CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Right to Fair Hearing — Access to Regular Courts
Principle Statement
It would be a dangerous precedent to hold that once parties submit themselves to a native arbitration such parties are precluded from going before regular courts no matter how unsatisfactory the decision by the arbitration may be to either of the parties. That will make the traditional arbitration tribunal a final court from which there can be no appeal. Such a status for a native tribunal will be unconstitutional as the 1999 Constitution by Section 36(1) gives parties right of access to regular courts to ventilate their grievances.
Ratio Decidendi (Source)
Per Ogbuagu, JSC (adopting Court of Appeal reasoning), in Agala & Ors v. Okunsin & Ors (2010) NLC-123-25-2003(SC) at p. 29; Paras B–D.
"It would be a dangerous precedent to hold that once parties submit themselves to a native arbitration such parties are precluded from going before regular courts no matter how unsatisfactory the decision by the arbitration may be to either of the parties. That will make the traditional arbitration tribunal a final court from which there can be no appeal. Such a status for a native tribunal will be unconstitutional as the 1999 Constitution by Section 36(1) gives parties right of access to regular courts to ventilate their grievances."
Explanation / Scope
This principle establishes that submission to native arbitration does not preclude parties from accessing regular courts, as that would be unconstitutional under Section 36(1). The principle applies where native arbitration is raised as a bar. It ensures that parties have access to regular courts. The principle reflects the constitutional right to fair hearing. It prevents native tribunals from becoming final courts. The court must protect access to justice. The principle provides guidance on the effect of native arbitration.
