Chief Dr. Pere Ajuwa & Anor v. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited
CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
The Appellants filed an originating summons at the Federal High Court, Yenagoa, Bayelsa State (later transferred to Port Harcourt) seeking to enforce a joint resolution of the National Assembly awarding them US$1.5 billion as compensation for environmental degradation of their communities caused by the Respondent’s oil production activities since 1956. On 24 February 2006, the trial court gave judgment ordering the Respondent to comply with the National Assembly resolution and pay the stated sum.
The Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal and applied to the trial court for an unconditional stay of execution. On 19 May 2006, the trial court refused unconditional stay but granted a conditional stay on the condition that the judgment sum be deposited in the Central Bank of Nigeria in the name of the Chief Registrar of the Federal High Court on or before 12 noon on 22 May 2006. The Respondent filed an application at the Court of Appeal seeking variation of the conditional stay to an unconditional stay pending appeal, and another motion dated 19 September 2006 seeking leave to amend its notice of appeal and for accelerated hearing.
The two motions were transferred from the Port Harcourt Division to the Abuja Division of the Court of Appeal and heard together. On 10 May 2007, the Court of Appeal granted all reliefs sought, including unconditional stay of execution, and gave directions for filing briefs with the appeal adjourned to 21 June 2007 for hearing. The Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court against that ruling.
Issues for Determination
ISSUE 1: Whether the Court of Appeal followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court for the grant of unconditional stay of execution for money judgment in granting to the Respondent an unconditional stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal High Court.
ISSUE 2: Whether the first prayer contained in the Respondent’s motion dated 19th September, 2006 was not too vague and bad in law to be granted by the court.
ISSUE 3: Whether the Court of Appeal ought not to have struck out the Respondent’s appeal in the court below rather than setting it down for hearing expeditiously when the time within which the Respondent should file its brief of argument had expired and there was no application for enlargement of time to file the brief.
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal granting unconditional stay of execution and accelerated hearing of the appeal before that court, and ordered the Appellants to pay N50,000.00 costs to the Respondent.
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Abandonment of Appeal — Pendency of Motion for Amendment — Effect
“I do not think it is right or reasonable to hold that an Appellant who has filed a motion for leave to file and argue additional grounds of appeal lacks the will to prosecute his appeal. I regard it as preposterous and an abuse of language to so hold. It is certainly not evidence of apathy towards the prosecution of the appeal or tardiness in doing so. It is certainly in my opinion the opposite. An Appellant who has in court an application to file additional grounds of appeal cannot be said to be apathetic to the prosecution of the appeal the grounds of which he is seeking to add to.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 26; Paras B—D.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Appeal — Abandonment — Failure to File Brief Within Time — When Appeal Not Deemed Abandoned
“From the facts and circumstances of this matter, it was not the fault of the Respondent that its motion to amend its notice of appeal and raise fresh issues was not heard in good time to enable it file its brief of argument within the time stipulated by the rules of the court below. The court eventually heard the motion and after granting same, made consequential orders to file briefs of argument and set the appeal down for hearing. All these steps were well taken. It was immaterial that no application was filed when the court below made the consequential orders. In Nneji & Ors. v Chukwu & Ors. (supra) with a similar setting, this court held that the order of the Court of Appeal for filing of briefs out of time without a prior application for same was an order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal. The orders appear necessary and the need for same arose incidentally.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at pp. 25—26; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Competence of Appeal — Grounds of Appeal — Mixed Law and Fact — Leave Required
“The senior counsel for the Respondent, with respect to the preliminary objection, initially maintained that since the present appeal arose from the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal made on May 10th, 2007, leave of the court below or this court ought to be obtained before filing the Notice of Appeal. He placed reliance on the provisions of Section 21 (2) of the Supreme Court Act. Senior counsel submitted that since the Appellants failed to obtain the requisite leave, the entire Notice of Appeal and the appeal are incompetent and should be struck out or dismissed.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at pp. 3—4; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Concurrent Findings of Fact — When Supreme Court Will Interfere
“It is very well settled that concurrent findings by the trial court and the court of Appeal would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court except there has been exceptional circumstances to disturb those findings such as: The findings cannot be supported by evidence, or are perverse. There is miscarriage of justice or violation of law or procedure.”
Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at pp. 5—6; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Exercise of Judicial Discretion — Nature of Discretion Question — Question of Fact
“It is nevertheless a question of fact with the exercise of discretion. In Grifths v. J. P. Harrison Watford Ltd. (1963) A.C 1, Lord Denning expressed it succinctly thus reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusion and often do juries. So do Judges. And are they not reasonable men. It has therefore been recognised that these more or less discretion questions of impression or opinion in respect of which reasonable men may arrive at discrepant conclusions on the same evidence are questions of facts.”
Per Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 34; Paras B—E.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Grounds of Appeal — What Constitutes Error of Law — Legal Principles
As carefully set out by Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC in Nwadike v Ibekwe (supra) on the point: (a) It is an error of law if the adjudicating tribunal took into account some wrong criteria in reaching its conclusion. (b) Several issues that can be raised on legal interpretation of deeds, documents, term of arts and inference drawn therefrom are grounds of law. (c) Where a ground deals merely with a matter of inference, even if it be inference of fact, a ground framed from such is a ground of law. (d) Where a tribunal states the law in a point wrongly, it commits an error in law. (e) Where the complaint is that there was no evidence or no admissible evidence upon which a finding or decision was based, same is regarded as a ground of law. (f) If a Judge considers matters which are not before him and relies on them for the exercise of his discretion, he will be exercising same on wrong principles and this will be a question of law.
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at pp. 9—10; Paras B—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Interlocutory Appeals — Leave to Appeal — Question of Law Alone
“It is my considered opinion that the provisions of Section 233(2)(a), (3) and (6) should be given a harmonious reading in such a manner that it does not obliterate the clear provisions of Section 233(2)(a) which gives a specific provision of right of appeal without leave on point of law. Subsection (3) of Section 233 of the Constitution makes other rights of appeal subject to that provided in subsection (2)(a) of the same.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 7; Paras A—B.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Judicial Discretion — Definition and Nature — Independence from Party Consent
“Judicial discretion is a sacred power which inheres to a judge. It is an armour which the judge should employ judicially and judiciously to arrive at a just decision. Same should not be left to the whims and caprices of a party to the action. It is not in tandem with the dictates of public policy which demands, inter alia, that administration of justice shall be discharged without any form of prompting by the parties. Discretion had been defined to mean ‘a power or right’ conferred upon public functionaries by law of acting officially in certain circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 18; Paras A—C.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Precedent — Discretionary Decisions — No Binding Authority
“In matters of judicial discretion, since the facts of two cases are not always the same, this court does not make it a practice to lay down rules or principles to fetter the exercise of its discretion or that of the lower courts. In matters of discretion, no one case is authority for the other. A court cannot be bound by a previous decision to exercise its discretion in regimented way, because that would be as it were, putting an end to discretion.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 18; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Stay of Execution — Conditional Stay — Onerous Conditions
“The court below found that the trial high court made the order of conditional stay in terms which were onerous and impossible to comply with. This is clearly manifest in the 3rd further affidavit of the Respondent. The Respondent was ordered to pay the sum of US$1.5 billion within a time that is less than one working day. As the ready cash was not available, the Respondent would have to dispose of its assets and oil wells etc. If the appeal succeeds, the judgment will be barren – as their assets would have gone. All these factors convinced the court below to find that the Respondent showed why the order is onerous and impossible of immediate performance. I feel the court below was in order.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at pp. 19—20; Paras D—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Stay of Execution — Doctrine of Corporate Death — Preservation of Judgment Debtor
“The court below agreed that in line with the doctrine of corporate death, the Respondent should be kept ‘alive’ to enable it pursue its appeal. It maintained that the goose that lays the golden eggs must not be allowed to pass on. A death which denies the Respondent of prosecuting the appeal is not justice. The court below made its order to keep the Appellant alive to prosecute the appeal. I am unable to fault that decision.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 20; Paras A—C.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Stay of Execution — Judicial Discretion — Exercise of Discretionary Power
“The grant/refusal of an application for stay of execution is a matter of discretion, and so the Judge must examine the facts and circumstances of the case and the rules applicable and refrain from acting as he likes. He must take into account the competing rights of the parties and exercise his discretion judicially and judiciously. That is to say with sound and convincing reasons.”
Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 41; Paras B—D.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Stay of Execution — Judicial Discretion — Interference by Appellate Court
“Stay of execution, conditional or unconditional are granted entirely at the discretion of the court and with all discretionary powers/orders, an appeal court is always loath to interfere with the way a court exercises its discretion but will be compelled to interfere if the discretion was wrongly exercised, or was tainted with some irregularity, or in breach of the law, or the court finds that it is in the interest of justice to interfere.”
Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 40; Paras E—A.
APPELLATE PRACTICE — Stay of Execution — Money Judgment — Consent of Judgment Creditor
“It is my considered opinion that the decision of this court UBN v Odusote Bookstore Ltd (supra) did not lay it down as a general principle of law that in all money judgments, the consent of judgment creditors must be secured to enable judges make order of stay of execution. It is when the judgment debtor is a bank or a financial institution and a proposal is being made as to where the judgment debt would be kept pending determination of the appeal that parties, but more especially the judgment creditor, will have an input.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 19; Paras C—E.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Applications — Misjoinder of Prayers — Irregularity — Technicalities
“To say the least, the wording of Prayer 1 can be described as inelegant. That is not to suggest that the two prayers to amend the notice of appeal and to raise fresh issues cannot be discerned therein. If they had been duly separated, the novel tag of ‘misjoinder of prayers’ would have been avoided. In my considered opinion, same is a mere irregularity that was rightly waived by the court below. After all, the Appellants have not shown how they have been prejudiced or misled. The technical objection is misconceived. The days of technicalities are gone. The current vogue is the doing of substantial justice to both sides in such a way that the main appeal will be heard and determined on its merit.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 23; Paras A—D.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Stay of Execution — Judicial Discretion — No One Case Is Authority for Another
“The practice of law in matters of judicial discretion are spelt out in clear terms and that is, that since facts of two cases are not always the same, this court does not make a practice of laying down rules or principles to fetter the exercise of its discretion or of the exercise of discretion by the lower courts. Therefore, it is safe to say that in matters of discretion, no one case is authority for the other. This is because when one case is authority for another and the court bound by a previous decision in the particular way that would put an end to discretion.”
Per Ngwuta, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 53; Paras A—C.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Stay of Execution — Variation of Terms — Further Application Under Section 24 of Supreme Court Act
“Indeed it is within the rights of the Respondent to apply for a further stay of execution with terms or conditions which may differ from those imposed by the Court of Appeal. This is allowable under Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act. This variation may be granted by the Supreme Court or further varied or annulled.”
Per Ngwuta, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 53; Paras A—B.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Third Party Interests — Equity’s Darling — Court’s Duty to Protect
“It should be stated that the facts of the interest of Federal Government of Nigeria and other 3rd party interests in the joint venture operated by SPDC were deposed to for the purpose of bringing to the notice of the court below ‘third parties interests’ that would be adversely affected if unconditional stay was refused. That was well made as ‘third parties’ interests are Equity’s darling’. The court must protect them jealously.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 21; Paras A—C.
EVIDENCE LAW — Unchallenged Affidavit Evidence — Deemed Admitted
“The Appellants argued that there was no evidence before the court below that the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) has 55% equity interest in the company. But I note that same is covered in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the 3rd further affidavit on Pages 107-108 of Volume 2 of the record of appeal. As the depositions were not challenged, they are deemed to be admitted by the Appellants.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 20; Paras E—A.
Obiter Dicta
Per Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC: “While I do not wish a party should waive its constitutional right of appeal, if it feels strongly dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, it is equally the duty of counsel to ensure a speedy trial and determination of the appeal. In this case the lower court delivered its ruling on 10/5/07 and fixed the appeal for hearing on 21/6/2007 within which time to appeal would have been heard and determined. Instead, learned senior counsel had embarked on this tortuous journey of appeal on the exercise of discretionary power by the lower court. This is 2011, four (4) years after which this appeal is been heard and determined by the lower court. Now the appeal is being sent to the lower court for trial after having wasted four years without the Appellants knowing their fate to the money in issue. This act, with due respect, is not encouraging and should not repeat itself and I would not say more than this.”
Per Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC, in Chief Dr. Pere Ajuwa & Anor v. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (2011) NLC-2902007(SC) at pp. 35—36; Paras C—A.
Orders of Court
The Supreme Court made the following orders:
1 . The preliminary objection raised by the Respondent was overruled.
2. The appeal was unanimously dismissed as being devoid of merit.
3. The Appellants shall pay N50,000.00 (Fifty Thousand Naira) costs to the Respondent.
4. The decision of the Court of Appeal granting unconditional stay of execution and accelerated hearing of the appeal before that court was affirmed.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
Tayo Oyetibo, SAN (with him K. Onunojo, A. Kayode, O. Obele, S. Edward)
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
Chief Richard Akinjide, SAN (with him K. Obisike)
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
— (DELIVERED BY JOHN AFOLABI FABIYI. JSC DELIVERING LEAD JUDGMENT:)
Concurring Opinion(s)
— WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN. JSC:
I have had the privilege of reading in draft the leading judgment of my learned brother, Fabiyi. JSC, just delivered and agree with the reasoning and conclusion therein stated.
Having nothing useful to add as my learned brother has dealt with the issues for determination exhaustively, I accordingly dismiss the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the said leading judgment including the order as to costs.
P.29
— MUHAMMAD SAIFULLAH MUNTAKA-COOMASSIE. JSC:
On the 24/2/2006, Justice O J. Okeke sitting at the Federal High Court, Yenagoa Division delivered his judgment wherein he ordered as follows:
“The court therefore grants the two declaration of reliefs sought by the Plaintiffs, and orders the Defendant to comply forthwith with the resolution of the National Assembly that it pays the sum of US$1.5 Billion as compensation to the Plaintiffs for the injuries and damaged suffer.”(See Page 309 of the record).
The Defendant, who is the Respondent in this appeal, filed an application for the stay of execution of this judgment after filing the Notice of Appeal.
P.30
The trial court heard the application and on 19/5/2001 conditionally granted the application as follows:
“That the execution of the judgment in this suit is stayed on condition that judgment Debtor/Applicant deposits the judgment sum of US$1.5 Billion with the Central Bank of Nigeria in an interest yielding account in the name of the Chief Registrar, Federal High Court of Nigeria on or before 12 noon Monday 22nd May, 2006 to await the outcome of the appeal.”
The Respondent thereafter filed an application before the Court of Appeal, Port-Harcourt Division, in which it prayed the lower court as follows:
“1) The stay of execution of the Order of the Honourable Justice Okechukwu Okeke of the Federal High Court made on Friday May, 19th 2006 that the Appellant/Applicant deposit the judgment sum of 1.5 Billion US Dollars with the central Bank of Nigeria in the name of the Chief Registrar of the Federal High Court on or before 12 noon on Monday May 22nd 2006.
The ruling and orders of conditional stay of execution granted by Honourable Justice Okechukwu Okeke of the Federal High Court, Port-Harcourt on May 19th 2006 be varied by this honourable court by granting un-conditional stay of execution of the judgment and orders of the lower court pending the final determination of the Defendants/Applicant’s appeal.”
On the 20/9/2006, Respondent also filed another motion dated 19/9/2006 in which it prayed the lower court for the following reliefs:
“1. Granting leave to the Defendant/Appellant/Applicant to amend the notice of appeal in this matter by filing and arguing the amended notice of appeal including raising fresh issue herein attached as Exhibit SPDC 1.
For the accelerated hearing of the appeal.”
P.31
The two applications were consolidated after the matter has been transferred to the Court of Appeal, Abuja Division for hearing. The lower court in its considered ruling after hearing both parties on 10/5/2007, held thus:
It must not elude the court that any order made by court is an interim order pending the hearing and determination of the substantive appeal. I do not agree that the judgment creditor must consent to all applications for stay of monetary judgment. This is only required where the judgment creditor is a bank or financial institution.
In sum, from the peculiar circumstance of the instant case, I hold that there are good and justiable reasons to grant the prayer of the Applicant for unconditional stay of execution. It is my impression that if this appeal fails that Applicant has assets within the jurisdiction of the court to be attached for payment of the judgment debt whereas if the appeal succeeds such success will automatically be rendered barren and nugatory as the Appellant/Applicant would no longer be around to enjoy the dividend of victory. This court however endorses the undertaking of the Applicant to accelerate hearing of the appeal. The Appellant is to file the Appellant’s brief within (14) days and Respondent within (21) days of the receipt of the Appellant’s brief. Appeal is adjourned to 21st day of June, 2007 for hearing.
The Appellant was dissatisfied with the ruling of the lower court and had appeal to this court. The Appellant in its notice of appeal dated 22nd of May, 2007, raised six grounds of appeal.
P.32
Thereafter, in his brief of argument filed before this court formulated three issues for determination as follows:
Whether the Court of Appeal followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court for grant of un-conditional stay of execution for money judgment in granting to the Respondent an un-conditional stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal High Court.
Whether the first prayer contained in the Respondent’s motion dated 19/9/2006 was not too vague and bad in law to be granted by the court.
Whether the Court of Appeal ought not to have struck out the Respondent’s appeal in the court below rather than setting it down for hearing expeditiously when the time within which the Respondent should file its brief of argument had expired and there was no application for enlargement of the time to file the brief.
The Respondent in its brief of argument formulated four (4) issues for determination as follows;
(a) “Whether the judicial discretion of court to grant unconditional stay of execution is dependant on the consent of the judgment creditor irrespective of the peculiar facts of each case. (Ground 2).
(b) Whether or not having regard to the law and affidavit evidence, the Court of Appeal was right in granting the reliefs contained in the first paragraph of the prayers in the Respondent’s motion dated September I 9th, 2006 (Ground 1).
(c) Whether the order of filing of briefs made by the Court of Appeal is a necessary and consequential order following the grant by the Court of Appeal of these reliefs in the Respondent’s motion dated 19/9/2006 (as the Respondent contends). Or whether the order for the filing of briefs amounted to granting a relief not sought (as the Appellants contend). (Ground 4).
P.33
(d) Whether or not, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Respondent’s appeal at the Court of Appeal can, in law, be deemed to have been abandoned. (Ground 5) 1.
The Respondent also in its brief of argument raised a preliminary objection as to competence or otherwise of the appeal itself and Grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the notice of appeal. The Respondent referred to Section 233(2), (3) and (6) of the 1999 Constitution, and Section 21 (2) of the Supreme Court Act and submits that the Appellant required the leave of this court to appeal against the interlocutory decision of the lower court. Hence the failure of the Appellant to obtain the leave of court before filing this interlocutory appeal renders the notice of appeal invalid and incompetent. The provisions of Section 21 (2) of the Supreme Court Act, is clear and un-ambiguous to the effect that an appeal against the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal can only be brought or filed with the leave of the lower court or this court. However, Section 233(2) of the 1999 Constitution creates an exemption, i.e.
“an appeal shall lie from decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as of right in the following cases: –
(a) where the ground of appeal involves question of law alone, decision in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeal.”
From the above, the word “decision” does not create a dichotomy between a “final” or interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal.
P.34
It is my view therefore that:-
(a) An appeal against the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal can only be brought with leave to this court where the grounds of appeal raise issues of facts alone or mixed law and fact; and
(b) The Appellant against an interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal would not require the leave of Court of Appeal where the ground of appeal raises issues of law alone.
The Respondent must have realised this point when it proceeded to restrict its objection to Grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the notice of appeal and argued that being grounds of fact, and mixed law and fact in respect of which no leave has been obtained, they are therefore incompetent.
The Appellant in its reply brief submits that Grounds 3, 4 and 5 are grounds of law alone. He cited and relied on the following cases;
i) Ojemen v Momodu (1983) 1 SCNLR 118 at 203.
ii) Gomex Ltd v Nab Ltd (1997) 3 NWLR (Part 496) 643 at 654.
iii) Maigoro v Garba (1999) 7 SC (Part III) 11; (1999) 10 NWLR (Part 624) 555 at 567- 568.
v) Adeyemo v Beyioku (1999) 13 NWLR (Part 635) 472;
v) Ngile v Achukwu (2004) 8 NWLR (Part 875) 363 at 394.
P.35
One interesting point to note in all these cited authorities is that, the appeals in these cases were against the final judgments of the Court of Appeal. Thus, I paused here for a moment and asked myself what is the appeal in the case at hand all about? In my view, this appeal is against the exercise of discretion of the Court of Appeal to:-
a) grant unconditional stay of the judgment of the trial court pending the determination of the appeal before it; and
b) to grant an order amending the notice of appeal and to raise a fresh issue.
Therefore, can the lower court exercise its discretion without considering the material facts placed before it? If so, can any appeal against the exercise of that discretion be a matter of pure law without reference to the facts considered by the lower court? In my view, the answer would be in the negative. Furthermore, in trying to unravel the questions stated above. I have searched for the meaning of the word “judicial discretion” in Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition, edited by Bryan Garner at Page 409, the word or phrase was defined as follows:-
“The exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and principles of law, a court’s power to act or not to act when a litigant is not entitled to demand the act as a matter of right.”
Then in the New International Comprehensive Dictionary of the English Language – Encyclopaedia Edition at Page 365, the word “discretion” was defined as-
“the act or the liberty of deciding according to justice and propriety, and one’s idea of what is right and proper under the circumstances without wilfulness or favour.”
P.36
Both dictionaries referred to the word –
“circumstances” which means the facts or peculiar nature of the case which a judge exercising its discretion would consider.”
Thus, whichever way the Appellants may put it, an appeal against the exercise of discretion by the lower court must involve the consideration of the ‘circumstances’ in order to determine whether discretion, was judiciously exercised. Thus, this appeal cannot therefore be said to involve the question of law alone, it must of necessity involve the consideration of the facts placed before the lower court. It is in this regard that I agree with my lord, Karibi-Whyte in Metal Construction (W. A) Ltd. v Migliore (1979) 6-9 SC (Reprint) 118; (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 126) 299 at 314, when he held as follows:
“It is nevertheless a question of fact with the exercise of discretion. In Grifths v J.P. Harrison Watford Ltd. (1963) AC 1, Lord Denning expressed it succinctly thus;
“Reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusion, and often do Juries. So do Judges. And are they not all reasonable men?”
It has therefore been recognised that these more or less discretion questions of impression or opinion in respect of which reasonable men may arrive at discrepant conclusions on the same evidence are questions of facts.”
Therefore, this appeal cannot fall within the ambit of the provisions of Section 233(2) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. The applicable section is Section 233(3) and (6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, and Section 21(2) of the Supreme Court Act.
P.37
In the circumstances of this case, I hold that this appeal is incompetent as it has not been filed with the leave of either the lower court or this court. The appeal is therefore struck out.
My lords, I shall not end this contribution without making comments on the propriety of this appeal. While I do not wish a party should waive its constitutional right of appeal, if it feels strongly dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, it is equally the duty of counsel to ensure a speedy trial and determination of the appeal. In this case the lower court delivered its ruling on 10/5/07 and fixed the appeal for hearing on 21/6/2007 within which time to appeal would have been heard and determined. Instead, learned senior counsel had embarked on this tortuous journey of appeal on the exercise of discretionary power by the lower court. This is 2011, four (4) years after which this appeal is been heard and determined by the lower court. Now the appeal is being sent to the lower court for trial after having wasted four years without the Appellants knowing their fate to the money in issue. This act, with due respect, is not encouraging and should not repeat itself and I would not say more than this.
I have had the privilege of reading in draft the illuminating leading judgment of my learned brother, John Fabiyi, JSC just delivered, I am in support of his lordship’s reasoning and conclusions which I adopt, with respect, as mine. In fact the lucidity of the language employed in the said leading judgment and wisdom contained therein encouraged me to write more in support of it.
P.38
With the foregoing reasons of mine and more elaborate and detailed reasons adumbrated in the leading judgment of my Lord John Fabiyi, JSC. I too agree that the appeal though competent, lacks substance/merit and, like my brother, I dismiss the appeal. Consequently, I order an accelerated hearing of the appeal before the lower court. I endorse the order as to costs made in the lead judgment.
P.39
— BODE RHODES-VIVOUR. JSC:
— MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI JSC:
This is an appeal against the ruling of the Court of Appeal delivered on 10th May, 2007. The Appellants were Respondents in the court below whilst the Respondent was the Appellant in that court.
The background of the facts relevant to this appeal are as follows:
On or about December 2000, the Appellants presented a petition to the House of Representatives against the Respondent. The petition of the Appellants had sought against the Respondent the sum of US$1.5 Billion as compensation for the economic hardship and environmental degradation of the Appellants’ communities by the Respondent’s oil production activities in the Ijaw communities of Bayelsa State since 1956.
The Appellants’ petition was referred to the Committee on Public Petitions of the House of Representatives.
P.43
The Respondent duly appeared before the committee to defend the petition and indeed submitted answers to the 107-point query raised by the committee on the petition.
The Respondent participated actively in the hearings and working visit of the committee and its secretary/legal adviser, one Mr. I. Odeleye, who represented the Respondent specifically said that the Respondent had no objection whatsoever to the hearing of the petition by the committee and would, to the best of their ability, assist and honour their obligations in respect of the petition.
In the course of its deliberations, the committee set up a legal advisory panel comprising Hon. Justice Mohammed Bello (former Chief Justice of Nigeria) as Chairman, Hon. Justice Kayode Eso; Hon. Justice Philip Nnaemeka Agu, and Chief Ladi Rotimi-Williams SAN, as Secretary.
The panel after reviewing the evidence presented to the committee by both the Respondent and the Appellants recommended to the committee that the compensation payable to the Appellants should be the sum of US$1.5 Billion. The committee in turn recommended that sum to the House of Representatives as the compensation payable to the Appellants.
The House of Representatives subsequently passed on May 28th, 2002, a resolution directing the Respondent to pay to the Appellants, compensation in the sum of US$1.5 Billion. The Senate also passed a similar resolution.
The Respondent however failed and/or refused to obey the resolutions and as such no compensation was paid to the Appellants pursuant to their petition.
P.44
In a bid to enforce the award made by the aforesaid resolution, the Appellants took out, in the Federal High Court, an originating summons seeking inter alia a declaration that the Respondent was bound to comply with the aforesaid resolution and an order compelling the Respondent to pay to the Appellants the compensation fixed at US$1.5 Billion. After hearing both parties, Okeke, J., of the Federal High Court granted the Appellant’s reliefs in a judgment delivered on February 24, 2006.
Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal and applied to the Federal High Court for a stay of execution.
On 19th May, 2006 the Federal High Court in a ruling delivered on that date granted the Respondent’s application on the condition that the Respondent deposited the judgment debt of US$1.5 Billion with the Central Bank of Nigeria in an interest yielding account in the name of the Chief Registrar, Federal High Court of Nigeria. The order was to be complied with on or before 22nd May, 2006.
The Respondent then filed in the Court of Appeal a similar application dated 19th May, 2006, seeking an unconditional stay of execution.
Whilst the Respondent’s application for unconditional stay of execution was pending in the Court of Appeal, it brought another motion dated 19th September, 2006 seeking two prayers as follows:
“1. Granting leave to the Defendant/Appellant/Applicant to amend the notice of appeal in this matter by filing and arguing the amended notice of appeal including raising fresh issues herein attached as Exhibit SPDC 1.
For accelerated hearing of the appeal.”
P.45
The Court of Appeal decided to hear the two motions together and delivered a single ruling thereon on 10th May, 2007 in which the court granted the prayers contained in the motion dated 19th September, 2006 as well as an unconditional stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal High Court.
Being dissatisfied with the ruling of the Court of Appeal, the Appellants have appealed to this court by a notice of appeal dated 22nd May, 2006 and filed on same day.
On 6th February, 2008, this court granted the Appellants an order for extension of time within which the Appellants may file the record of appeal in this matter and deemed the record already filed as being properly filed.
The Appellants filed 6 grounds of appeal and formulated three (3) issues in an Appellants’ brief filed on 28/9/09-
Whether the Court of Appeal followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court for the grant of unconditional stay of execution for money judgment in granting to the Respondent an unconditional stay of execution of the judgment of the Federal High Court.
Whether the first prayer contained in the Respondent’s motion dated 19th September, 2006 was not too vague and bad in law to be granted by the court.
Whether the Court of Appeal ought not to have struck out the Respondent’s appeal in the court below rather than setting it down for hearing expeditiously when the time within which the Respondent should file its brief of argument had expired and there was no application for enlargement of time to file the brief.
P.46
The Respondent on the 12/6/08 filed a brief settled by Chief Richard Akinjide in which it framed a preliminary objection to the Appellants’ notice and grounds of appeal. Learned counsel further couched four (4) issues for determination in the event that the preliminary objection failed. These are SPDC’s issues for determination on the merit of the appeal.
In the alternative to the Respondent’s (SPDC) preliminary objection, the Respondent argues as follows against the Appellant’s appeal on the merit:
The Respondent (SPDC) formulates the following issues for determination:
(a) Whether the judicial discretion of the courts to grant unconditional stay of execution is dependent on the consent of the judgment creditor, irrespective of the peculiar facts of each case?
(Formulated from Ground 2 of the notice of appeal and encompasses Appellants’ Issue 1)
(b) Whether or not, having regard to the law and the affidavit evidence, the Court of Appeal was right in granting the reliefs contained in the first paragraph of the prayers in the Respondent’s motion dated September 19th, 2006?
(Formulated from Ground 1 of the notice of appeal and encompassed Appellants’ Issue 2)
(c) Whether the order for the filing of briefs made by the Court of Appeal is a necessary and consequential order following the grant by the Court of Appeal of the reliefs in the Respondent’s motion dated 19/9/2006 (as the Respondent contends) or whether the order for the filing of briefs amounted to granting a relief not sought (as the Appellants contend)?
P.47
(d) Whether or not, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, the Respondent’s appeal at the Court of Appeal can, in law, be deemed to have been abandoned.
The preliminary objection of the Respondent has to be taken before anything else since the competence or otherwise of the appeal is at stake and along with it the necessary jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate.
Chief Akinjide SAN., for the Respondent contended that the present appeal arose from the interlocutory decision of the Court of Appeal made on 10th May, 2007 and by virtue of Section 21 (2) of the Supreme Court Act, requires as a condition precedent, the leave of either the Court of Appeal or this court before the filing of the notice of appeal which leave the Appellant failed to obtain. He stated on that Grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the Appellants’ notice of appeal are grounds of mixed law and facts and so leave was a necessity. He cited Opuiyo v Omoniwari (2007) 6 SC (Part I) 35; (2007) 16 NWLR (Part 1060) 415 at 430; Metal Construction W.A. Ltd. v Migliore (1990) 2 SC 33; (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 126) 299 at 314 A-B; Nwadike v Ibekwe (1987) 2 NSCC 1219 at 1235; Ojemen v Momodu II (1983) NSCC 135.
In a reply brief filed on 11/7/08, learned counsel for the Appellant answered the questions raised in the preliminary objection and enjoined the court to interpret Section 233 of Constitution reading all the relevant subsections together thereby derive the real meaning and the intendment behind the provisions. That Section 21 (2) of the Supreme Court Act must be interpreted to be in harmony with Section 233 of the Constitution. He referred to Section 117 of the 1963 Constitution in situations akin to the present, which section is in pari materia with Section 233 of the 1999 Constitution. He cited National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. v Uchay (1973) 4 SC 1; (1973) 4 SC (Reprint) 1; Onigbeden v Balogun (1975) 5 SC 63; (1975) 4 SC (Reprint) 63.
P.48
I shall quote the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution in relation to appeals to this court and they are as follows:
Section 233(2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution:
“An appeal shall lie from decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court as of right in the cases:
(a) Where the ground of appeal involves question of law alone, decision in any civil or criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeal.”
Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution:
“Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, an appeal shall lie from the decisions of the court of appeal to the Supreme Court with the leave of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.”
Section 233(6) of the 1999 Constitution:
“Any right of appeal to the Supreme Court from the decisions of the Court of Appeal conferred by this section shall, subject to Section 236 of this Constitution, be exercised in accordance with any act of the National Assembly and rules of court for the time being in force regulating the power, practice and procedure of the Supreme Court.”
Section 21(2) of the Supreme Court Act:
“Where in the exercise by the Court of Appeal of its jurisdiction an interlocutory order or decision is made in the course of any suit or matter an appeal shall, by leave of that court or of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, lie from any order made ex-parte or by consent of the parties or relating only to costs.”
P.49
The Respondent submitted that:
Section 233(3) of the Constitution provide for appeal with leave in all other cases not covered by Section 233(2) of the 1999 Constitution. Those interlocutory appeals from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court are covered by Section 233(3) of the 1999 Constitution.
Learned senior advocate for Respondent said that:
Section 233(6) of the 1999 Constitution provides, in mandatory terms, that the exercise of any right of appeal conferred by Section 233 of the Constitution, which no doubt includes the right of appeal created in Section 233(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, shall subject to Section 236 of this Constitution, be exercised in accordance with any act of the National Assembly, which no doubt, includes the Supreme Court Act.
That the latter provision of Section 233(6) of the 1999 Constitution, which takes precedence, having made the exercise of the right of the appeal created in Section 233(2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution exercisable in accordance with the Supreme Court Act, which is an Act of the National Assembly, Section (21)(2) of the Supreme Court Act, applies.
That by Section 21(2) of the Supreme Court Act, appeals on interlocutory decisions of the Court of Appeal lie to the Supreme Court with the leave either of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.
Whereas Section 233(2) (a) of the 1999 Constitution relates generally to “decision” of the Court of Appeal, Section 21(2) of the Supreme Court Act deals specifically and unambiguously with appeals from interlocutory decisions of the Court of Appeal.
P.50
Reading the relevant constitutional provisions within the ambit of what is before the court, the appeal is really on grounds of law simpliciter and there is no requirement for leave to appeal first applied for and obtained. No matter how coloured, it cannot change from that of ground of law to being what it is not, that is mixed law and facts which the Respondent is urging, the numerous judicial authorities cited of Respondent’s counsel notwithstanding. The preliminary objection fails and is therefore dismissed.
Arguing the appeal along the lines of the issues crafted, learned senior advocate, Tayo Oyetibo stated that this application being for a variation of conditions or terms of stay of execution, the Applicant has a burden to prove that the conditions or terms imposed by the trial court are onerous and deserve to be varied. That the variation cannot be granted on the mere asking. He cited CBN v Beckitt Construction Ltd. (2004) 14 NWLR (Part 893) 233 at 297.
That the Respondent had admitted before the trial court as per their 1st further affidavit that they had the financial ability to pay the judgment debt. That the Court of Appeal therefore misdirected itself in law when it granted the unconditional stay based on impecuniosity, colossal judgment debt, contribution to judgment debt by Federal Government, conditions not to come into play in such an application either for stay or variation for unconditional stay of execution of judgment. He cited Franchal (Nig.) Ltd. v Nigeria Araba Bank Ltd. (2000) 6 S. C. (Part I) 1; (2000) 9 NWLR (Part 671) 1 at 22 B-C; Nwabueze v Nwosu (1988) 9 S.C. 68; (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 88) 272; Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited v Monokpo (2001) 18 NWLR (Part 744) 212 at 242; Okafor v Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (Part 64) 129 at 136; Mobil Oil Ltd v Agadaigho (1988) 2 NWLR (Part 77) 388; Martins v Nicannar Food & Co. Ltd. (1988) 2 NWLR (Part 74) 75.
P.51
Chief Akinjide SAN, responding submitted that the grant of unconditional stay of execution is a matter of the judicial discretion of the court and not subject to the discretion or consent of the judgment creditor. That if the discretion is left to the whims and caprices of a judgment creditor or any of the parties to the case, it ceases to be a judicial discretion. He cited UBN Ltd. v Odusote Bookstore Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (Part 331) 129; NNPC v BCE Consulting Engineers (2004) 2 NWLR (Part 858) 484; Akujinwa v Nwaonuma (1998) 11-12 SC 112; (1998) 13 NWLR (Part 583) 632; A-G Rivers State v Ude (2006) 6-7 S.C. 131; (2006) 17 NWLR (Part 1008) 436 at 461.
In granting the unconditional stay of execution, the Court of Appeal had held at Pages 317-318 of Volume 11 of the record of appeal as follows:
“In view of the huge amount involved in the judgment/debt and the unreasonableness of the order itself particularly as to the time lag in the deposit of such amount, the third party interests in the assets relied upon to make the order
(1) The Federal Government.
(2) Third parties having various contracts with the Appellant/Applicant.
(3) Agip and Elf Nigeria Limited as co joint venture, the preservation of the Res and the protection of the Applicant as a business entity, the court shall be cautious in the surrounding circumstance not to make an order that will have the effect of killing the goose that will eventually lay the golden egg.
P.52
A situation where an Applicant will be unable to exercise his constitutional right of appeal due to impecuniousity will be a special circumstance that may persuade the court to grant the Applicant an unconditional stay. The case of Mobil Producing v Monokpo (2001) 18 NWLR (Part 744) 212, is not applicable to this application as the Applicant in that case is not a Nigerian company and more so had no known assets capable of being attached within Nigeria. In the instant application it is not disputed that the Appellant/Applicant has assets and facilities far in excess of the judgment debt within the jurisdiction of the court and in Nigeria. SPDC is also a Nigerian company wherein the Federal Government has 55 % equity interests. It must not elude the court that any order made by court is an interim order pending the hearing and determination of the substantive appeal.
What in my view is called in question is the judicial discretion exercised both by the trial Federal High Court and the Court of Appeal and what the attitude of this court should be to either of the two decisions. For effect, the high court granted a conditional stay which was to get the Respondent sum of 1.5 Million Dollars or 190 Billion Naira into an interest yielding bank account and at the Court of Appeal, the Respondent had asked for an unconditional stay of execution which in real terms was a variation of the order of the High Court and which variation the Court of Appeal granted.
The practice of law in matters of judicial discretion are spelt out in clear terms and that is, that since facts of two cases are not always the same, this court does not make a practice of laying down rules or principles to fetter the exercise of its discretion or of the exercise of discretion by the lower courts.
P.53
Therefore, it is safe to say that in matters of discretion, no one case is authority for the other. This is because when one case is authority for another and the court bound by a previous decision in the particular way that would put an end to discretion. See: Akujinwa v Nwaonuma (1998) 11-12 SC 112; (1998) 13 NWLR (Part 583) 632 at 647; A-G Rivers State v Ude (2006) 6-7 SC 131; (2006) 17 NWLR (Part 1008) 436 at 461.
Indeed it is within the rights of the Respondent to apply for a further stay of execution with terms or conditions which may differ from those imposed by the Court of Appeal. This is allowable under Section 24 of the Supreme Court Act. This variation may be granted by the Supreme Court or further varied or annulled. See: Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Odusote Bookstores Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (Part 331) 129 at 133;
I am satisfied as my learned brother, Fabiyi JSC, in the leading judgment has found that the Court of Appeal was right to have made the orders it made of granting the unconditional stay of execution. This is because that court rightly found and I agree that not granting the unconditional stay of execution would have the effect of frustrating the possible outcome of the appeal in the event that the substantive appeal succeeded. The need to be cautious could not have been an overstatement.
This appeal is dismissed and I affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal including the unconditional stay of execution and the accelerated hearing of the appeal before that court.
P.54
Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement — dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
1. Adisa v Oyinwola (2000) 6 SC (Part II) 47; (2000) 10 NWLR (Part 746) 116 — cited at p. 16; p. 18
2. Adeyemo v Beyioku (1990) 10 NWLR (Part 635) 472; (1999) 13 NWLR (Part 635) 472 — cited at p. 6; p. 32
3. Akujinwa v Nwaonuma (1998) 11-12 SC 112; (1998) 13 NWLR (Part 583) 632 — cited at p. 18; p. 48; p. 49
4. Amadi v N.N.P.C. (2000) 6 SC (Part I) 66; (2000) 10 NWLR (Part 674) 76 — cited at p. 26
5. Amaechi v INEC (2008) 1 SC (Part I) 36; (2008) 5 NWLR (Part 1080) 277 — cited at p. 23
6. Amachree v Newington 14 WACA 97 — cited at p. 22
7. Attorney-General Rivers v Ude (2006) 6-7 S.C. 131; (2006) 17 NWLR (Part 1008) 436 — cited at p. 18; p. 48; p. 49
8. Bello v Attorney-General Oyo State (1986) 12 S.C 1; (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt. 45) 828; (1986) 17 NSCC 1257 — cited at p. 2; p. 23
9. Benmax v Austin Motor Co. Ltd. (1945) All E.R 326 — cited at p. 3; p. 10
10. C.C.B. (Nig.) Plc. v Rose (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 544) 37 — cited at p. 22
11. CBN v Beckitt Construction Ltd. (2004) 14 NWLR (Part 893) 233 — cited at p. 47
12. Chukwumah v Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Part 289) 512 — cited at p. 8
13. Comex Ltd. v N.A.B. Ltd. (1997) 3 NWLR (Part 496) 643 — cited at p. 6; p. 8; p. 32
14. Commissioner for Works, Benue State v Devcon Ltd. (1988) 7 SC (Part I) 29; (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 83) 407 — cited at p. 22
15. Eronini v Iheuko (1989) 3 SC (Part I) 30; (1989) 2 NSCC (Part 1) 503 — cited at p. 19
16. Ezegbu v F.A.T.B. (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 216) 197 — cited at p. 2; p. 23
17. Fasoro v Beyioku & Ors. (1988) 2 NWLR (Part 76) 263 — cited at p. 21
18. Fawehinmi v Akilu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 112) 643 — cited at p. 2; p. 23
19. Franchal (Nig.) Ltd. v Nigeria Arab Bank Ltd. (2000) 6 S.C. (Part I) 1; (2000) 9 NWLR (Part 671) 1 — cited at p. 13; p. 47
20. Government of Gongola State v Tukur (1989) 9 SC 105; (1989) 4 NWLR (Part 117) 595 — cited at p. 22
21. Grifths v J. P. Harrison Watford Ltd. (1963) A.C 1 — cited at p. 2; p. 34
22. Maigoro v Garba (1999) 7 SC (Part III) 11; (1999) 10 NWLR (Part 624) 555 — cited at p. 6; p. 32
23. Martins v Nicanner Food & Co. Ltd. (1988) 2 NWLR (Part 74) 75 — cited at p. 14; p. 47
24. Metal Construction (W.A) Ltd. v Migliore (1990) 2 SC 33; (1990) 1 NWLR (Part 126) 299 — cited at p. 3; p. 8; p. 10; p. 34; p. 44
25. Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd v Agadaigho (1988) 2 NWLR (Part 77) 388 — cited at p. 14; p. 47
26. Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unlimited v Monokpo (2001) 18 NWLR (Part 744) 212 — cited at p. 13; p. 47; p. 48
27. Mogaji v Cadbury Nig. Ltd (1972) 2 SC 97; (1972) 2 SC (Reprint) 136 — cited at p. 21
28. National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd. v Uchay (1973) 4 SC 1; (1973) 4 SC (Reprint) 1 — cited at p. 5; p. 44
29. Ngige v Achukwu (2004) 8 NWLR (Part 875) 363 — cited at p. 6; p. 32
30. Nneji & Ors. v Chukwu & Ors. (1988) 1 NSCC 1115 — cited at p. 25; p. 26
31. NNPC v BCE Consulting Engineers (2004) 2 NWLR (Part 858) 484 — cited at p. 47
32. Nwabueze v Nwosu (1988) 9 SC 68; (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 88) 272 — cited at p. 13; p. 47
33. Nwadike v Ibekwe (1987) 2 NSCC 1219; (1987) 4 NWLR (Part 67) 718 — cited at p. 3; p. 8; p. 9; p. 44
34. Nzeribe v Dave Eng Co. (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt. 361) 124 — cited at p. 1; p. 37
35. O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte Plc. (1983) 3 All E.R 468 — cited at p. 3; p. 10
36. Obomhense v Erhahon (1993) 7 NWLR (Part 303) 22 — cited at p. 25; p. 26
37. Odusote v Odusote (1971) 1 All NLR 219 — cited at p. 18
38. Ogbechie v Onochie (1986) 2 NWLR (Part 23) 484 — cited at p. 3; p. 9; p. 10
39. Ogunubi v Kosoko (1991) 18 NWLR (Pt 210) 511 — cited at p. 2; p. 23
40. Ojemen v Momodu (1983) 1 SCNLR 188 — cited at p. 6; p. 8; p. 32; p. 44
41. Okafor v Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (Part 64) 129 — cited at p. 14; p. 47
42. Okerie v Ejiofor (1996) 3 NWLR (Part 434) 90 — cited at p. 21
43. Okulate v Awosanya (2000) 1 SC 107; (2000) 2 NWLR (Part 646) 530 — cited at p. 16
44. Omoregbe v Lawani (1980) 3-4 SC 108; (1980) 3-4 SC (Reprint) 70 — cited at p. 21
45. Onigbeden v Balogun (1975) 4 SC 85; (1975) 4 SC (Reprint) 63 — cited at p. 5; p. 44
46. Opuiyo v Omoniwari (2007) 6 SC (Pt. I) 35; (2007) 16 NWLR (Part 1060) 415 — cited at p. 8; p. 44
47. Orient Bank (Nig) Plc. v Bilante International Ltd. (1996) 5 NWLR (Part 447) 166 — cited at p. 15; p. 20
48. State v Whitman R.11, 431 A.2d 1229 — cited at p. 19
49. UBN Ltd. v Odusote Bookstore Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (Part 331) 129 — cited at p. 13; p. 14; p. 15; p. 16; p. 17; p. 19; p. 48; p. 49
50. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd v Odusote Bookstores Ltd. (1994) 3 NWLR (Part 331) 129 — cited at p. 49
51. University of Lagos v Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 143; (1984) 11 S.C 152 — cited at p. 1; p. 37
52. University of Lagos v Olaniyan (1985) 16 NSCC (Part 1) 98 — cited at p. 19
Referenced Statutes
1. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 — Section 233(1), (2)(a), (3), (6) — cited at p. 4; p. 5; p. 6; p. 7; p. 32; p. 35; p. 44; p. 45; p. 46
2. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 — Section 236 — cited at p. 6; p. 44; p. 45
3. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 — Section 287(1) — cited at p. 13
4. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963 — Section 117 — cited at p. 44
5. Supreme Court Act — Section 21(2) — cited at p. 4; p. 5; p. 6; p. 32; p. 35; p. 44; p. 45
6. Supreme Court Act — Section 24 — cited at p. 49