Alhaji Saka Opobiyi & Anor v. Layiwola Muniru
CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial — not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
The dispute concerned the administration and distribution of the estate of one Tukur Gogo Olowo of Ile Panu, Masingba, Ilorin, who died in 1924. Members of his family first approached a court in 1979 for distribution of the estate under Islamic Law of inheritance, but there was no record of that proceeding. Subsequently, the appellants commenced an action on 12 October 1994 at the Upper Area Court No. 2, Oloje, Ilorin, following an order of retrial de novo made by the Kwara State Shariah Court of Appeal on 22 August 1990. The original parties having died in the course of litigation, the current parties were substituted: the appellants are great grandsons of Tukur (representing his daughter Saratu’s line), and the respondent is a great, great grandson of Tukur (representing the line of his only son, Abudu-Salami).
The Upper Area Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that they failed to establish certainty of the estate and the dates of death of heirs, and that they could not succeed unless a male heir from the male side was joined. The Shariah Court of Appeal allowed the appeal substantially and remitted the case to the trial court with specific guidelines for further investigation, including determining Abdulsalami’s acquisition of title and whether Saratu predeceased or survived Tukur. The appellants further appealed to the Court of Appeal, Ilorin, against the part of the Shariah Court of Appeal judgment that excluded what had been given to Zainab from the estate.
Issues for Determination
ISSUE 1: Whether the Court of Appeal, Ilorin was right or wrong in striking out the appellants’ appeal on a Preliminary Objection embedded in the respondent’s brief of argument challenging the competency of both Appellants and Respondent to sue and be sued respectively on the estate of late Tukur.
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. It set aside the order of the Court of Appeal striking out the appeal and ordered that the appeal before the Court of Appeal be heard and determined on its merits, before a different panel of Justices. No order as to costs was made.
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Abuse of Court Process — Ordering Parties to Recommence Suit De Novo Amounts to Abuse of Process
“The injunction that parties could commence the suit afresh equates with abuse of process. It was in bad taste as the court below could lay the matter to rest by deciding it once and for all. It is abuse of court process for the court below to advise the parties to commence afresh a case that it could have dealt with to finality.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at pp. 13—14; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Decision of Court — Must Be Supported by Evidence — Misdirection to Give Judgment Without Evidence
“It is settled law that a decision of the court must be supported by evidence and that it is misdirection for a court to give judgment on an issue on which there is no evidence at all, as in the instant case.”
Per Onnoghen, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at p. 12; Paras A—B.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Islamic Law of Inheritance — Distant Kindred (Dhul Arham) — Right to Share Only When Residuaries and Heirs Are Unavailable
“The right of Dhul Arham that is maternal and close relations to the deceased to share out of the estate is considered when the first two categories are not available, residuaries and heirs.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at pp. 9—10; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Jurisdiction — Locus Standi — Fresh Issue of Locus Standi Raised for First Time on Appeal May Be Raised Without Leave
“An issue of jurisdiction being fundamental to the case does not require leave to be raised. Furthermore, it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The respondent in the instant appeal did not require leave to raise the issue of locus in the preliminary objection filed afresh and argued before the court below.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at p. 9; Paras A—B.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Jurisdiction — Locus Standi — Lack of Locus Standi Goes to Jurisdiction
“Locus standi is the legal capacity to institute an action in a court of law. Where a plaintiff is held to lack the locus standi to maintain an action, the finding goes to the issue of jurisdiction – as it denies the court jurisdiction to determine the action. Jurisdiction is in other words, a radical question of competence – a court can only be competent when the case comes by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at pp. 8—9; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Motion — Affidavit — A Motion Without a Supporting Affidavit Is Bare and Without Support
“It is apt that every motion must be supported by an affidavit and failure to file such an affidavit renders same bare and without support. Any decision arrived at, in such a circumstance, would have been rendered in vaccuo leading to the inescapable end result of arriving at abstract justice.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at p. 12; Paras B—C.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Preliminary Objection — Form and Procedure — Notice Must Give Three Clear Days and Set Out Grounds
“Order 3 Rule 15 (1) of the Court of Appeal rules 2007 enjoins a respondent intending to rely on a preliminary objection to the hearing of the appeal to give the appellant three clear days notice before the hearing, setting out the grounds of the objection and shall file twenty copies of the notice with the Registrar.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at pp. 6—7; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Preliminary Objection — Notice of Preliminary Objection Not Moved at Hearing Is Deemed Abandoned
“The notice of preliminary objection which was not moved at the hearing of the appeal must be deemed as having been abandoned.”
Per Fabiyi, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at p. 12; Paras D—E.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Preliminary Objection — Requirement of Evidence — Where Objection Turns on Facts, Objector Must Supply Affidavit Evidence
“Where a preliminary objection veers off the exclusive domain of law and flirts with facts of the case as in this instance where it needs verification whether or not the status of the parties or any of them was in question, therefore the objector must justify the objection by supplying the relevant facts in affidavit. The court cannot act on the objection without basis or in vacuo.”
Per Peter-Odili, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at pp. 19—20; Paras E—A.
CIVIL PROCEDURE — Substitution of Parties — Where Original Parties Die, Substituted Parties Must Continue Suit
“When in this circumstance, all the original parties are dead and the issue of the distribution of the estate is yet to be settled, the present parties who came into the matter by way of substitution granted by court must continue to keep the suit alive.”
Per Adekeye, JSC, in Opobiyi & Anor v. Muniru (2011) NLC-123-30-2005(SC) at p. 10; Paras B—C.
Obiter Dicta
Per Fabiyi, JSC: “The injunction that parties could commence the suit afresh equates with abuse of process. It was in bad taste as the court below could lay the matter to rest by deciding it once and for all. It is abuse of court process for the court below to advise the parties to commence afresh a case that it could have dealt with to finality.” (At p. 12; Paras D–E).
Orders of Court
1. The appeal was allowed.
2. The order of the Court of Appeal striking out the appeal was set aside.
3. The appeal before the Court of Appeal is to be determined on its merits before a different panel of Justices.
4. No order as to costs.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
Akin Akintoye; Josiah Adebayo
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
Ismael Saka Ismael
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
— (DELIVERED BY OLUFUNLOLA OYELOLA ADEKEYE, J.S.C. (DELIVERING THE LEAD JUDGMENT): )
Concurring Opinion(s)
— WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.:
I have had the benefit of reading in draft, the lead judgment of my learned brother Adekeye, JSC just delivered.
I agree with his reasoning and conclusion that the appeal has merit and should be allowed.
There is no iota of evidence to support the holding by the lower court that at the time of initiating the action any of the direct descendants of Tukur was still alive particularly when the appellants contend the contrary.
It is settled law that a decision of the court must be supported by evidence and that it is misdirection for a court to give judgment on an issue on which there is no evidence at all, as in the instant case.
I therefore allow the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made in the lead judgment including the order as to costs.
Appeal allowed.
P.12
— A. FABIYI, J.S.C.:I
I have read before now the judgment just handed out by my learned brother – Adekeye, JSC. I agree with the reasons and conclusion arrived at therein.
This matter relates to the realm of Islamic personal law.
The parties were said to be distant kindred (Ohul Arham) of Tukur. A preliminary objection was taken at the Court of Appeal to challenge the competence of the parties. The motion filed had no affidavit in support. As a result, there was virtually no evidence to prop the challenge to the competence of the parties. See: Menakaya V. Menekaya (2001) FWLR (Pt. 76) 742 at 770; which is in point.
It is apt that every motion must be supported by an affidavit and failure to file such an affidavit renders same bare and without support. Any decision arrived at, in such a circumstance, would have been rendered in vaccuo leading to the inescapable end result of arriving at abstract justice.
See: Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 346 and Chief of Air Staff V. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR (pt. 922) 496 at 546;both cited by the appellants’ counsel.
To cap it, the motion was not even moved at the hearing of the appeal. The notice of preliminary objection which was not moved at the hearing of the appeal must be deemed as having been abandoned. See: Oforkiri v. Maduike (2003) 1 SCNJ 440; Tiza v. Begha (2005) 5 SCNJ 168. In effect, the court below was not on a firm ground when it struck out the appeal on the erroneous ground that the appeal was incompetent. As same was not rooted in evidence, the decision was rendered in vacuo. It thus led to abstract justice.
Learned counsel for the appellant observed that the lower court ordered that parties could re-commence the suit de novo as they are presently; whereas the present status of the parties remains the same as at 1994 when the matter commenced except for slight modifications occasioned by deaths and substitutions.
P.13
He felt that the order of the court that parties could recommence the suit de novo amounts to an encouragement of abuse of judicial process and undue protraction of litigation. Learned counsel was on a firm ground in his strongly expressed views. The injunction that parties could commence the suit afresh equates with abuse of process. It was in bad taste as the court below could lay the matter to rest by deciding it once and for all. It is abuse of court process for the court below to advise the parties to commence afresh a case that it could have dealt with to finality. See: Badejo V. Minister of Education (1996) 9-10 SCNJ 51 at 70.
The short of it is that the appeal deserves to be allowed.
I agree with my learned brother. The decision of the court below is hereby set aside. I order that the appeal be heard afresh by a different panel of Justices. I abide by the order relating to costs in the lead judgment.
P.14
— BODE RHODES-VIVOUR, J.S.C.:
The appellants and the respondents are grand and great grand children of Tukur (Deceased). In Islamic Law they are known as Dhul Arham. That is, distant kindred. They are in court to share the property of Tukur. The position in Islamic Law is that these Litigants do not inherit if the deceased’s children are alive. For example a grandchild does not inherit with a son of the deceased.
Now, all the original parties are dead and the issue of distribution of the Estate of Tukur remains unresolved. It follows that the present parties who came in by way of substitution granted by the court ought to continue with the case. Striking out the appeal on a preliminary objection by the Court of Appeal cannot in the circumstances be sustained by this court.
P.15
This case must continue. Accordingly, the appeal before the Court of Appeal shall be heard on its merits.
For this and the elaborate reasoning of my learned brother, Adekeye, JSC I agree that the order striking out the appeal is set aside and the directives proposed complied with.
P.16
— MARY UKAEGO PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.:
I have had the preview of the draft Judgment of my learned brother, Adekeye JSC which decision and reasons I agree with.
This a retrial suit that emanated from the upper Area court II, of Oloje, Ilorin in Kwara state sometime in 1994, in which the appellants, then as plaintiffs claimed from the trial court the sharing of the estate of one Tukur, their grandfather, which was said to include the g rooms built by one Zainab Abebi, in accordance with the Islamic law. In their effort to establish the claim, plaintiff called 3 witnesses including themselves while in his defence, respondent then as defendant, also called 3 witnesses himself inclusive. In the end, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.
Being dissatisfied with the whole of the judgment of the trial court, the appellants, having run out of time sought and obtained leave to and thereafter appeared to the Sharia Court of Appeal, Ilorin, which court held that the appeal succeeded substantially and thereupon sent the case back to the trial court for retrial. Appellants were still dissatisfied with a part of the Sharia Court of Appeal judgment particularly the part excising a parcel of land from the estate in issue, while sending the case back for retrial.
P.17
Then the appellants appeared to the Court of Appeal; (court below) from the Sharia Court of Appeal, Ilorin and consequently filed their appellants brief of argument. Responding, the respondent filed their brief in which was subsumed a preliminary objection pursuant to an earlier fired motion on notice which effectively gave birth to this substantive appeal. The court below upheld the preliminary objection and struck out the appeal hence the present appeal to this court.
A background view of this case is that what is at the crux of the case is the estate of the grandfather of the plaintiff/appellants named Tukur, who was also the great- great grandfather of the respondent. The said Tukur had four surviving children at the time of his death namely; Abdulsalami, Saratu, Aishat and Salamat none of whom was alive at the commencement of his suit in 1994. Also established by the plaintiff/appellants in evidence is that the estate of Tukur had not been shared up till the time the case was brought to court. 1st plaintiff Alhaji Alabi Opobiyi now deceased as head of family had allowed Alhaja Zainab Abebi (daughter of Abdulsalami, the only male child of Tukur, also deceased) to erect on a portion of the rand in issue, a block of 8 rooms, where in she lived till her death. The expectation is that the said piece of land upon the death of Alhaja Zainab Abebi should revert to the entire estate since it was not a gift or an act of sharing, but a gesture to afford the said Alhaja Zainab Abebi shelter within the area of the estate.
It was at the appeal to the court below the respondent for the first time questioned and/or impeached the competence of the parties to the entire suit based, on Islamic law.
In accordance with the rules of this court, the appellant filed their brief 28/3/08 in which were couched three issues viz:-
P.15
Whether the lower court was not in error when it held, without any concrete evidence, that it appears that the incompetency in this suit relates to the time of the initiation of this action which had been conceded to by the learned counsel to the appellants, hence at the time of initiation when the grandchildren initiated action (sic) when their parents were alive.. (emphasis ours); thereby encouraging, howebeit inadvertently, proliferation and/or repetition of action and/or abuse of courts process. (Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal)
Whether the lower court had not erroneously granted the respondent a relief that was never sought nor supported by evidence. (Ground 1 and 2 of the grounds of appeal.)
Whether the lower court was not in error by failing, refusing and/or neglecting to consider the appeal on its merit, despite its decision on the preliminary objection, in the event its judgment was in error. (Ground 3 of the grounds of appeal).
Respondent also within the same rules of court field their brief on 9/2/09 and framed a single issue thus:
Whether the Court of Appeal, Ilorin was right or wrong in striking out the appellant’s appeal on a preliminary objection embedded in respondent’s brief of argument challenging the competence of both appellant’s and respondent to sue and be sued respectively on the estate of late Tukur?
The sole issue as crafted by the respondent seems adequate in answering the question posed in this appeal, the three issues of the appellant’s being in effect a repetition of each other. I shall therefore go with the issue as formulated by the respondent.
At the hearing the learned counsel for the appellants adopted their brief and also the reply brief. He contended within the contents of the appellant’s brief that the court below was in error when it concluded that the appellant fall within the class of heirs called “Distant Kindred” (Ohul Arham) in accordance with the Islamic Law of inheritance may not be wrong in itself; but the context in which it was adopted by the lower court cannot be said to be appropriate.
P.16
That from the totality of the evidence before the trial court, nowhere is it contained that at the time the suit was initiated, any of the direct descendants of Tukur was alive. That the decision was not backed by evidence and not allowable by law. He cited Menakaya v. Menakaya (2001) FWLR (Pt.76) 742 at 7720. That the lower court could have upheld the decision of the Sharia Court of Appeal, instead of striking out the appeal before it. That is was an abuse of court process of the court below to have ordered a retrial. He cited Badejo v. Minister of Education (1996) 9 – 10 SCNJ 51 at 70.
For the appellants was further submitted that the appeal before the court below was simply against a part of the judgment of the Sharia Court of Appeal and so the respondent should have cross-appealed if he felt aggrieved but failed to do so and therefore the preliminary objection raised by him is incompetent which was in effect raising of a new issue without leave of court first sought for and obtained. He referred to Bob-Manuel v. Briggs (2003) 5 NELR (Pt.813) 323; Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2004) 7 SCNJ 189 at 202 – 203; Owie v. Ighiwi (2005) 1 SCNJ 181 at 197 – 198; Dabo v. Abdullahi (2005) 2 SCNJ 76 at 89; Order 3 rule 3(1) rules of this court.
Learned counsel for the appellant said that the said issue of competency raised by the respondent was a fresh issue and was not of mere law but mixed law and facts and therefore leave must be sought and obtained before it could be raised at the court below. He cited Felix Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt. 921) 393 at 404.
He went on to submit for the appellants that a court of law is not empowered to grant any relief not sought by a litigant or even to grant a relief though sought but is not supported by evidence.
P.17
That the lower court lacked the basis to find that a careful perusal of the records showed the parents of the parties were alive and so rendering the suit incompetent thereby ousting the jurisdiction of the court below. He referred to Ishola v. UBN Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.922) 422 at 438; Menakaya Menakaya (2001) FWLR (Pt. 76) 742 at 770; Felix Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.921) 393 at 404; Chief of Air Staff v. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.922) 496 at 546.
Learned counsel for the appellants went on to contend that the motion on notice dated 16/10/2001, by which the preliminary objection was raised had no supporting affidavit and so no evidence to push the objection and the objection should have been struck out. He cited Mobil Oil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 346 at 433; (2003) 13 NWLR (pt.852) 346 at 433; A. G. Federation v. A.N.P.P. (2003) 18 NWLR (PT.852) at 182 AT 207; Oshiomhole v. F.G.N. (205) 1 NWLR (Pt.909) 414; Oforkiri v. Maduike (2003) 1 SCNJ 440 at 448; Tiza v. Begha (2005) 5 SCNJ 168 at 178.
Responding, learned counsel for the respondent stated that the court below was right in declining jurisdiction since the suit was incompetent on account of the direct children of Tukur Gogo Olowo whose estate was in issue were still alive. That neither the appellants nor the respondent were competent to sue or be sued respectively. He referred to Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria v. National Union of Road Transport Workers, (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt.2) 251 at 260; Emezi v. Osuagwu (2005) 2 SC 128 at 141; Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390; Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 669; Momoh & Anor v. Olotu (1970) NSCC 99 at 104; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Oloba v. Akereja (1998) 7 SC 8 (Pt.1) 1 at 11.
P.18
He stated further on behalf of the respondent that jurisdiction being of fundamental importance could be raised as a fresh issue without leave even for the first time on appeal. He referred to Gaji v. Paye (2003) 5 SC 53; Dopemu Taiwo Adeyemi & Ors v. Akinbode Okobi & Ors (1997) 6 SCNJ 678.
Learned counsel for the respondent contended that a preliminary objection as contained in the respondent’s brief of argument in the court below was proper and there was no necessity for a supporting affidavit. This is because the form, nature or procedure of how it is raised is not strictly material. He referred to Yusuf v. Union Bank (1996) 6 SCNJ 203 at 210; Agbaka v. Amadi (1998) 7 SCNJ 367 at 375 – 376; West Minister Bank Ltd v. Edward (1942) 1 ALL ER 470 at 474; Nuhu v. Ogele (2003) 12 SC (Pt.1) 32 at 53.
That the notice of the preliminary objection to the appellant as contained in the respondent’s brief satisfied the requirement of 3 clear days of notice of a preliminary objection and so met the condition in Order 3 Rule 15 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002. He cited Maigoro v. Garba (1999) 7 SCNJ 270 at 282.
That is summary are the submissions of counsel either way. The gravamen of the contest before this court is in the main whether or not the Court of Appeal was right in striking out the suit based on incompetence on the ground that the parents of some of the parties were alive at the time the suit was initiated. It is true that under the Islamic law if inheritance, if the parents of the appellants and respondent or those of any of the parties were alive that could situate the parties into the class of heirs called “Distant Kindred” (Ohul Arham) would by that not have the competent to either sue or be sued for inheritance of an ancestor whose estate is in issue.
P.19
It is therefore an area needing evidence for clarification and would therefore not be easy to bring a preliminary objection contesting jurisdiction of such without adequate notice to the other party and leave of court especially being a fresh issue. This is because, such a decision cannot be easily reached by the court off hand without support of the necessary evidence as to the true status of those suing or being sued. See Menakaya v. Menakaya (2001) FWLR (Pt.76) 742 at 770; Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2004) 7 SCNJ 189 at 202 – 203; Owie v. Ighiwi (2005) 1 SCNJ 181 at 197 – 198; Felix Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) 393 at 404; Dabo v. Abullahi (2005) 2 SCNJ 76 at 89.
It is easy therefore to see that the court below made a hurried decision stemming from wrong premises thereby ousted its jurisdiction from a matter properly before it.
For emphasis the matter calls to attention the view of this court in A. G. Federation v. A.N.P.P (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 182 at 207, when this court held that where a preliminary objection veers off the exclusive domain of law and flirts with facts of the case as in this instance where it needs verification whether or not the status of the parties or any of them was in question, therefore the objector must justify the objection by supplying the relevant facts in affidavit. The court cannot act on the objection without basis or in vacuo.
I refer to Chief of Air Staff v. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.922) 496 at 546; Mobil Oil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 346 at 433.
From the forgoing and the more detailed judgment of my learned brother Adekeye JSC, I allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal which struck out the suit. The matter is therefore sent back to the court below for the hearing and determination of the appeal before it on the merits and before another panel of justices.
P.20
Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement — dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
1. A-G Federation v. A.N.P.P. (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt.852) 182 at 207 — Cited at p. 20
2. A-G Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 NWLR (pt.111) pg.552 — Cited at p. 9
3. Agbaka v. Amadi (1998) 7 SCNJ 367 at 375-376 — Cited at p. 7, p. 19
4. Anambra State v. A-G Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (pt.302) pg.692 — Cited at p. 9
5. Badejo v. Minister of Education (1996) 9-10 SCNJ 51 at 70 — Cited at p. 12, p. 17
6. Beecham Group v. Essdee Foods Ltd. (1985) 3 NWLR (pt.11) pg.112 — Cited at p. 10
7. Bob-Manuel v. Briggs (2003) 5 NELR (Pt.813) 323 — Cited at p. 17
8. Chief of Air Staff v. Iyen (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.922) 496 at 546 — Cited at p. 5, p. 12, p. 18, p. 20
9. Dabo v. Abdullahi (2005) 2 SCNJ 76 at 89 — Cited at p. 17, p. 20
10. Dopemu Taiwo Adeyemi & Ors v. Akinbode Okobi & Ors (1997) 6 SCNJ 678 — Cited at p. 19
11. Emezi v. Osuagwu (2005) 2 SC 128 at 141 — Cited at p. 7, p. 18
12. Eze v. A-G Rivers State (2001) 8 NSCQR pg.537 — Cited at p. 5
13. Ezukwu v. Ukachukwu (2004) 7 SCNJ 189 at 202-203 — Cited at p. 17, p. 20
14. Fadiora v. Gbadebo (1978) 3 SC 219 — Cited at p. 10
15. Felix Onuorah v. K.R.P.C. Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (Pt.921) 393 at 404 — Cited at p. 17, p. 18, p. 20
16. Gaji v. Paye (2003) 5 SC 53 — Cited at p. 19
17. Hope v. Smurift (2007) 6 SCNJ 269 — Cited at p. 5
18. Ishola v. UBN Ltd (2005) 6 NWLR (pt.922) 422 at 438 — Cited at p. 18
19. Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 at 342 — Cited at p. 9, p. 18
20. Maigoro v. Garba (1999) 7 SCNJ 270 at 282 — Cited at p. 7, p. 8, p. 19
21. Menakaya v. Menakaya (2001) FWLR (Pt.76) 742 at 770 — Cited at p. 12, p. 17, p. 18, p. 20
22. Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Monokpo (2003) 18 NWLR (pt.852) 346 at 433 — Cited at p. 5, p. 12, p. 18, p. 20
23. Momoh & Anor v. Olotu (1970) NSCC 99 at 104 — Cited at p. 18
24. Nuhu v. Ogele (2003) 12 SC (pt.1) 32 at 53 — Cited at p. 7, p. 19
25. Odemilekun v. Hassan (1997) 12 NWLR (pt.531) pg.56 — Cited at p. 10
26. Oforkiri v. Maduike (2003) 1 SCNJ 440 at 448 — Cited at p. 12, p. 18
27. Oloba v. Akereja (1998) 7 SC 8 (Pt.1) 1 at 11 — Cited at p. 18
28. Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390 — Cited at p. 7, p. 9, p. 18
29. Oshatoba v. Olujitan (2000) 5 NWLR (pt.655) pg.159 — Cited at p. 10
30. Oshiomhole v. F.G.N. (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt.909) 414 — Cited at p. 18
31. Owie v. Ighiwi (2005) 1 SCNJ 181 at 197-198 — Cited at p. 17, p. 20
32. Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria v. National Union of Road Transport Workers (1992) 2 SCNJ (Pt.2) 251 at 260 — Cited at p. 18
33. Thomas v. Olufusoye (1986) 1 NWLR (pt.18) pg.669 — Cited at p. 9, p. 18
34. Tiza v. Begha (2005) 5 SCNJ 168 at 178 — Cited at p. 12, p. 18
35. West Minister Bank Ltd v. Edward (1942) 1 ALL ER 470 at 474 — Cited at p. 19
36. Yusuf v. Union Bank (1996) 6 SCNJ 203 at 210 — Cited at p. 5, p. 7, p. 19