CIVIL PROCEDURE — Injunction — Interlocutory Injunction — Duty of Appellate Court When Interfering with Trial Court’s Discretion
Ratio Decidendi
Per Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC in Uzuda & Ors v. Ebigah & Ors (2009) NLC-123-348-2002(SC) at pp. 9-10; Paras A-D:
"Where a court conceives that an injustice might occur to any side and true justice as empirically conceived would suffer irremediably then such an order ought not to be made. It is essential and I dare say imperative that the fundamental premise for the grant of order is made from behaving in a party against whom the order is made from behaving in an unconscionable manner or manifesting such unwelcoming idiosyncrasies which when viewed properly would readily damage the interest of the other party and a sorry state of affairs would be institutionalized or allowed to exist which would render any future decision useless or might in all probability, cause a damage that cannot be easily cured by way of compensation."
Explanation / Scope
This principle establishes the standard for appellate interference with trial court discretion in granting interlocutory injunctions. An order should not be made where injustice might occur and justice would suffer irremediably. The order is justified where the party against whom it is made behaves unconscionably or in a manner that would damage the other party’s interest, causing damage not easily cured by compensation. The principle applies in appeals against interlocutory injunctions. It ensures that injunctions are granted only where necessary. The principle reflects the discretionary nature of injunctive relief. It prevents injustice through injunctions. The court must consider the conduct of the parties. The principle provides guidance on appellate review of injunctive orders.