Ratio Decidendi

Per Mohammed, JSC, in Oshe v. Okin Biscuits Limited & Anor (2010) NLC-123-396-2002(SC) at pp. 6–7; Paras E–A:

"It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its own views of the evidence for those found by the trial court. However, an appellate court would only interfere with the finding of fact by the trial court when it becomes very clear that the finding is perverse or it is not supported by evidence or is not the result of a proper exercise of judicial discretion."

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes that appellate courts should not substitute their views of evidence for the trial court’s findings. Interference is justified only where findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or not the result of proper judicial discretion. The principle applies where findings of fact are challenged. It ensures that trial courts’ findings are respected. The principle reflects the limits of appellate review. It prevents unjustified interference. The court must find an exception. The principle provides guidance on when interference is justified.

Cases Applying This Principle