CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
The Respondent is a company engaged in the manufacture of tyres, while the Appellant is a businessman. In 1989, the Appellant entered into a dealership/distributorship contract with the Respondent for the sale of motor tyres. Under the terms of the contract, the Appellant was required to pay, and did pay, a refundable deposit which was retained by the Respondent. During the course of the contract, a dispute arose as to whether the Appellant was indebted to the Respondent and whether the Respondent was entitled to withhold the refundable deposit and bonuses to offset part of the alleged indebtedness.
In 1999, the Appellant demanded the refund of the deposit and payment of bonuses. The Respondent communicated its refusal to pay in a letter dated 26 July 1999. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed suit No: PLD/J/153/2007 before a Plateau State High Court claiming the refundable deposit, bonuses, interest, and special damages. The trial Court found in favour of the Appellant. Dissatisfied, the Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal, Jos Judicial Division, which on 27 June 2013 held that the suit was statute barred and declined to address other issues. Further dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination
Whether the Court below was right when it held that the appellant’s action is statute barred by virtue of Section 18 of the Plateau State Limitation Law (Edict No. 16, 1988).
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and made no order as to costs. The Court held that the appellant’s action, founded on breach of contract, was statute-barred having been filed outside the five-year period prescribed by Section 18 of the Plateau State Limitation Law (Edict No. 16, 1988).
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
Obiter Dicta
“The rational for statute of Limitation is simple. A claimant who has slept on his rights is not to be assisted or allowed to bring his action when he likes. A claimant should file his action with diligence and within the time provided by statute. Limitation periods protect a defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim. For example, if a claim is brought a long time after the events in question, there is a strong likelihood that evidence which was available earlier may have been lost, and the memories of witnesses may have faded. A party would not be allowed to take advantage of the Limitation law where there is clear evidence of disability, mistake, fraud and in certain cases involving personal injury, death.”
Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, in ABUBAKAR v. MICHELIN MOTOR SERVICES LTD (2020) NLC-123-1412014(SC) at pp. 7-8; Paras C-A.
“It is desirable but not mandatory that Limitation Law is pleaded. If it is not pleaded, it still can be raised at any stage in the proceedings and in any Court for the first time, since it is an issue of jurisdiction. The adverse party must be put on notice so that he is not taken by surprise.”
Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, in ABUBAKAR v. MICHELIN MOTOR SERVICES LTD (2020) NLC-123-1412014(SC) at p. 6; Paras C-D.
Orders of Court
(1) The appeal is dismissed for lack of merit.
(2) The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
(3) No order as to costs.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
Kehinde Aina, Esq. (with him, Chiamaka Obiadi, Esq.)
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
E.O. Okoro, Esq. (with him, S.M. Danlami, Esq. and E.I. Ndidigwe, Esq.)
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
— (DELIVERED BY KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.)
I have had the benefit of reading before now, the judgment of my learned brother, OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC just delivered. I agree with him entirely that the appellant’s action at the trial Court was in respect of an alleged breach of contract between him and the respondent in respect of a dealership contract. The parties are ad idem that the cause of action accrued in 1999. The record shows that the suit was filed on 30/4/2007, about eight years later.
​The purport and effect of a statute of limitation, such as the Plateau State Limitation Edict No. 16 of 1988 is that where the statute prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot validly be brought or instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. An action brought after the prescribed period is said
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to be statute-barred.
It was held in Amadi & Anor. V. INEC (2012) LPELR – 7831 (SC) @ 31-32 D-E, that the essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a right in perpetuity, but a right generally limited by statute.
Consequently, where the action is bought outside the prescribed period, the Court is divested of jurisdiction to entertain the matter, as it is no longer a live issue. See also: Egbe V. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47); Hassan V. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt.1223) 547. It was further held in Sulgrave Holdings Inc. & Ors. V. Federal Government of Nigeria & Ors. (2012) LPELR -15520 (SC) @ 36 A-D, that the purpose of a Limitation Law is to require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing predictability and finality in legal affairs.
The applicable provision of the Plateau State Limitation Law (Edict No.16 of 1988) is Section 18 thereof, which provides:
“No action founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in parts (i) and (ii) of this edict shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause of action
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accrued…”
Section 14 of the Law is inapplicable to the facts of this case, there being no pleading relating to a mortgage or charge.
I agree with my learned brother, that the appellant’s claim, founded on breach of contract was statute-barred having been filed outside the 5 years prescribed by the Limitation Law. I agree with the sound reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit. It is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court is affirmed.
I make no order for costs.
Concurring Opinion(s)
— CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.S.C.
I had the advantage of reading, before now, the Draft of the leading judgement which my Lord, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC, just delivered. I agree with His Lordship that this appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
— AMIRU SANUSI, J.S.C.
 I read in advance the judgment by my learned brother, Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. It is noted by me that this appeal or suit as filed at the lower Court is an offshoot of appeal No.SC.141/2014 in which judgment was just delivered to the effect that the action filed by the appellant at the trial Court was done outside the stipulated period allowed by law. The said
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decision has therefore affected this sister appeal too. The action in this case was filed outside the period stipulated by Section 18 of Plateau State Limitation Law/Edit No. 16 of 1988 as found by the lower Court.
The appeal is therefore lacking in substance and is accordingly dismissed. I affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal i.e. the lower Court.
Appeal dismissed.
— EJEMBI EKO, J.S.C.
Section 18 of the Plateau State Limited Law No. 16, 1988 provides expressly that no action founded on contract shall be brought after the expiration of five years from the date on which the cause accrued. The provisions are clear and unambiguous.
The Appellant, as the Plaintiff at the trial Court, founded his claims on the refusal of the Respondent, as the defendant, to pay, on his demand for refund, the refundable deposit as agreed in the contract he was enforcing. The action was therefore founded on breach of contract by the Defendant.
The Respondent, refusing to pay the refundable deposit, made its refusal to pay very clear in the letter dated 26th July 1999, The right to the cause of action summarised in the following five claims the Appellant
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made against the Respondent at the trial Court, to wit –
a. the sum of N4,400,000.00 (Four Million, Four Hundred Thousand Naira) only being the refundable deposit the plaintiff has with the defendant.
b. the sum of N1,936,919.54 (One Million, Nine Hundred and Thirty-Six Thousand, Nine Hundred and Nineteen Naira Fifty Four Kobo) only being 1999 end of year and progress bonuses.
c. 10% interest per annum therefrom 1999 till final payment of the entire sum.
d. the sum of N112,500.00 per week as special damages from 1st January 2000 to 26th January 2001 i.e. for 55 weeks.
e. the costs of this action,
Accrued to the Appellant from the said refusal to pay which was duly communicated to the Appellant on 26th July, 1999. The five (5) years period for the purpose of the limitation, calculated from the said 26 July, 1999, ends in July 2004. The suit commenced in 2007 was clearly statute barred, and right to enforce the cause of action extinguished against the Appellant, as the plaintiff.
​The Appellant, in order to avoid the full force of Section 18 had submitted, wrongly, that it is Section 14 of the said Limitation Law, and not
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Section 18 that applies to his case. Section 14 of the Law No. 16 applies only in respect or relation to dispute for recovery of any principal sum of money secured by mortgage or other charged on property, foreclosure action; et al which is not the issue in this appeal. Between the Appellant and the Respondent there was no mortgage transaction to warrant the plea or resort to Section 14 of the Limitation Law No. 16, 1988 of Plateau State, as the Appellant has, Resort to Section 14 was clearly diversionary and unavailing.
The judgment just delivered in this appeal by my learned brother, OLABODE RHODES-VIVOUR, JSC, represents my views in the appeal. I hereby endorse and adopt it, including all the orders made therein.
Appeal dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement — dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
1. Adekoya v. FHA (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1099) p. 539 — Cited at p. 5
2. Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) p. 1 — Cited at p. 15
3. Afolayan v. Ogunrinde (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 127) — Cited at p. 15
4. Amadi & Anor v. INEC (2012) LPELR-7831(SC) — Cited at pp. 18-19
5. Egbe v. Adefarasin (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) p. 1 — Cited at pp. 16, 19
6. F.R.I.N. v. Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) p. 1 — Cited at p. 16
7. Hassan v. Aliyu (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 547 — Cited at p. 19
8. J.K.K. Ltd v. Gov of Lagos State (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1399) p. 151 — Cited at p. 5
9. Lawon Sanda v. Kukawa LG & Anor (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 174) p. 379 — Cited at p. 5
10. Mulima & Anor v. Usman & 3 Ors (2014) 1-2 SC (Pt. 111) p. 126 — Cited at p. 16
11. Okenwa v. Military Gov Imo State (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 455) p. 394 — Cited at p. 16
12. Sulgrave Holdings Inc. & Ors v. Federal Government of Nigeria & Ors (2012) LPELR-15520(SC) — Cited at p. 19
13. Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) p. 669 — Cited at p. 15
14. UBA Plc v. Abdullahi (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 807) p. 359 — Cited at p. 5
15. Uwazuruonye v. Gov of Imo State & 2 Ors (2012) 11 SC p. 133 — Cited at p. 15
Referenced Statutes
1. Limitation Law, Cap L67 of Lagos State — Cited at p. 7
2. Plateau State Limitation Law (Edict No. 16 of 1988) — Section 14 — Cited at pp. 4, 5, 11-13, 14, 22
3. Plateau State Limitation Law (Edict No. 16 of 1988) — Section 18 — Cited at pp. 4, 5, 14, 17, 19, 20, 22