CASE IDENTIFICATION
EDITORIAL SUMMARY
Editorial â not part of the judgment as delivered
Facts of the Case
On 18 March 2023 and 15 April 2023, the 1st Respondent (INEC) conducted the Governorship Election and supplementary election respectively into the office of the Governor of Kebbi State. The 1st Appellant was sponsored by the 2nd Appellant (PDP), whilst the 2nd Respondent was sponsored by the 4th Respondent (APC). The 3rd Respondent was the running mate of the 2nd Respondent. At the conclusion of the election, the 2nd Respondent was declared the winner, having scored 409,225 votes against the Appellants who scored 360,940 votes, with a margin of lead of 48,285 votes.
Dissatisfied with the outcome, the Appellants filed a joint petition before the Governorship Election Tribunal. At the hearing, the Appellants called 86 witnesses. The trial Tribunal dismissed the petition for lacking in merit. The Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal. Being further dissatisfied, the Appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues for Determination
ISSUE 1:
Whether the issue of the disqualification of the 3rd Respondent to contest the Kebbi State Governorship election was not proved by the Appellants as a pre-election matter.
ISSUE 2:
Whether the lower Court was wrong to hold that the alternative ground of non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022, was not proved by the Appellants.
Decision / Holding
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The Court held that the issue of disqualification of the 3rd Respondent on grounds of forgery was a pre-election matter over which the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction, that the evidence of subpoenaed witnesses not frontloaded within the statutory time was inadmissible, and that the Appellants failed to prove that any non-compliance substantially affected the outcome of the election.
Ratio Decidendi / Principles
APPELLATE PRACTICE â Appeal â Ground(s) of Appeal â How to Determine Whether a Ground of Appeal Is One of Law, Facts or Mixed Law and Facts; Whether Leave of Court Is Required Where an Appeal Is on Ground(s) of Law Alone “In determining the nature of a ground of appeal, i.e. whether it is a ground of law, ground of fact or ground of mixed law and facts, the christening of the ground is of no help or guide to the Court. In other words, the mere fact that an Appellant has designated a ground as a ‘ground of law’ or headed the ground as ‘error of law’ is not conclusive as to the nature of the ground. What the Court ought to do is to consider the ground together with its particulars and determine whether the complaint of the Appellant therein is such that will require the Court to make a pronouncement on an issue of law or that will warrant it to apply law to undisputed facts, in which case the ground will be a ground of law. Where however the complaints conveyed by the ground and its accompanying particulars are such that an appellate Court will be required to make a pronouncement on issues of disputed facts or to apply the law to disputed facts, then the ground will not be of law, but of facts or mixed law and facts, in which case leave will be required to file same before this Court.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 28â30; Paras BâA.
APPELLATE PRACTICE â Appeal â Leave of Court/Leave to Appeal â Whether Leave of Court Is Required to Appeal on Grounds of Fact or Mixed Law and Fact; Effect of Failure “It is trite that where leave is required to be sought and obtained in respect of a ground of appeal, failure to seek leave before raising such a ground renders the ground incompetent and liable to be struck out. Since issues for determination are distilled from grounds of appeal, any issue formulated from an incompetent ground will equally be incompetent and liable to be struck out.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 26â28; Paras BâA.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Joinder of Party(ies) â Essence of Joinder of Necessary Party(ies) to an Action “Furthermore, the only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is that he should be bound by the result of the action, and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectually and completely settled unless he is a party.” Per Aji, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 65; Paras DâE.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Joinder of Party(ies) â Factors to Be Considered by a Court in Determining Whether a Party Should Be Joined to a Suit “The relevant questions to consider in determining whether the joinder of a party is necessary are: 1. Is the cause or matter likely to be defeated by the non-joinder? 2. Is it possible for the Court to adjudicate on the cause of action set up by the Plaintiff unless the third party is added as Defendant? 3. Is the third party a person who ought to have been joined as a Defendant? 4. Is the third party a person whose presence before the Court as Defendant will be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate on and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter?” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 43; Paras BâE.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Locus Standi â Meaning and Nature of Locus Standi; Effect of Lack of Locus Standi “The term, locus standi, denotes the legal capacity to institute proceedings in a Court of law. An objection to a Plaintiff’s locus standi attacks his competence to sue as to whether he has any legal or equitable interest to protect. … No doubt, the issue of locus standi is a fundamental matter that goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Court, for where the Plaintiff lacks locus standi, the Court cannot create one for him or manufacture another Plaintiff to maintain the action. Hence, the law is firmly settled that where there is no locus standi, a Court cannot exercise jurisdiction to entertain the action or suit brought by the Plaintiff.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 17â18; Paras CâB.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Locus Standi â What a Party Must Show to Establish Locus Standi; How to Determine Whether a Plaintiff Has Locus Standi “For a person or party to have locus standi to sue, he must show substantial or tangible interest in the outcome of the litigation. A Court will only accord locus standi to a Plaintiff who shows that his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected. The Plaintiff must be able to demonstrate how his rights have been infringed or how the matter directly affects him. There are two tests for determining if a person has locus standi. They are: I. The action must be justiciable; and 2. There must be a dispute between the parties.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 18â19; Paras EâC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Misjoinder/Non-Joinder of Party(ies) â Whether a Cause or Matter Can Be Defeated by Reason of Non-Joinder or Misjoinder of Parties “The general rule is that no action shall be defeated by reason of non-joinder of a party and a Court shall determine the suit before it between the parties before it. This is echoed by Order 9 Rule 5 and Order 9 Rule 14(1) – (3) of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 40â41; Paras BâD.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Necessary Party(ies) â Effect of Failure to Join a Necessary Party in an Action “Another reason for joining a party to an action is so that he would be bound by the result of the action and the question to be settled. Certainly, the 1st respondent qualifies as a necessary party in the circumstances of this case. The lower Court rightly held that the failure to join the 1st respondent as a party to the action was a breach of its right to fair hearing, guaranteed by Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. The effect of a breach to the right to fair hearing … is that the entire proceedings are a nullity and liable to be set aside.” Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 62; Paras BâE.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Necessary Party(ies) â What Are the Relevant Considerations in Determining Who Is a Necessary Party in a Suit “…the blue litmus test for the determination of who may be a necessary party to a suit is predicated on whether the Judgment will affect the party; and one of the reasons which makes it necessary to make a particular person a party to an action is that he will be bound by the result of the action and to put an end to parallel litigations.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 49â51; Paras FâC.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Necessary Party(ies) â Who Is a Necessary Party and Effect of Failure to Join a Necessary Party in an Action “There are instances where failure to add a party to an action will be fatal. Where a necessary party whose presence is necessary for the determination of all the questions in a suit is not added as a party, the failure will have fatal consequences and the judgment will be unsustainable. Similarly, where the Plaintiff claims a relief or reliefs which when granted will have a binding effect on a person who is not a party to the action, the action becomes incompetent as the necessary party has not been joined. A necessary party to a proceeding is a party whose presence and participation is necessary or essential for the effective and complete determination of the claim before the Court. He is not only a desirable or proper party, but also a party who is both interested in the subject matter of the proceedings and in the absence of whom the questions or issues in dispute cannot be properly, judiciously and finally settled unless he is made a party.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 41â43; Paras EâA.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Necessary Party(ies) â Who Is a Necessary Party and Effect of Failure to Join a Necessary Party in an Action “Although non-joinder of a party may not be fatal to a case, the non-joinder of a necessary party, where it ought to have been done and has not been done, affects the Court’s jurisdiction and fair hearing of the necessary party is breached. Where the plaintiff’s case or the defendant’s case cannot be effectively and completely determined without the joinder, that makes the party to be joined as a necessary party. A necessary party is someone whose presence is essential for the effectual and complete determination of the issues before the Court. It is a party, in the absence of whom the claim cannot be effectually and completely determined.” Per Aji, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 64â65; Paras DâB.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Action â Proper Parties â Whether Proper Parties Must Be Before the Court for It to Be Competent to Adjudicate on a Matter “It is only when proper necessary parties are before the Court that the Court is competent to adjudicate on a suit.” Per Aji, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 65; Para C.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Preliminary Objection â Whether a Party Can Argue His Preliminary Objection in His Brief Without Filing a Separate Notice “Failure of a Respondent to file a separate ‘notice’ does not render his preliminary objection incompetent or ineffective. Where a Respondent raises and argues his preliminary objection in his brief of argument, the need to file a separate Notice of Preliminary Objection is obviated. Where this is done and the brief containing the preliminary objection was filed not less than three clear days before the hearing of the appeal, then the requirement of Order 2 Rule 9 of the Supreme Court Rules would have been met, as long as the Respondent’s counsel does not fail to do what ought to be done in every case where there is an objection to the hearing of an appeal, that is, drawing the Court’s attention to and formally moving the objection at the hearing of the appeal. This is an acceptable practice and has been endorsed by this Court in several decisions.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 14â16; Para C.
CIVIL PROCEDURE â Undefended List Procedure â The Procedure Under the Undefended List “It is pertinent to note that even in the Undefended List Procedure, where a claimant seeks to recover a liquidated sum, the defendant must be put on notice and is at liberty to file a notice of intention to defend the suit, accompanied by an affidavit setting out the grounds of his proposed defence to the claim. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the claimant is convinced that the defendant has no defence, the defendant is still given an opportunity to be heard before any decision is made that affects his interest.” Per Kekere-Ekun, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 60; Paras AâD.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW â Breach of Right to Fair Hearing â Effect of Proceedings Conducted in Breach of Right to Fair Hearing “There is a saying to the effect that ‘a man’s head cannot be shaved behind his back’. What transpired in the entire proceedings before the trial Court had the opposite effect. The infringement of the 1st Respondent’s right to fair hearing having been established, the proceedings before the trial Court are a nullity and the lower Court cannot be faulted for setting aside same.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 57; Paras CâF.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW â Breach of Right to Fair Hearing â Principles of Fair Hearing; Instance Where It Can Be Said That a Right to Fair Hearing Has Been Breached “Natural justice is made up the two principles i.e. nemo judex in causa sua (a man cannot be a Judge in his own cause) and audi alteram partem (hear the other side). These are the jointly known as twin pillars of natural justice and must at all times be observed. … The true test of a fair hearing is the impression of a reasonable person who was present at the trial, whether from his observation, justice has been done in the case. In a situation such as this where the 1st Respondent was completely shut out, an impartial observer who is a man of reason and a complete stranger to the proceedings will certainly get the impression that he was not accorded his right to fair hearing.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 54â56; Paras BâD.
JURISDICTION â Appellate Jurisdiction â Whether an Appellate Court Can Exercise Jurisdiction Over a Matter Where the Lower Court(s) Lacks Jurisdiction “It is also settled beyond equivocation that want of jurisdiction on the part of a trial Court or lower Court has the effect of robbing an appellate or higher Court of jurisdiction.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at p. 18; Paras CâD.
MORTGAGE â Legal Mortgage â Conditions That Must Be Met Before a Mortgagee Can Pass a Good Title to a Purchaser Free from the Equity of Redemption “In a legal mortgage, the mortgagee retains the right of redemption, and he is entitled to recover ownership of the mortgaged property once he has repaid the loan or liquidated the indebtedness. Thus, by executing a deed of legal mortgage in favour of the mortgagee, the mortgagor does not completely divest himself of his interest in the mortgaged property. The mortgagee’s powers only arise when the debt is due but unpaid. Thus, while the mortgagee has certain powers, they are exercisable only subject to certain conditions. … the mortgagee’s … power of foreclosure/possession … as well as the power of sale, are not at large. They are exercisable only upon some conditions, such as when the debt is due but remains unliquidated by the mortgagor.” Per Jauro, JSC, in AMCON v. Suru Worldwide Ventures (Nig.) Ltd & Ors (2024) NLC-123-1098-2019(SC) at pp. 52â53; Paras BâD.
Orders of Court
Appeal dismissed. The judgment of the lower Court delivered on 24 November 2023 was affirmed. Cross-appeals Nos. SC/CV/1228A/2023 and SC/CV/1228B/2023 to abide by the judgment in the instant appeal.
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant(s)
D. D. Dodo, SAN with him, Michael Kaase Andoakaa, SAN, Ibrahim K. Bawa, SAN, M. S. Ibrahim, SAN appearing with them Pamek Okoh, Esq.
Counsel for the Respondent(s)
Usman Asole, SAN with them Rachael C. Nsofor, Esq., Abdul Noah, Esq., Joshua E. Usman, Esq. and Kalat N. Jalau, Esq. - for 1st Respondent Y. C. Makyau, SAN with him, Ahmed Raji, SAN, Sam Atok, SAN for the 2nd Respondent appearing with them O. A. Dada, Esq. and Segun Carad. K. K. Eleja, SAN with him, Wole Agunbiade, SAN, Olusegun O. Jolaawo, SAN for the 3rd Respondent appearing with them Lagalo Dan Lagalo, Esq. and Israel Sola, Esq. Abdullahi Yahya, SAN, with him Wale Fapounda, SAN, Andrew Malgwi SAN, appearing with them Samuel A. Oguntuyi, Esq. and Mahmoud Belgore, Esq. - for 4th Respondent
Amicus Curiae
None
JUDGMENTS / OPINIONS OF THE COURT
Authoritative judicial text as delivered
Lead / Majority Opinion
â (DELIVERED BY UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, J.S.C. (DELIVERING THE LEADING JUDGMENT):)
On 18/3/2023 and 15/4/2023, the 1st Respondent (INEC) conducted the Governorship Election and supplementary election respectively, into the office of the Governor of Kebbi State. In the election, the 1st Appellant was sponsored by the 2nd Appellant, whilst the 2nd Respondent was sponsored by the 4th Respondent. The 3rd Respondent was the running mate of the 2nd Respondent. At the conclusion of the election, the 2nd Respondent was declared the winner, having scored the majority of lawful votes of 409,225 against the Appellants who scored 360,940; with the margin of lead being 48,285.
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the said election, the Appellants filed a joint Petition against the Respondents on 5/5/2023. At the hearing of the petition, the Appellants called 86 witnesses in proof of their petition. At the close of hearing, the trial Tribunal on 5/10/2023 delivered its judgment dismissing the Petition for lacking in merit. Aggrieved by the judgment of the trial Tribunal, the Appellants on 24/10/2023, appealed to the lower Court. On 24/11/2023, the lower
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Court found the Appellants’ appeal unmeritorious and accordingly dismissed same. This impelled the Appellantsâ appeal to this Honourable Court.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION BY PARTIES:
The learned senior Counsel for the Appellants nominated these issues for the determination of this appeal:
I. Whether the Appellants have proved that the 3rd Respondent was disqualified by virtue of Sections 182(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered), from contesting in the Kebbi State governorship election, having submitted forged certificate to the Independent National Electoral Commission.
II. Whether the question of qualification of the 3rd Respondent as presented by the Appellants is a pre-election matter.
III. Whether the lower Court did not altogether come to a wrong decision that the Appellant failed to prove its alternative ground upon which the petition was presented to wit: that the election was invalid by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022.
IV. Whether the decision of the lower Court was not, in the circumstance, perverse.
The 1st Respondent nominated
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these issues:
1. Whether the Appellants have proved that the 3rd Respondent was not qualified by virtue of Section 182(l)(i) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) to contest in the Kebbi State Governorship Election?
2. Whether the issue of the qualification of the 3rd Respondent as presented by the Appellants is a pre-election matter.
3. Whether the lower Court was correct when it held that the Appellants failed to prove their ground of non-compliance in the petition.
4. Whether the decision of the lower Court not being perverse, ought to be disturbed by this Honourable Court.
The 2nd Respondent distilled these issues for determination:
1. Whether in the light of the decision of this Honourable Court in SC/CV/935/2023 between ABUBAKAR ATIKU & ANOR v. INEC & ORS delivered on the 26th of October, 2023, the lower Court was not right to have held that the trial tribunal rightly struck out paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the Petition, the evidence of PW27, PW28 and PW78 who were subpoenaed witnesses and the exhibits tendered in respect of the allegations of forgery of testimonial
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including exhibits P569 (disclaimer), P713, P714 and P715, INEC Forms CF001 and EC9?
2. Whether the lower Court was right to have upheld the decision of the trial Tribunal that the Appellants failed to adduce legally admissible and credible evidence in prove of the allegation that the 3rd Respondent was not qualified to contest the election for the office of Governor of Kebbi State held on the 18th day of March, 2023 and 15th day of April, 2023?
3. Whether the lower Court was not right when it held that the trial Tribunal rightly struck out paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the Appellants’ Petition on the ground that they dealt with pre-election matters?
4. Whether the lower Court was not right when it affirmed the judgment of the Trial Tribunal that the Appellants failed to prove the allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 in the conduct of the Kebbi State Governorship Election of 18th day of March, 2023 and 15th day of April, 2023?
5. Whether the lower Court rightly dismissed the Appellants’ Appeal in its entirety for failure to adduce cogent, verifiable and legally admissible
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evidence to warrant the grant of the declaratory reliefs sought by the Appellants?
The 3rd Respondent formulated these issues:
1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the judgment of the tribunal expunging the evidence of PW27, PW28, and PW78 who were subpoenaed witnesses and filed no witness statement on oath before the Tribunal together with exhibits tendered by them?
2. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the judgment of the tribunal that exhibit P569, the disclaimer and all other exhibits that followed from it were infected by the virus that infected Exhibits P569?
3. Whether the lower Court was right in upholding the dismissal of the allegation of nonqualification of the 3rd Respondent, which is anchored on forgery of testimonial?
4. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the tribunal’s judgment that the Appellants failed to prove the allegations of non-compliance with the provision of Electoral Act (the alternative prayer of the Petition) and consequently dismissing the Petition in its entirety?
5. Whether the lower Court was not correct in its decision that paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24 and
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25 of the appellants’ case deal with issue of nomination and sponsorship of candidate which is a pre-election matter on which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction?
The 4th Respondent distilled these issues:
1. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the decision of the trial Tribunal expunging the evidence of the Appellants’ subpoenaed witnesses, PW27, PW28, and PW78 and all exhibits tendered by them in respect of the allegation of forgery of testimonial.
2. Whether the lower Court was right in affirming the decision of the trial Tribunal that Exhibit 569 the letter of disclaimer having been written by PW27 during the pendency of the Petition in response to a request by Appellants counsel and all subsequent exhibits that followed it are caught by the virus of Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011.
3. Whether the lower Court was right in its decision striking out Paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the Petition on the ground that they dealt with pre-election matter over which the trial Tribunal hud no jurisdiction and if the same had occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
4. Whether upon a proper evaluation of the evidence
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led, the lower Court was right in upholding the decision of the trial Tribunal that the Appellants failed to adduce legally admissible and credible evidence in proof of the allegation that the 3rd Respondent submitted a forged Certificate to the 1st Respondent and was therefore not qualified to contest the Election for the office of Governor of Kebbi State.
5. Whether the lower Court was right when it affirmed the decision of the trial Tribunal that the Appellants failed to prove the allegations of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 in the conduct of the Kebbi State Governorship Election.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION BY THE COURT:
The Appellants argued their issues 1 and 2 together but will be retouched by this Court, while issues 3 and 4 of the Appellants will also be couched together. This appeal shall therefore be considered on 2 issues as follows:
1. Whether the issue of the disqualification of the 3rd Respondent to contest the Kebbi State Governorship election was not proved by the Appellants as a pre-election matter?
2. Whether the lower Court was wrong to hold that the alternative ground of non-compliance
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with the Electoral Act, 2022, was not was proved by the Appellants?
ISSUE ONE:
Whether the issue of the disqualification of the 3rd Respondent to contest the Kebbi State Governorship election was not proved by the Appellants as a pre-election matter?
The learned senior Counsel to the Appellants argued that the Appellantsâ case is that the testimonial presented by the 3rd Respondent to INEC is forged having regards that the 3rd Respondent never graduated from Sultan Abubakar College, Sokoto, and thus disqualified by virtue of Section 182 (1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). That by virtue of Section 182 (1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and Section 134 (1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022, the issue of disqualification of a candidate to contest governorship election is both a pre and post-election matter that has no statutory limitation of time. Strong reliance was placed on SALEH V. ABAH & ORS (2017) 12 NWLR (PT. 1578) 100, MAIHAJA V. GAIDAM (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC). That once it is proved that a person submitted a forged certificate to INEC at any time, he stands disqualified from contesting any election. He submitted
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that to prove their allegation, the Appellants tendered Exhibits P.734 (INEC Form CF001) and P.714 (INEC Form EC9 for 2023 General Election) through PW98. He submitted that it is immaterial that the 3rd Respondent did not attach the testimonial of Sultan Abubakar College, Sokoto in P.714 (INEC Form Ec9 for 2023 General Election). Further in proof, that Exhibits P.571 and 572 showed that the name Umar Abubakar did not graduate from Sultan Abubakar College, Sokoto. It was contended that the admission of Exhibits P.581, 582, and 583, utilized to prove that the testimonial submitted by the 3rd Respondent was not forged ought to be expunged since they were not pleaded nor frontloaded. He relied on Paragraph 12 (3) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022 and ONYEWUCHI V. IHEMEDU & ORS (2015) LPELR- 25776 (CA). Again, that the evidence of RW3 is unreliable and at best supported the case of the Appellants since he was only Principal between 30/5/2023 to 12/6/2023. Thus, that the lower Court was wrong to expunge the evidence of PW27, PW28, and PW78 since they were admitted without objection contrary to the decision in UZODINMA V. IHEDIOHA (2020) 5 NWLR (PT.
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1718) 529.
He submitted that the finding that the presentation of a forged certificate by the 3rd Respondent is a pre-election matter is perverse. He asked this Court to resolve this issue in favour of the Appellants.
The arguments of the learned senior Counsels to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents shall be considered together. It was submitted that since PW27, PW28, and PW78 were subpoenaed witnesses, who tendered Exhibits 713, P714, P715, INEC Forms CF001 and EC9 including the disclaimer (Exhibit P569) on allegation of forgery of testimonial by the 3rd Respondent, the lower Court was right to strike out their evidence for not being frontloaded with the petition. He referred to SC/CV/935/2023 BETWEEN ATIKU ABUBAKAR & ANOR V. INEC & ORS delivered on 26/10/2023. Also, that the Respondents objected to the testimonies of the subpoenaed witnesses and the fact that both Appellants and Respondents relied on the evidence of subpoenaed witnesses does not make it permissible in law since parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court by agreement. Similarly, that the Appellants failed to adduce legally admissible evidence in proof of the
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allegation that the 3rd Respondent was not qualified to contest the office of Governor of Kebbi State held on 18/3/2023. Furthermore, that paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the Appellantsâ petition relate to the alleged submission of false information by the 3rd Respondent to the INEC in Forms CF001 and EC9, which are acts that happened prior to the Kebbi State Governorship election of 18/3/2023, outside the jurisdiction of the trial Tribunal as decided in PDP V. NGBOR & ORS (2023) LPELR-59930 JSC. They prayed for the resolution of this issue in favour of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE:
It must be noted that he who alleges must prove. This applies also to election petition. The petitioner will fail if no evidence is given by him to support his petition. The issue of proof in election petition is on the petitioner, which are the Appellants in the instant appeal. The burden of proof lies on the petitioner to prove the averments and allegations in his petition in areas where issues have been joined. See Per OBASEKI, JSC in OMOBORIOWO & ORS V. AJASIN (1984) LPELR-2643(SC) (PP. 41 PARAS. B). Per AGIM,
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JSC in OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (PP. 11-12 PARAS. C), stressed the point thus:
The appellants in their petition desired the Tribunal to give judgment to them granting them the reliefs they claimed on the basis that the facts they assert in their petition exist. Therefore, they had the primary legal burden to prove the existence of those facts by virtue of S. 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 which provides that “whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must” prove that those facts exists.” Because the evidential burden to disprove the petitioners’ case would shift and vest on the respondents only if the evidence produced by the petitioners established the facts alleged in the petition by virtue of S. 133(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, the Tribunal was bound to first consider if the evidence produced by the petitioners established the existence of the facts alleged in the petition, before considering the evidence produced by the respondents to find out if the evidence disproved the case established by the petitioners on a balance of probabilities.
Even
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where the Respondents do not lead evidence to dislodge the petition of the Appellants and choose to remain mute, the Appellants have the bounden duty and obligation to prove their petition against the Respondents.
At page 19 of paragraph 4.54 of the Appellantsâ brief of argument, it was argued that since the evidence of PW27, PW28, and PW78 was admitted without objection from the Respondents, they cannot object to it on appeal. It is however indicated by the record before me that there was an objection on the issue which caused the trial Tribunal to determine and decide on it. Besides and rightly as submitted by the learned senior Counsel to the 2nd Respondent, parties cannot confer jurisdiction on the Court over inadmissible evidence or matter. By virtue of Paragraphs 4(5) and 41(1) and (3) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022, the Appellants have lost their right to use and rely on the evidence of PW27, PW28, and PW78. Similarly, the Court has also lost its jurisdiction to entertain same. It is trite that jurisdiction cannot be acquired or conferred on the Court by consent of the parties, or because the Court was oblivious or mistaken as to the
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defect in its jurisdiction. See Per KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC in DONGTOE V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PLATEAU STATE & ORS (2001) LPELR-959(SC) (PP. 18 PARAS. F).
The evidence of PW27, PW28, and PW78, having been filed after the statutory period allowed to file statement of witnesses on oath, it is inadmissible and allowing same will muzzle the Respondents in exercising their right to fair hearing. It is also against the rules of pleadings since it will spring surprise on the Respondents, who may not have time to respond. This Court recently in SC/CV/935/2023 between ABUBAKAR ATIKU & ANOR v. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (INEC) & ORS delivered on the 26th day of October, 2023, Per Okoro, JSC held:
…a combined reading of Section 285 (5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) and Paragraph 4 (5) of First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022, shows that the time for the filing of written statement on oath of witnesses in election petition proceedings is 21 days from the date of declaration of results… amendment to the petition or calling of additional witnesses will not be entertained after the statutory time
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limit for the filing of the petition has expired… subpoenas are not a tool with which to circumvent the provisions of the law and the effect and purpose of Section 285 (5) of the Constitution and Paragraph 4 (5) of the First Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022. It is on this note that I hold that the decision of the Court below to strike out the offending witness depositions cannot be faulted.
Section 182(1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides that âNo person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if: (j) he has presented a forged certificate to the Independent National Electoral Commission”. Further, Section 134 (1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022 provides that âAn election may be questioned on any of the following grounds- A person whose election is questioned was at the time of the election not qualified to contest the electionâ.
Although Courts have held and with finality decided on the communal interpretation of the above sections to mean that it is a pre-election matter, I must add that the word âshallâ is not always standing for mandatory. It may mean
15
futuristic, imminent and yet to happen. It denotes that there must have been a disqualification before the Governorship election is conducted. It implies that the person is not only disqualified by mere presentation of a forged certificate to INEC but that he must have been criminally convicted or certified so by the Federal High Court or by the preponderance of evidence proved that he forged the certificate. This is the reason why it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt to bring the forger to conviction by the Court before he stands disqualified to contest the governorship election or the Federal High Court must certify and decide on forgery against the person. From the moment a party or adverse party discovers the presentation of a forged certificate or forgery, he goes to the Federal High Court to seek for redress and it is the judgment of the Federal High Court convicting or establishing forgery that can be used to disqualify such a candidate. That is the spirit and intent of the decision of this Court that the issue of disqualification for election and nomination ought to be a pre-election matter. Whereas the Federal High Court finds the candidate
16
convicted or establishes forgery, it can be used for the disqualification of the candidate returned as elected. To my mind, this is the combined and communal meaning of Sections 182 (1)(j) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and 134 (1)(a) of the Electoral Act, 2022. The election petition tribunal therefore is established not to handle pre-election matters or cases arising before the election but post-election matters. That is why pre-election matters and election petition are sui generis and time-bound. See Section 285(9) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). In fact, Section 29 (5)(6) of the Electoral Act, 2022 has expressly explained and settled the matter where it provides that, â(5) Any aspirant who participated in the primaries of his political party who has reasonable grounds to believe that any information given by his political partyâs candidate in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate in relation to his constitutional requirements to contest the election is false, may file a suit at the Federal High Court against that candidate seeking a declaration that the information contained in the affidavit is false. (6) Where
17
the Court determines that any of the information contained in the affidavit is false only as it relates to constitutional requirements of eligibility, the Court shall issue an order disqualifying the candidate and the sponsoring political party and then declare the candidate with the second highest number of valid votes and who satisfies the constitutional requirement as the winner of the electionâ.
Furthermore, Section 84 (14) of the Electoral Act, 2022 provides that â(14) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or rules of a political party, an aspirant who complains that any of the provisions of this Act and the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate of a political party for election, may apply to the Federal High Court for redressâ.
Notably and judicially, our Courts have classified pre-election matters into: (1) nomination of a candidate (2) double nomination of a candidate (3) disqualification of a candidate (4) wrongful substitution of a successful candidateâs name by the Electoral Body (5) wrongful omission of a successful candidateâs name by
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the Electoral Body (6) complaints about the conduct of primaries (7) false declaration on oath about particulars of a candidate. See APC v LERE (SUPRA), MODIBBO v USMAN (2020) 3 NWLR (PT. 1712) 470 @ 500 – 515, GBILEVE V. ADDINGI (2014) 16 NWLR (PT. 1433) 394.
I must state also that by the above provisions of the law and judicial precedents, it is expressly and abundantly clear that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is an intra and internal party affairs as provided in Section 29 (5) of the Electoral Act, 2022. In fact, it states that â…any information given by his political party’s candidate in the affidavit or any document submitted by that candidate in relation to his constitutional requirements to contest the election is false…â It therefore does not allow for pugnosing and meddlesomeness by a candidate or party of a different political party. Even where the candidate or aspirant of same political party complains on issue of disqualification or forgery of certificate as in the instant appeal, he must do so within 14 days thereafter or he loses his right. Any matter arising therefrom or that comes before any Court in Nigeria
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after the 14 days are elapsed is stale, expired, and limited and that Court ceases to have jurisdiction to entertain same.
This being so, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain the Appellantsâ case bordering on the 3rd Respondentâs disqualification or certificate forgery. It ought to have gone to the Federal High Court and not the election petition Tribunal since it is a pre-election matter. Besides, it would have been done by an aspirant of the primary election in the 4th Respondents (APC) Party and not by the Appellants. The Appellants by law and tradition do not have the locus and right to enquire about the disqualification of the 3rd Respondent nor the issue of certificate forgery, even if it is established to be so.
In the same vein, forgery or presentation of forged certificate is usually considered criminal that the proof of must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the present appeal, the Appellants could not prove this even on preponderance of evidence, let alone beyond reasonable doubt. Apposite and akin to the facts in this appeal is the dictum of Per GARBA, J.S.C in APC & ANOR V. OBASEKI & ORS (2021)
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LPELR-55004 (SC) (PP. 47-53 PARAS. E), when he observed:
…The facts upon which these reliefs were predicated all alleged falsification and forgery of information and documents submitted to the 3rd Respondent by the Respondent which have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt…They must in addition, thereby demonstrate that the 1st Respondent’s indication in the Form submitted to the 3rd Respondent in accordance with the provision of Section 31 (2) of the Evidence Act, that he had fulfilled all the constitutional requirements for the election into the office of the Governor of Edo State, was false.
This issue is resolved against the Appellants.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether the lower Court was wrong to hold that the alternative ground of non-compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022, was not was proved by the Appellants?
The submission of the Appellants is that the 1st Respondent did not substantially comply with the provision of the Electoral Act, 2022, and other extant electoral laws in the conduct of the Kebbi State Governorship election held on 18/3/2023, which election was marred by substantial irregularities and infractions, which include
21
failure of the 1st Respondent to comply with the provision of Section 73 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2022, over-voting and lack of improper ballot accounting. He argued that the Court ought to hold the 1st Respondent accountable for failure to comply with Section 73 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2022. Also that the Appellants proved through Exhibits P.421-430, P4311- P738, P1293-P1390, A-K, their case of over-voting, and that the wasted or invalid votes should be deducted from the votes of the Appellants as well as the 2nd and 3rd Respondents. He relied on APC V. KARFI (2018) 6 NWLR (PT. 1616) 505, and asked for a re-run election since overvoting and ballot accounting that affected the said election is a total of 69,779. That the Appellants having produced the CTC of the electoral documents cannot be accused of dumping documents on the Court, which is against the provision of Sections 137 and 46(4) of the Act. He relied also on OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2023) LPELR-60392 (SC). It was submitted that since the lower Court failed to rely on the evidence before it to make findings which are inconsistent with the evidence on record, its decision is perverse
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and this Court can interfere. He prayed for the resolution of this issue in favour of the Appellants and to allow the appeal.
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Respondents respectively argued that the lower Court decided that even by the pleadings of the Appellants, if over-voting is proved by them, it would not have affected the result of the election. That Exhibits R1-R19 and R22-R299 (EC8C, EC8A, EC8B) and EC40G tendered by the 1st Respondent in support of the declaration of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents as winners of the Kebbi State Governorship election conducted on 18/3/2023 enjoy presumption of regularity pursuant to Section 168 of the Evidence Act, 2011; since the Appellants could not counteract or rebut them. They also relied on APC V. SHERIFF & ORS (2023) LPELR-59953(SC). Additionally, they contended that no probative value can be attached to the evidence of PW1-PW86, since their evidences have been discredited. That where the petitioner complains of non-compliance, he must prove it polling unit by polling unit, which the Appellants failed to. That the evidences of Appellantsâ witnesses were not credible to prove over-voting, neither did
23
they produce the BVAS machines and the Register of voters for each polling unit where they alleged overvoting as decided in OYETOLA & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (supra). Again, that none of the Appellantsâ 47 witnesses demonstrated that there was improper accounting of ballot papers issued in any of the poling units challenged, nor did it affect the outcome of the said election. Further, that the evidence of PW86 was hearsay since he did not make or sign any of the 110 documents he tendered, nor was he at the polling units where the votes were sorted, counted, recorded, and announced. On dumping of documents, they argued that the purpose for which Exhibits P1293-P1390 were tendered through PW86, Exhibits P714 and P715 through PW78 and Exhibits P1391-P1400 from the bar by the Appellants was left to the conjecture and speculation of the Court. He sought reliance on ANDREW & ANOR V. INEC & ORS (2017) LPELR-48518(SC). They urged for the resolution of this issue in their favour and asked for the dismissal of the appeal.
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO:
The invalidation of an election or the blame of the 1st Respondent (INEC) is possible where
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non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 or any extant law on election has substantially affected the results or outcome of the election held on 18/3/2023. This obviously and apparently informed the right and indeed correct decision of the lower Court when it held at page 6445, Vol. VI of the record that âthe few polling units were there are ballot non-accounting or ballot deficit, the number is so negligible that it does not have any effect on the votes.â This is squarely in consonance with the provision of the Electoral Act, 2022. The spirit and intent of Section 135 (1) is that:
An election shall not be liable to be invalidated by reason of noncompliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the Election Tribunal or Court that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of this Act and that the non-compliance did not affect substantially the result of the election.
The Appellants pleaded with particularity and specificity in their paragraph 124 of the petition that â124. The margin of lead between APC and PDP after the deduction of the votes affected by over-voting is
25
thus: 401,240- 355,985=45,255 votesâ. However, the margin of lead between the 2nd Respondent and 2nd Appellant is 48,285 votes. Thus, by the candid calculation and admission of the Appellants, the 2nd Respondent is still in the lead with about 3,030 votes. Since the substantial non-compliance was measured and ascertained by the Appellants themselves to come up with this result, how else do the Appellants want the election of 18/3/2023 to overturn in their favour or for this Court to order for a re-run or repeat election? The lower Court verily observed and stated the obvious that âfrom their pleading above, the case of the appellants in respect of overvoting was bound to fail since even if they succeeded in proving over-voting, it would have no effect on the final result of the electionâ. At pages 6448-6449, the lower Court excerpted the wise and flawless reasoning of the trial Tribunal thus:
…the Tribunal proceeded to consider the case of the appellants in respect of the allegation of over-voting. It held …that the appellants failed to produce the record of accredited voters, BVAS and register of voters, and that only the polling
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results in respect of 35 polling units were tendered and considered by the Tribunal…The Tribunal thereafter, proceeded to identify 7 polling units where over-voting and other irregularities occurred and the votes that were scored by the appellants and the ls1 and 2nd respondents. It concluded…”Votes to be deducted will be as follows:
APC-89 + 152 + 82 + 162 + 193 + 442 + 275=7335.
PDP- 66 + 100 + 117 + 147 + 166 + 250+ 98=944.
The difference would be just 391 votes. This is quite minute and infinitesimal to cause any upset. The margin of lead is still very high and in favour of the 2nd Respondent. Whatever angle one views the case of the appellants in respect of allegation of overvoting, it failed right from the embryonic stage.
This issue must also be resolved against the Appellants.
By the pleadings of the Appellants and the evidence led, it is apparent that there has been substantial compliance with the Electoral Act, 2022, in the conduct of the Kebbi State Governorship election of 18/3/2023. A return to an election will not be voided if it appears to any Court hearing the petition that challenges the return that there was
27
substantial compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act. The word used in the section is substantial, which does not carry the same clout as absolute compliance. See Per IRIKEFE, JSC in IBRAHIM V. SHAGARI & ORS (1983) LPELR-1412(SC) (PP. 8-9 PARAS. B-B).
SC/CV/1228A/2023 and SC/CV/1228B/2023 which are the cross-appeals are to abide by the judgment in the instant appeal.
The judgment of the lower Court stands and the appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
Concurring Opinion(s)
â KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, J.S.C.:
I have had a preview of the judgment of my learned brother, Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the appeal lacks merit and ought to be dismissed.
The concurrent findings of the two lower Courts demonstrate the correct application of the law and settled judicial principles to the facts of the case.
A careful perusal of the petition, particularly Ground A and the averments in support thereof reveals that the Appellants’ grouse is with the nomination of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents as Governorship and Deputy Governorship candidates by their party, the All Progressives
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Congress (4th Respondent) to fly the party’s flag at the Governorship election held on 18th March 2023. It is alleged that they submitted forged/false documents with their Form EC9 (Form CF001 under the Electoral Act 2010, as amended) and were thus not qualified to contest the election.
This Court has held that an allegation of this nature, having regard to Section 31 of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended (now Section 29 of the Electoral Act 2022) and Section 285 (9) and (14) (c) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, is a pre-election matter which must be filed “not later than 14 days from the date of the occurrence of the event, decision or action complained of in the suit.”
See: A.P.M. Vs INEC (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 159 @ 181 – 182; Atiku Abubakar Vs INEC (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt, 1737) 37; Akinlade Vs INEC (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt, 1754) 429 @ 465 – 466; SC/CV/1226/2023; Jibrin Muhammad Barde & Anor Vs INEC & Ors., delivered today 19/1/2024.
Furthermore, by Section 29(5) of the Electoral Act, 2022, the Federal High Court has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. It is not an issue for the Election Petition
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Tribunal.
An allegation of forgery is also criminal in nature and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
The affirmation by the lower Court of the trial Tribunal’s striking out of paragraphs 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of the petition on the ground that they are in respect of pre-election matters cannot be faulted.
With regard to the second ground of the petition, which seeks the nullification of the 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ declaration and return on grounds of corrupt practices or non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, Section 135(1) of the Act is very clear. It provides:
“135(1) An Election shall not be liable to be invalidated by reason of non-compliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the Election Tribunal or Court that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of this Act and that the non-compliance did not affect substantially the result of the election.”
There is no election in the world that can be conducted perfectly. It is therefore not sufficient for a petitioner to merely show that there were instances of
30
corrupt practices or non-compliance. He must go the extra mile to show that the alleged corrupt practices or instances of non-compliance substantially affected the outcome of the election. See: Abubakar Atiku Vs INEC (supra); Yahaya Vs Dankwambo (2016) 1 SC (Pt. Ill) 29; Akinlade Vs INEC (supra); SC/CV/1226/2023: Jibrin Muhammad Barde & Anor. Vs INEC & Ors. (supra).
The finding of the trial Tribunal affirmed by the Court below to the effect that the allegations of non-compliance have not been shown to have substantially affected the outcome of the election is fully supported by the evidence on record. The findings are not in any way perverse. I endorse them.
For these and the more comprehensive reasoning in the lead judgment, I dismiss this appeal for being bereft of merit.
The judgment of the lower Court delivered on 24/11/23 is hereby affirmed.
Appeals No. SC/CV/1228A/2023 and SC/CV/1228B/2023 shall abide the instant judgment.
Appeal dismissed.
â MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.S.C.:
I have read the lead judgment in draft, written by my Learned Brother, Hon. Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC in this appeal and agree that the appeal
31
is lacking in merit for the reasons set out therein.
The appeal is dismissed by me too in terms of the lead judgment.
â IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, J.S.C.:
I have had the privilege of previewing the draft of the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, the Hon. Justice U. M. Abba-Aji, JSC. I am in full agreement with the reasoning postulated in the judgment, to the conclusive effect that the instant appeal is grossly lacking in merits, thus ought to be dismissed.
Hence, having adopted the reasoning and conclusion postulated in the judgment in question, I hereby, without any further ado, dismiss the appeal for lacking in merits.
Appeal dismissed.
â TIJJANI ABUBAKAR, J.S.C.:Â
I read before now, the comprehensive leading judgment prepared and rendered in this appeal by my lord and learned brother UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC.
I totally agree that the appeal lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed, it is hereby dismissed by me, I abide by the order on the fate of the cross-appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
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Dissenting Opinion(s)
None
REFERENCES
Research enhancement â dynamically linked
Referenced Judgments
A.P.M. v. INECÂ (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1846) 159 â cited at p. 29
Abubakar Atiku v. INECÂ (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1727) 37 â cited at pp. 29, 31
Akinlade v. INECÂ (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1754) 429 â cited at pp. 29, 31
Andrew & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2017) LPELR-48518(SC) â cited at p. 24
APC & Anor v. Obaseki & Ors (2021) LPELR-55004 (SC) â cited at p. 20
APC v. Karfi (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 505 â cited at p. 22
APC v. Lere â cited at p. 19
APC v. Sheriff & Ors (2023) LPELR-59953(SC) â cited at p. 23
Atiku Abubakar v. INECÂ (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 â cited at p. 29
Dongtoe v. Civil Service Commission, Plateau State & Ors (2001) LPELR-959(SC) â cited at p. 14
Gbileve v. Addingi (2014) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1433) 394 â cited at p. 19
Ibrahim v. Shagari & Ors (1983) LPELR-1412(SC) â cited at p. 28
Jibrin Muhammad Barde & Anor v. INEC & Ors (SC/CV/1226/2023 delivered 19/1/2024) â cited at pp. 29, 31
Maihaja v. Gaidam (2017) LPELR-42474 (SC) â cited at p. 8
Modibbo v. Usman (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1712) 470 â cited at p. 19
Omoboriowo & Ors v. Ajasin (1984) LPELR-2643(SC) â cited at p. 11
Onyewuchi v. Ihemedu & Ors (2015) LPELR-25776 (CA) â cited at p. 9
Oyetola & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2023) LPELR-60392 (SC) â cited at pp. 22, 24
PDP v. Ngbor & Ors (2023) LPELR-59930 JSC â cited at p. 11
Saleh v. Abah & Ors (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) 100 â cited at p. 8
Uzodinma v. Ihedioha (2020) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1718) 529 â cited at p. 9-10
Yahaya v. Dankwambo (2016) 1 SC (Pt. III) 29 â cited at p. 31
Referenced Statutes
1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), Sections 182(1)(j), 285(5), 285(9), 285(14)(c) â cited at pp. 8, 14-16, 18, 29
Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), Section 31 â cited at pp. 21, 29
Electoral Act, 2022, Sections 29, 29(5), 29(6), 73(2), 84(14), 134(1)(a), 135(1), Paragraphs 4(5), 12(3), 41(1), 41(3) of First Schedule â cited at pp. 8, 9, 13-14, 17-19, 22, 25, 29-30
Evidence Act, 2011, Sections 31(2), 83(3), 131(1), 133(1), 133(2), 135(1), 168 â cited at pp. 12-13, 21, 23, 30