Principle Statement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with sentence of course it is possible, but not in the least probable, the case is beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Mukhtar, JSC, in Jua v. State (2010) NLC-123-287-2008(SC) at pp. 22–23; Paras D–A.

"Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which can be dismissed with sentence of course it is possible, but not in the least probable, the case is beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice."

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt; fanciful possibilities are insufficient to raise reasonable doubt. The principle applies in criminal trials. It ensures that the standard is properly understood. The principle reflects that the standard is not absolute certainty. It prevents acquittals based on remote possibilities. The court must determine if there is reasonable doubt. The principle provides guidance on the meaning of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Cases Applying This Principle