Nwiboko Akputa v. The State

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Judicial Division, delivered on the 26th day of November, 2020, which affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Ebonyi State, delivered on the 19th day of September, 2018, which found the appellant guilty of the offence of murder and imposed the statutory death sentence as punishment.

Nwiboko Akputa, (“the appellant”) and one Sunday Nwoka were jointly charged on a one-count charge for murder contrary to Section 319(1) of the Criminal Code Law, Cap. 33 Vol. 1, Laws of Ebonyi State of Nigeria, 2009, at the High Court of Ebonyi State. The prosecution relied on five (5) witnesses as well as several exhibits including the extra-judicial statements of the appellant, in mounting its case at the trial.

The case of the prosecution was that on the 13th day of July, 2013, the appellant and the second accused gruesomely murdered the victim, Chukwuma Akputa (now deceased), who happened to be the brother of the appellant. It was alleged that the appellant had a protracted land dispute with the deceased

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and had made several attempts to kill the deceased. However, the incident that led to the death of the deceased was that on the aforementioned day, the appellant had phoned the deceased and lured him to a bush where the appellant and the second accused attacked and stabbed him to death with daggers. Thereafter, the deceased was declared missing and a search party was organized to look for him. The appellant joined the search party. Yet, the deceased could not be found. Police investigations fixed the appellant as a suspect and upon interrogation, the appellant confessed that he and the second accused killed the deceased. He then took the police and villagers to the River Bank where he had dumped the deceased’s body. The said body was recovered therefrom.

In his defence, the appellant testified for himself and called no other witness. The second accused also testified for himself. Throughout the trial, proceedings and documents tendered in evidence were conducted and made in English Language.

The trial Court, by its judgment delivered on the 19th day of September, 2018, found the appellant guilty of the offence of murder and imposed the statutory death

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sentence as punishment. On the other hand, the second accused was not found guilty and was subsequently discharged and acquitted.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, the appellant filed an appeal before the lower Court challenging his conviction and sentence, via an amended notice of appeal filed on the 15th day of May, 2020, containing six grounds of appeal. The lower Court, by its judgment delivered on the 26th day of November, 2018, dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial Court on all issues raised.

Dissatisfied with the judgment of the lower Court, the appellant has now filed an appeal before this Court challenging his conviction and sentence, via a notice of appeal filed on the 27th day of January, 2021, containing four grounds of appeal. For the reasons which will shortly come to light, I intend to reproduce them as follows:
GROUND 1: ERROR IN LAW
The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law when they held:
“It is clear from the wordings of the Constitution that for an accused to get the assistance of an interpreter he or his counsel has to inform the Court that he does

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not understand the language being used at his trial”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR:
1. There is nothing in the provision of Section 36(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) expressly placing any duty on the accused to tell either his accuser or the Court the particular language in which they will inform him of his offence.
2. The section rather places duty on the accuser to inform the accused in the language he understands.

GROUND 2: ERROR IN LAW
The learned Justices of appeal erred in law when they held that the issue of identification of the corpse on which post mortem autopsy was performed was not a necessity in this case.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. There was no distinct identification at the point of recovery of the corpse which corroborated with the findings of the pathologist as to ground the assumption that the corpse recovered was the same with the one on which autopsy was performed.
2. Neither PW2 nor PW4 or any other person showed any mark of recognition to show that the corpse recovered was actually that of Chukwuma Akputa.
GROUND 3: ERROR IN LAW
The learned Justices of

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appeal erred when they held that the doctrine of “last seen” applied to the present circumstances.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. There was no evidence that the appellant was seen with the alleged deceased at any point in time.
2. No link was established between the appellant and the alleged deceased.
GROUND 4: ERROR IN LAW
The learned Justices of Appeal erred when they held that the appellant did not inform the Court that he did not understand the language of Court during trail within trial.
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
1. A close look at the provision do the Constitution says the accused person is entitled to be informed in the “language he understands” and entitled to interpreter.
2. The rights of the accused outlined above are to be provided without demand. The duty is one the prosecution to ask the accused the language he understands and not on the accused to demand it.

In amplifying his grounds of appeal, the appellant formulated two issues for determination in his brief of argument filed on the 18th day of August, 2021 and deemed properly filed on the 3rd day of May, 2023, to wit:
1. Whether the Court of appeal

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was right when it held that the duty to provide interpreter as provided in Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, is predicated upon request by the accused person.
2. Whether the Court of appeal was right in holding that the evidence of identification of the corpse of the deceased was not a necessity in this particular case.

On the other hand, the respondent filed its brief of argument on the 7th day of October, 2021. Therein, four issues for determination were formulated, to wit:
1. Whether the Court below was wrong in affirming the conviction and sentence of death of the appellant on the firm ground that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt in the trial Court;
2, Whether as required by law the corpse of the deceased was not properly and validly identified to the medical doctor who performed the post mortem examination on the deceased’s body.
3. Whether the Court below was not right in law when it held that the trial Court correctly applied the jurisprudential doctrine of last seen in this case; and
4. Whether the Court below was wrong in holding that the appellant’s

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right to an interpreter during his trial was not derogated upon by the trial Court being that the appellant was not provided with an interpreter even when he did not ask for it.

My Lords, I have taken great pains to set-out in detail the grounds of appeal and the issues formulated by both parties to point out that the respondent with respect has not spared any effort to complicate this appeal which is otherwise simple but for its convoluted manner of presenting of its case.

It is observable that Issues Nos. 1 and 3 in the respondent’s brief of argument raise matters not adverted to in the grounds of appeal nor comprised in the issues for determination formulated by the appellant.

It has been stated times without number that issues for determination must fall within the scope or ambit of the grounds of appeal. Any issue for determination falling outside the ambit or scope of the grounds of appeal is incompetent. See Adejugbe v. Ologunja [2004] 6 NWLR (Pt 868) 46, (2004) Vol. 8 MJSC 33; Onifade v. Olayiwola [1990] 7 NWLR (Pt 161) 130, 157; Shittu & Ors v. Fashawe (2005) LPELR-3058 (SC). Issues for determination whether filed by appellant or

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respondent must be tailored to the real and crucial issues in controversy. See Ibrahim v. Ojomo [2004] 4 NWLR (Pt 862) 89, (2004) Vol. 4 MJSC 143.
The work of this Court, as an appellate Court, is done based on issues for determination derived from grounds of appeal. An issue for determination is a point so crucial that when decided one way or the other affects the fate of the appeal. If they are not related to any ground of appeal, then they become irrelevant and go to no issue.
Any argument in the brief in support of such issues should be discountenanced by the Court.

Equally, the issues for determination in a brief of argument though necessarily based on the grounds of appeal are considered to have displaced the grounds of appeal. See Momodu & Ors v. Momoh & Anor (1991) LPELR-1906 (SC). Hence, the argument in the brief follows the issues for determination and not the grounds of appeal directly. The issues may comprise the substance of the grounds of appeal or may contain less but cannot contain more than what have been alleged by the grounds of appeal. In the instant appeal, Issues Nos. 1 and 3 in the respondents’ brief are

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therefore irrelevant and go to no issue. Accordingly, issues Nos. 1 and 3 in the Respondent’s brief of argument are hereby discountenanced by me.

This leaves Issue Nos. 2 and 4 in the respondent’s brief which are similar to those formulated by the appellant. The only difference is more or less in the way they were couched. I shall therefore be guided by the two issues formulated by the appellant since they are more encompassing and elaborately couched in determining this appeal. I propose to take each issue in turn, first setting out the respective submissions of the appellant and the respondent before proceeding to provide my opinion and conclusion on the merits of the issues.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE NO. 1
On issue one, it was argued that there is nothing in Section 36(6) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered) which expressly places the duty on the accused to be the one that will reveal, without being asked, the language he understands. Learned counsel strongly contended that at all levels in the process of criminal adjudication, the duty is always on the authorities as imposed by the Constitution to

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ascertain the language the accused person understands and inform him the details of the allegation against him as well as interpret the judicial proceedings to the accused in the ascertained language.

It was further contended that from a community reading of Section 36(6)(a)-(e), contrary to the reasoning of the lower Court, there is no condition to be fulfilled by the accused before he can take the benefits of the provisions. All duties are placed on the authorities to ensure that the accused is informed of and interpreter provided for him.

According to learned counsel, all the authorities relied upon by the lower Court under this issue were based on a mistaken assumption that Section 36(6)(a) and (e) placed duty on the person being accused of criminal offence to go out of his way to inform the accuser the language in which he will be informed of the allegation against him instead of the person or authority accusing him making effort to ascertain the language of the accused.

Learned counsel further referred this Court to the case of Ajiboye v. FRN (2019) 6 WRN 1, 13, in submitting that in taking the extra-judicial statements of the

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appellant, the police failed to comply with the formal requirements for taking extra-judicial statements laid down in the aforementioned case.

It was further submitted that the accused was never asked the language he understands both at the level of investigation before the police and during the trial within trial. All the extra-judicial statements of the appellant were not properly interpreted and it is quite doubtful that the accused understood the language they were made since they did not ask him the language he understood.

With the aforesaid contentions, he urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant by expunging both extra-judicial statements of the appellant as well as the trial within trial.

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
Responding to the above arguments, learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that during the trial, the appellant never stated that he was an illiterate. He merely stated the level of his education. Further that, while the investigation lasted, he maintained that he did his Primary 6, and later during his trial, he said he stopped at Primary 5. On this point, the case of Ogheneovu v. FRN [2019]

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13 NWLR (Pt. 1689) 235, 255, paras G-H, 270, paras A-B, was cited.

In addition, it was contended that illiteracy was never raised until the matter got to the lower Court, and so there was no evidence led before the trial Court to show that the appellant, a First School Leaving Certificate holder, could neither read and write, nor understand English Language.

It was further submitted that the issue of illiteracy is a question of fact which is to be proved through evidence, and the onus is certainly on the appellant to prove that question. Also, Courts are at liberty to draw some inferences or/and conclusion to presume his literacy on such issue. In support of his submissions, he cited the following cases Anaeze v. Anyaso (1993) 5 NWLR (pt 291) 1; Ogheneovu v. FRN (supra).

It was further contended that it behoves on an accused or his counsel to raise objection timeously and request for the assistance of an interpreter. Where he fails to so object and request for an interpreter, the right to raise the issue is lost and cannot be raised or entertained on appeal as a ground for setting aside a conviction unless he claimed the right at the proper

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time and was denied same. On this submission, he placed reliance on the following cases: Ogheneovu v. FRN (supra); Nwokocha v. A.G, Imo State [2016] 8 NWLR (Pt 1513) 141; Onyia v. State (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt 1118) 142; and State v. Gwonto (1983) SCNLR 142.

He further posited that neither the appellant nor his counsel ever complained at the trial or objected to the use of English language in conducting proceedings involving him. He also never requested for an interpreter and as such cannot be heard to be complaining of denial of right to an interpreter in this appeal. He urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO. 1
Without much rhetoric, PW4’s evidence is to the effect that the appellant volunteered Exhibit D to him. In recording Exhibit D, PW4 adduced evidence to the effect that he recorded the appellant’s statement and read it over to him in the same language. If PW4 had recorded the statement in English Language and read it to the appellant in English Language that was because the appellant understood English Language.

My Lords, I do not think that an investigator is under any obligation to

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insist on the depth of a suspect’s erudition when once the suspect informs the investigator that he understands the language in use during the investigation of the allegation, and the recording of the suspect’s statement. As a general rule, there is a rebuttable presumption of literacy, which must be rebutted with evidence by the party pleading illiteracy. See Anaeze v. Anyaso [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt 291) 1; Otitoju v. Gov., Ondo State [1994] 4 NWLR (Pt 340) 518. Thus, even if English Language is not the mother tongue of the appellant or even if the appellant downplayed his knowledge of and his ability to communicate in English Language, the onus was on the appellant to prove the assertion by empirical evidence. The presumption that the appellant was literate at all material times, which is rebuttable is further strengthened or reinvigorated by the appellant’s own admission in Exhibit H, where he stated that: “I attended Ogbaga Nkaliki Primary School Onyigwa in Echiaba Development Centre of Ebonyi LGA where I sat for my First School Leaving Certificate in 1992…”

In the instant case, I agree with respondent’s line of argument. Having gone through the record

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of appeal, I have observed tnat illiteracy was never raised until the matter got to the lower Court as the first appellate Court. The issue of literacy does not begin or end with whether or not a person completed Primary 5 or Primary 6 of his basic education. There was no evidence led before the trial Court, as required by law, to show that the appellant could neither read and write nor understand the English Language. To my mind, therefore, the issue of calling an interpreter did not arise because even when the charge was read to the appellant, such was done in English Language in the presence of his counsel. There was therefore no necessity to call any interpreter.

Furthermore, the appellant in volunteering Exhibit H, which is inparimateria with Exhibit D, admitted before PW5 that he understood English Language. PW5 was the Investigating Police Officer at the State’s C. I. D level. His unchallenged oral evidence on oath is hereunder replicated in part:
The first accused was charged and cautioned in English Language and volunteered his statement which was a confessional statement. I recorded the [sic] statement in English Language and Read same over

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to him. The first accused claimed to understand same. The accused who claimed that he understood the said statement then signed and I counter signed.
[See Page 133, lines 2-7 and 12-13 of the Record of Appeal]

On this wise, I find the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that accused was never asked the language he understands both at the level of investigation before the police and during the trial within trial, with respect, to be most untenable.

The appellant also placed heavy reliance on Section 36(6)(a) and (e) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered), while submitting that the duty to provide interpreter is predicated upon the charging authorities ascertaining the language of the accused. Section 36(6)(a) and (e) provides as follows:
6) Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to-
(a) be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence;
(e) have, without payment, the assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial of the offence.

By the above cited provisions,

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an interpreter only becomes mandatory or necessary where a person charged with a criminal offence does not understand the language used at the point of arrest and trial. In light of the profile of the appellant as already evinced above, there is clear evidence that the appellant, a First School Leaving Certificate Holder, understood English Language being the language of the Court during his trial. Moreover, even if the appellant could not understand the language used and understand the charges laid against him, the appellant at all material times had the opportunity to obtain clear legal advice from or provide cogent instructions to his legal representation for an interpreter, which he did not do.
See Anyanwu vs. State [2002] 13 NWLR (Pt.783)107; Madu v. State [1997] 1 NWLR (Pt 482) 386; Ogheneovu v. FRN (supra).
In the case of The State v. Salihu Mohammed Gwonto and Ors. (1983) 1 SCNLR 142, (1983) LPELR-3220(SC), Nnamani, JSC, supported the above view when he held thus:
I think, with all respect, that the point which was missed here is that the importance of the issue of representation lies in the fact that if an accused person is

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represented by counsel such counsel ought to demand his client’s right to interpretation or object to any irregularity such as lack of interpretation. If neither he nor the accused object, the right is lost for all time and certainly cannot be invoked in a Court of Appeal.
Without wasting the precious time of this Court, I do not see any merit in this issue. Issue one is hereby resolved against the appellant.

APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS ON ISSUE NO. 2
Submitting on issue two, it was argued that evidence of proper identification of the corpse of the alleged deceased was a necessity in this case and the lower Court was in grave error when it held otherwise.

It was further contended that identification of the corpse of a deceased as truly that of the person alleged to have died is a vital process in criminal prosecution, adding that if the corpse is properly identified as truly that of the deceased, it settles with finality the prosecution’s case that the alleged deceased actually died, which is a vital ingredient in a murder trial.

It was further submitted that there is no clear evidence that the corpse was identified as really that of the

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alleged deceased neither by PW4, PW2 or the medical officer, PW3. According to learned counsel, nobody pointed to anything with which the corpse was identified as that of the alleged deceased.

It was further argued that the other pieces of evidence available cannot be said to have consistently shown that the body on which the autopsy was performed was that of the alleged deceased as the issue of the appellants’ confession is still unresolved and doubtful.

He further argued that there were unresolved issues as to the appearance of the body of the alleged deceased such as the laceration described on the body of the corpse by the medical officer which did not align with matchet stabbing at the rib as described in the so-called confessional statement. Thus, the need for a separate witness to identify the corpse was not only desirable but a sine qua non. He referred to the authority of Egbaraevba v. State [2016] 8 NWLR (Pt 1515) 433, 438.

He urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant.

RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
Responding to the arguments, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the submission of the appellant

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is a misconception and distortion of the evidence of PW4 on the record.

In drawing the attention of this Court to the evidence of PW4 at pages 101-105 of the record of appeal, learned counsel submitted that nowhere in the printed record did PW4 adduce evidence that “when he went to recover the corpse the appellant was in the vehicle, as he did not want the community to know he was present, while he did the recovery.”

He further posited that the same distortion of facts played out in his misrepresentation to the effect that there was no evidence that the corpse was identified by either PW2 or any other person, and that there is no clear evidence that the corpse was even identified to the medical doctor that performed the autopsy.

Learned counsel submitted that the appellant and his counsel have gone into distortions and manufacturing evidence which is unethical conduct.

He further submitted that it was the appellant that validly identified, in the first place, the dead body of his step brother to the police and the villagers that accompanied the police to the scene of the crime. By Exhibits V and H, he stated that the deceased was his

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brother.

He further submitted that the issue of nonidentification of the deceased’s body was never raised at the trial stage. The reason is so simple. Learned counsel continued that PW3, in his evidence-in-chief, stated unequivocally that, “The autopsy was conducted on 27th July, 2013. The body was identified by Sunday Ogboloko (PW2).” In face of this evidence, if the appellant truly considered the evidence of PW3 false, he ought to have cross-examined PW3 accordingly or lead any evidence in rebuttal of the evidence. Having failed to so do, it would be late at the close of the case to attempt to negative the evidence after the effluxion of the stage of cross-examination. He referred to the cases of Oforlete v. The State [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt 681) 415 and Babalola v State [1989] NWLR (Pt 115) 264, 281, paras D-E.

He further posited that the corpse of the deceased was properly identified to the medical doctor PW3 by PW2 who was also a relation of the deceased. Moreover, he added, identification of the body of the deceased by the medical doctor who performed post-mortem examination on it is not a sine qua non in all cases, he referred to the case of

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Afosi v. State [2013] 13 NWLR (Pt 1371) 329, 333.

In conclusion, it was submitted that the totality of the evidence shows consistently that the corpse on which the autopsy was performed was that of the deceased. In view of this, learned counsel urged this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent.

REPLY BRIEF
In his reply brief filed on the 10tn day of December 2021, learned counsel to the appellant conceded that in the processes of arguing this brief, some extraneous issues not arising from the evidence on record were brought in. However, these issues, learned counsel argued, have not in any way affected the appellant’s contentions that there was no proper identification of the corpse at the point of recovery, as there is no distinctive feature from which the corpse was recognized as that of Chukwuma Akputa.

Learned counsel further referred to the case of Afosi v. State [2013] 13 NWLR (Pt 1371) 329, in submitting that the disparities in the wound described on the corpse and contradictory evidence of the various witnesses ought not to be accepted by the Court.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE NO. 2
Admittedly, the duty of counsel saddled

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with the defence of an accused person charged with a capital offence is not a light one. However, counsel must be careful not to conduct himself in any manner that will adversely affect the administration of justice. Counsel should learn to be honorable where there is no defense validly conceivable and available to their client’s case; they should say so; they are ministers in the temple of Justice and not ministers to only their clients. See Aliyu v. State (2021) LPELR-55002(SC).
A deliberately mischievous distortion of facts, no doubt, is a conduct unbecoming which is not only capable of adversely affecting the administration of justice, but does actually affect the administration of justice. See Magna Maritime Services Ltd and Anor v. Oteju and Anor (2005) LPELR-1817 (SC); Bille v. State (2016) LPELR-40832 (SC); Owuru and Anor v. Adigwu and Anor (2017) LPELR-42763 (SC). I will leave it just at that.

Now, contrary to the submissions of learned counsel to the appellant, PW4 adduced evidence to the effect that the appellant led PW4, members of his investigation team, and the villagers to the scene of the crime and showed them his slain brother’s

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corpse which they recovered. The evidence of PW4 in this regard is as follows:
I visited the scene of the crime on 15th July, 2013, with the first accused person, and other members of my investigation team. At the scene the first accused took me where the deceased was lying. I took photograph of the body of the deceased at the scene. The body/corpse of the deceased was later moved to Federal Teaching Hospital Abakaliki.

As for PW3, the Medical Doctor, he was not at the scene of the crime and by his evidence did not know the Deceased proper to the date of the incident. However, in line with the law, the corpse of the Deceased was duly identified to him by PW2 for postmortem examination. PW3, in his evidence-in-chief, stated unequivocally that “The autopsy was conducted on 27th July, 2013. The body was identified by Sunday Ogboloko (PW2).” Learned counsel for the respondent argued that if the appellant truly considered the evidence of PW3 to be false, he ought, in law, to have cross-examined PW3 accordingly or lead any evidence in rebuttal of the evidence of PW3. I find this argument attractive. From the record before this Court, it is apparent that

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the appellant did not cross-examine PW3.

The law is trite that where a witness called by the Prosecution testifies on a point of substance which the opposing party seeks to impeach, the opposing party via its counsel is required to put the substance of the contradictory evidence to the witness during cross- examination, or at least indicate that he does not accept such evidence as true. See Babalola v. State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 115) 264; Nwobodo v. Onoh (1984) 1 SCNLR 1 at 88, the letter and spirit of this principle is a search for the truth in the fairest manner possible, preventing surprise and unfair trial strategy. Thus, failure to cross-examine a witness on a point of substance supports an inference that the opposing party accepts the evidence Oforlete v. State (2000) LPELR-2270 (SC); Esene v. The State (2017) LPELR-41912 (SC); (1989) LPELR-695 (SC); Aliyu v. State (2013) LPELR-20748 (SC); Suleiman v. State (2022) LPELR-57577 (SC).

On the circumstance that will warrant calling a separate witness for identification of the deceased’s body, this Court had the privilege to pronounce in the case of Njoku v. State [1992] 8 NWLR (Pt 262) 714, 723, paras

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B-C, that:
Where the totality of evidence adduced by the prosecution showed unmistakably that the body on which a doctor performed a post mortem examination was that of the deceased, a separate witness to testify as to the identity of the corpse, though desirable is not a necessity. The identification must be done by persons who knew the deceased very well before her death.

My Lords, the corpse of the deceased was properly identified to the medical doctor (PW3) who performed the post mortem examination by PW2 who also happened to be a relation of the deceased.

Moreover, appellant’s argument on the issue of identification of the deceased’s body, with respect, seems to be tilting towards an attempt to dispel the age long principle of law that a Court of law can convict on a charge of murder even without the body of the deceased being recovered where the surrounding facts point irresistibly to the guilt of the accused. See Akpa v. The State [2008] 14 NWLR (Pt 1106) 72; Ibo v. The State (1971) NMLR 245; The State v. Ifu (1964) 8 ENLR 28; Udor v. State (2014) LPELR-23064(SC); Abokokuyanro v. State (2016) LPELR-40107 (SC).

Thus, even if the said

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corpse was not recovered at all, the confessional evidence and circumstantial evidence which were so cogent, direct, and properly proven in the instant case had safely fixed the appellant with the commission of the offence.

In light of the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that the totality of evidence showed consistently that the corpse on which the autopsy was performed was that of the deceased. I have no slightest doubt that the lower Court was right in holding that the evidence of identification of the corpse of the deceased was not a necessity in this particular case and same should remain undisturbed. Issue two is accordingly resolved against the appellant.

Thus, having resolved the two issues raised by the . appellant against him, the corollary is certainly that this appeal is devoid of any merit and deserves to be and is hereby dismissed for lacking in merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Judicial Division (lower Court) in which it affirmed the judgment the trial Court, is hereby further affirmed by me.

In a nutshell, I accordingly dismiss the appeal and further affirm the conviction and sentence passed on the appellant.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; scrollbar-color: var(–thumbBG) var(–scrollbarBG);”>

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Appeal Dismissed.