Principle Statement

As a matter of general principle, an appellate court would not interfere with an award of damages by a trial court simply because faced with a similar situation and circumstances it would have awarded a different amount. An appeal court will however interfere with an award by a trial court where it is clearly shown: (a) that the trial court acted upon wrong principle of law, or (b) that the amount awarded by the trial court is ridiculously too high or too low; (c) that the amount was an entirely erroneous and unreasonable estimate having regard to the circumstances of the case.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Oduwole & Ors v. West (2010) NLC-123-173-2003(SC) at p. 6; Paras A-C.

"As a matter of general principle, an appellate court would not interfere with an award of damages by a trial court simply because faced with a similar situation and circumstances it would have awarded a different amount. An appeal court will however interfere with an award by a trial court where it is clearly shown: (a) that the trial court acted upon wrong principle of law, or (b) that the amount awarded by the trial court is ridiculously too high or too low; (c) that the amount was an entirely erroneous and unreasonable estimate having regard to the circumstances of the case."

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes the grounds for appellate interference with defamation damages: wrong principle, ridiculously high/low, or entirely erroneous estimate. The principle applies in defamation cases. It ensures that appellate courts respect trial court discretion. The principle reflects the limited scope of appellate review. It prevents interference based on mere disagreement. The court must find an exception. The principle provides guidance on appellate review of defamation damages.

Cases Applying This Principle