Principle Statement

An award must be adequate to assuage for the injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Indeed, it must atone for the assaults on the plaintiff's character and pride which were unjustifiably invaded. However, it has been pronounced by this court that to the extent that the person who has injured a person in his reputation must pay for the injury he has suffered, there is an element of compensation in the award of damages made. But that is usually not on the basis that such would restore the plaintiff to the position he was before he was defamed, as if he had not been defamed where the injury he has suffered did not lead to pecuniary loss.

Ratio Decidendi (Source)

Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Oduwole & Ors v. West (2010) NLC-123-173-2003(SC) at p. 7; Paras A-C.

"An award must be adequate to assuage for the injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Indeed, it must atone for the assaults on the plaintiff's character and pride which were unjustifiably invaded. However, it has been pronounced by this court that to the extent that the person who has injured a person in his reputation must pay for the injury he has suffered, there is an element of compensation in the award of damages made. But that is usually not on the basis that such would restore the plaintiff to the position he was before he was defamed, as if he had not been defamed where the injury he has suffered did not lead to pecuniary loss."

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes that general damages for libel must be adequate to assuage injury to reputation and atone for attacks on character and pride, with an element of compensation. The principle applies in defamation cases. It ensures that damages are adequate. The principle reflects that damages compensate but do not restore the plaintiff fully. It prevents inadequate awards. The court must consider the injury. The principle provides guidance on factors in assessing damages.

Cases Applying This Principle