Principle Statement

It is however, very clear from the decision of this court in the case of FMBN v. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.591) 333 at 365 and the provisions of section 650 of CAMA which defines the word 'Court' as used in section 417 of CAMA that the 'Court' whose leave is required before proceeding with or commencing any action against a company in liquidation or under a winding up order is the Federal High Court, not any other court like say the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Onnoghen, JSC, in Agro Allied Development Ent. Ltd v. MV Northern Reefer & Ors (2009) NLC-123-268-2002(SC) at p. 8; Paras D–E.

"It is however, very clear from the decision of this court in the case of FMBN v. NDIC (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.591) 333 at 365 and the provisions of section 650 of CAMA which defines the word 'Court' as used in section 417 of CAMA that the 'Court' whose leave is required before proceeding with or commencing any action against a company in liquidation or under a winding up order is the Federal High Court, not any other court like say the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court."

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes that the “Court” under Section 417 of CAMA is the Federal High Court. Leave to proceed against a company in liquidation must be obtained from the Federal High Court, not the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court. The principle applies where a party seeks to sue a company in liquidation. It ensures that the proper court grants leave. The principle reflects the specialized jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in company matters. It prevents procedural errors. The court must apply the statutory definition. The principle provides certainty on the appropriate forum for seeking leave.

Cases Applying This Principle