNEWE (2014) 8 NWLR (PT. 1410) PG. 437.
    The Tribunal and the Court of Appeal were well guided by the very recent decisions of the superior Courts in UDOFIA v. ENANG (2023) LPELR-59447 (CA) and ABDULLAHI v. ARGUNGU (2023) LPELR-59950 (SC) which reinforced the same position. See also the very recent Supreme Court decision in ENANG v. ASUQUO (2023) 11 NWLR (PT. 1896) 510 AT 531 para F-G where this Court held as follows:
    “This Court has consistently stated in a plethora of authorities that membership of a political party is a matter that is strictly within the domestic affairs of a political party and the Courts have no jurisdiction to determine who the members of a political party are. It is not justiciable. Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition defined Justifiability this: “The quality or state of being

     

    34
    appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a Court”.

    I also rely heavily on JIME v. HEMBE (2023) LPELR-60334 (SC) where this Court succinctly held thus;
    “There is no doubt, from the evidence before the trial Court that the 1st Respondent moved from party to party in search of a place to perch in order to secure a nomination for the 2023 Gubernatorial election in Benue State. While such an act might have moral implications, there is no provision in the Electoral Act that precludes a candidate from participating in more than one primary. What is forbidden is his nomination by more than one political party at the same time and to his knowledge” Per KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, JSC (Pp. 32-33 paras A-D),
    In that case, on pages 28 – 29 the Court also held that;
    “It is not the duty of the Court to encourage practices that do not support democratic principles, but it is also not the duty of the Court to deliberately misapply the law in order to uphold moral democratic principles outside the contemplations of the legislation. The 1st Respondent in JIME v. HEMBE (SUPRA) was running from party to party, hopping from APC to NNPP to Labour

     

    35
    Party. Unfortunately, the law as it stands does not sanction his behavior so long as only one party finally nominates him. In this case, the Appellant changed his case from double nomination to double participation midstream. Be that as it may, he was not able to prove double participation in two primaries of two different political parties by the 1st Respondent and neither was the Appellant able to prove double nomination of the 1st Respondent by two political parties to make the latter fall foul of Section 35 of the Electoral Act”.

    Essentially, the Appellants’ case was fixated on the alleged nonsubmission by the 3rd Respondent of its Register of members as was borne out by paragraph 38 of the Petition where they pleaded thus:
    “38. The Petitioners state and shall contend at the hearing of this Petition that unless it is shown that the name of the 2nd Respondent was on the membership register submitted by the 3rd Respondent to the 1st Respondent 30 days to the date of the primary election of the 3rd Respondent in compliance with the statute, the 3rd Respondent cannot under the Electoral Law and the 1999 Constitution (as amended) validly and lawfully

     

    36
    sponsor the 2nd Respondent for the Abia State Governorship Election held on 18th March, 2023 and that the purported sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the Respondent is invalid, null and void”.

    Apart from my above reasoning, I adopt wholesale the reasoning of my learned brother of the Court of Appeal Abiru JCA on pg. 9054-9055 of the Record as follows:
    “It is elementary that in the interpreting a statute, the duty of a Court is to discover the intention of the law maker and in so doing it must consider the words used in order to discover their ordinary meaning, and then give use their ordinary meaning as they relate to the subject matter – Aliyu Vs Namadi (2023) LPELR 59742 (SC), Abdullahi Vs Argungu (2023) LPELR 59950 (SC), Carnation Registrars Ltd Vs The President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria (2023) LPELR 60102 (SC). It is also elementary that in interpreting a statute, nothing is to be added to or taken from its provisions – Attorney General, Federation Vs Attorney General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 249, Federal Republic of Nigeria Vs Bankole (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt 1418) 137. In Alagbaoso Vs INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR 59702(SC),

     

    37
    Garba, JSC, succinctly explained the two principles thus:
    “…provisions of a statute or law which are clear, express, precise and unambiguous should never be subjected to interpolations and/or glosses by the importation into or exportation of any words or extraneous situations not provided for or even envisaged by the provisions… As demonstrated in the lead judgment, such clear, precise, and unambiguous provisions do not call for interpretation, but application to the facts of a given case in such a way that the plain and unequivocal, intendment/intention of the Legislature expressly stated therein would not be whittled down or altered to suit a particular interest. The proper application of the provisions to any given set of facts would not and cannot lead to an ambiguity since the words deliberately and precisely chosen, used and employed by the Legislature are in themselves clear, and, unambiguous in expressing the real intention, purport and aim of the provisions. The duty of the Courts is to apply the provisions as they are and not import interpretation or construction that would import into; add to take out; subtract from the provisions

     

    38
    thereby altering or amending the provisions to fit into particular circumstances or situations that are totally alien thereto. The Courts have no direct power and authority or jurisdiction to legislate under any guise in order to fill in gaps that might appear in statutes or laws enacted by the Legislature, whose constitutional province it is to review, alter or amend the provisions of such statutes or laws. The Courts only expound, but cannot expand the clear, express, unambiguous, and mandatory provision of a statute or law in the name of interpretation or construction which the provisions do not call for…”
    Applying these principles to the above provisions, it is obvious that the requirements of a political party maintaining a Register of Members and making it available to the Independent National Electoral Commission thirty days before the date fixed for the party primaries, congresses or convention is purely for regulatory purposes. This is more so as there is no sanction provided in the Electoral Act for a political party that fails to comply with the provisions. The submitted Register of Members is not, and cannot be, conclusive on who are the

     

    39
    members of a political party at the time fixed for the party primaries, congresses or convention as there is nothing in the provisions banning political parties from taking on new members after the submission of their Register of Members to the Independent National Electoral Commission – Enang Vs Asuquo (2023)11 NWLR (Pt 1896) 510 at 536G.
    Neither is there anything in the provisions debarring such new members who joined after the submission of the Register of Members from participating in the primaries, congresses, or conventions of the political party conducted thereafter. The Courts recognize that it is within the prerogative of political parties to grant waivers to such people to contest their primary elections if it is considered in the best interest of the party to do so – Musa Vs PRP (1981) 2 NCLR 763 at 769, Agi Vs PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt 1595) 386 at 468 F-G and Enang Vs Asuquo supra. These are issues clearly touching on the management and running of the political party and within the internal affairs of the political party – Peoples Democratic Party Vs Ezeoriwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt 1606) 187, Ibrahim Vs Abdallah (2019) 7 NLR (Pt 1701) 293 at

     

    40
    311-312H-D, Udofia Vs Utuk (2023) LPFLR 59646 (CA)”.

    In conclusion and summary, this is an appeal against concurrent findings of facts by the two Courts below. There is no doubt that the grounds of disqualification contained in paragraphs 30-44 of the Petition are grounds of allegations of disqualification which were founded on pre-election issues outside the purview of the Tribunal. The argument of the Appellants is that even though the 2nd Respondent had joined the 3rd Respondent’s political party, his name was not submitted to the 3rd Respondent before the primary election. The Appellants’ claim is that the 2nd Respondent was not a member of a political party and was not sponsored by a political party, thus, the Appellants’ challenged the 2nd Respondent’s qualification mainly because of his membership of the 3rd Respondent. There is no doubt that the Appellants had raised a purely political question not meant for the Courts. Section 177 (c) of the 1999 CFRN (as altered) is meant to prohibit independent candidature. Where a party had embraced a candidate, sponsored him for election, the methodology by which the candidate was nominated by his party

     

    41
    is not justiciable. See UDOFIA v. ENANG (SUPRA); ABDULLAHI v. ARGUNGU (SUPRA) and ENANG v. ASUQUO (SUPRA).
    The 2nd Respondent had defected to Labour Party and won the election by 175,467 votes over the PDP candidate who got 88,529 votes.
    The Labour Party was in a position to determine whether the 2nd Respondent was its member. There was no breach of law by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents on the issue of membership. The Appellants failed to prove that at the time of the election, the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the election. The fact that the 2nd Respondent was jumping from one party to another until he found habour is not contrary to the Electoral Act or the Constitution. In any event, it is another aspirant at the party primaries that can complain. The 2nd Respondent cannot be legally faulted for finding succor with Labour Party after he lost the primaries at PDP so long as Labour Party had accepted him. There is no doubt that the 2nd Respondent was a member of the 3rd Respondent at the time of the election. SeeJIME v. HEMBE (SUPRA).

    Finally, grounds 11, 13, 14 & 16 on non-compliance and corrupt practices were abandoned to

     

    42
    chase shadows. That was the finding of the two Courts below. In this case, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents scored 175,467 votes while the Appellants scored 88,529 votes. Those votes were not challenged. I agree with the two Courts below that there is absolutely no profound legal reason to subvert the will of the majority of the electorate.

    This appeal is wholly without merit and is hereby dismissed. I affirm the judgment of the Court below in Appeal No: CA/OW/EP/GOV/AB/31/2023 delivered on 2/12/2023. I abide by the order as to costs.
    Appeal Dismissed.

     

    — ADAMU JAURO, J.S.C.:

    I had the opportunity of reading in advance, the lead judgment of my learned brother, Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC. I am in agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion contained therein, to the effect that the appeal is lacking in merit and ought to be dismissed.

    The nature of the contention of the Appellants that the 2nd Respondent was not qualified to contest the election under challenge was outside the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the trial tribunal and the complaint was unproved. The Appellants placed heavy reliance on Section 77 of the Electoral Act, 2022 and the

     

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    allegation that the name of the 2nd Respondent was not in the 3rd Respondent’s register of members submitted to INEC before its primary election. However, there is nothing in Section 77(3) of the Electoral Act that disqualifies a candidate whose name was not in the register of members submitted by his political party to INEC not later than 30 days before the date fixed for the party primaries, congresses or convention. Neither a party nor the Court is allowed to import into a statutory provision what is not contained therein.
    Another reason why the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint about the 2nd Respondent’s qualification is that the nature of the complaint, being issues of nomination and sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent by the 3rd Respondent, are firmly within the realm of a pre-election matter. See Section 285(14) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

    It is now settled that it is only a member of a political party who was an aspirant that participated in the primary election that can challenge the sponsorship and nomination of the candidate who emerged from the primary election. See PDP V. INEC & ORS

     

    44
    (2023) LPELR – 60457 (SC).
    Assuming the Appellants had the locus standi to raise the issue, same had become statute-barred at the time of the filing of the Petition as, by dint of Section 285(9) of the Petition, a pre-election matter must be filed not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.

    Furthermore, there is evidence that the 2nd Respondent resigned his membership of APC before joining the 3rd Respondent,

    For these reasons and of course, the more detailed ones adumbrated in the lead judgment, I join my learned brother in dismissing the appeal.
    Appeal dismissed.

     

    — EMMANUEL AKOMAYE AGIM, J.S.C.:

    I had a preview of the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Lord Justice, UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC. I completely agree with the reasoning, conclusions, decisions therein.

    Dissenting Opinion(s)

    None

    REFERENCES

    Research enhancement — dynamically linked

    Referenced Judgments

    Abdullahi v. Argungu (2023) LPELR-59950 (SC) — cited at pp. 34, 37, 41
    Achonu v. Okuwobi (2017) LPELR 42102(SC) — cited at p. 14
    Adeokin Records v. Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria (Ltd.) (2018) LPELR 45300 (SC) — cited at p. 14
    Agi v. PDP (2017) 17 NWLR (Pt 1595) 386 — cited at p. 40
    Alagbaoso v. INEC & Ors (2021) LPELR 59702(SC); (2023) LPELR 59702(SC) — cited at pp. 37-38
    Aliyu v. Namadi (2023) LPELR 59742 (SC) — cited at p. 37
    Allied Peoples Movement v. INEC (2023) 9 NWLR (Pt. 890) 419 — cited at p. 33
    Anyanwu v. Ogunewe (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1410) 437 — cited at p. 34
    APP v. Obaseki (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 1 — cited at pp. 8, 20
    Attorney General, Abia State v. Attorney General, Federation (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 763) 264 — cited at pp. 31-32
    Attorney General, Federation v. Attorney General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt 1380) 249 — cited at p. 37
    Carnation Registrars Ltd v. The President, National Industrial Court of Nigeria (2023) LPELR 60102 (SC) — cited at p. 37
    Enang v. Asuquo (2023) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1896) 510; (2023) LPELR 60042(SC) — cited at pp. 11, 34, 40, 41
    Engr. Nelson Oseloka Onubogu v. Ifeyinwa Anazonwu & 2 Ors (2023) LPELR 60288 (SC) — cited at pp. 11, 26
    Faleke v. INEC (2016) 18 NWLR (Pt 1543) 61 — cited at p. 20
    Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Bankole (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt 1418) 137 — cited at p. 37
    Ibrahim v. Abdallah (2019) 7 NLR (Pt 1701) 293 — cited at p. 40
    Jegede v. INEC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt 1797) 409 — cited at pp. 19, 20
    Jime v. Hembe (2023) LPELR-60334 (SC) — cited at pp. 35, 42
    Musa v. PRP (1981) 2 NCLR 763 — cited at p. 40
    Omisore & Anor v. Aregbesola & Ors (2015) LPELR-24803(SC) — cited at p. 18
    Oni v. Oyebanji (2023) 13 NWLR (Pt 1902) 544 — cited at pp. 8, 19
    Onubogu v. Anazonwu (2023) LPELR 60288(SC) — cited at p. 11
    Onyesoh v. Nnebedun & Ors (1992) LPELR-2742(SC) — cited at p. 14
    PDP v. INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-60457 (SC) — cited at p. 44
    Peoples Democratic Party v. Ezeoriwuka (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt 1606) 187 — cited at p. 40
    Sani v. Galadima (2023) LPELR 60183(SC) — cited at p. 11
    Shinkafi v. Yari (2016) 7 NWLR (Pt 1511) 340 — cited at p. 19
    Udofia v. Enang (2023) LPELR-59447 (CA) — cited at pp. 34, 41
    Udofia v. Utuk (2023) LPELR 59646 (CA) — cited at p. 41

    Referenced Statutes

    1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered), Sections 14(1), 177, 177(c), 182, 228(a), 285(5), 285(9), 285(13), 285(14) — cited at pp. 6-8, 16, 19, 25-31, 34, 44-45
    Electoral Act, 2022, Sections 35, 77, 77(2), 77(3), 82(1), 84, 84(1), 84(13), 84(14), 134(1), 134(1)(a), Paragraphs 4(5), 1st Schedule — cited at pp. 9-10, 12, 16, 18, 23, 26-27, 30-34, 36, 43-44