Ratio Decidendi

Per Muntaka-Coomassie, JSC, in Ajuwa & Anor v. SPDCN Ltd (2011) NLC-123-290-2007(SC) at p. 34; Paras B—E:

"It is nevertheless a question of fact with the exercise of discretion. In Grifths v. J. P. Harrison Watford Ltd. (1963) A.C 1, Lord Denning expressed it succinctly thus reasonable people on the same facts may reasonably come to different conclusion and often do juries. So do Judges. And are they not reasonable men. It has therefore been recognised that these more or less discretion questions of impression or opinion in respect of which reasonable men may arrive at discrepant conclusions on the same evidence are questions of facts."
View Judgment →

Explanation / Scope

This principle establishes that the exercise of judicial discretion is a question of fact, as reasonable people may reach different conclusions on the same facts. The principle applies where discretionary decisions are challenged. It ensures that discretion is treated as a question of fact. The principle reflects the nature of discretionary decisions. It prevents rigid application of precedent. The court must respect reasonable differences. The principle provides guidance on judicial discretion.

Cases Applying This Principle

Chief Dr. Pere Ajuwa & Anor v. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited