CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ā Prosecution ā Authority to Prosecute ā State Counsel as Officer of Attorney-General
Principle Statement
There is no doubt at all that the power to institute criminal proceedings against any person in the 1999 Constitution lies on the Attorney-General of the State or the Federation as the case may be, but such power may be exercised by the Attorney-General himself or through any officers of his department. ... The provisions of the sections presume that any officer in any department of the Attorney General's office is empowered to initiate criminal proceedings unless it is proved otherwise.
Ratio Decidendi (Source)
Per Kalgo, JSC, in FRN v. Adewunmi (2007) NLC-123-287-2002(SC) at p. 8; Paras DāE.
"There is no doubt at all that the power to institute criminal proceedings against any person in the 1999 Constitution lies on the Attorney-General of the State or the Federation as the case may be, but such power may be exercised by the Attorney-General himself or through any officers of his department. ... The provisions of the sections presume that any officer in any department of the Attorney General's office is empowered to initiate criminal proceedings unless it is proved otherwise."
Explanation / Scope
This principle establishes that the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial power can be exercised through officers of the department. The presumption is that any officer in the Attorney-General’s department is empowered to initiate criminal proceedings unless proved otherwise. The principle ensures that prosecutions are not invalidated by technical challenges to authority. It applies in criminal proceedings where the authority of the prosecutor is questioned. The burden is on the accused to prove lack of authority. The principle reflects the practical organization of prosecutorial functions. It ensures efficient administration of criminal justice. The Attorney-General remains ultimately responsible.
