Eze Lambert Okoye Akuneziri v. Chief P.D.C. Okenwa & Ors

The purport of S.15 of the Chieftaincy Law of Imo State (1.S.L22 of 1978) is unambiguous. The governor can set up an inquiry thereunder, and if satisfied that the particular chief no longer enjoyed popular support of his community in the report of that inquiry, he can withdraw recognition from him.
Precisely, this is the situation in this case. The High Court of Imo State came to a right conclusion. I therefore, in line with fuller reasons in the judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed JSC, allow this appeal, set aside decision of Court of Appeal and restore the judgment of the High Court. I award the 4th appellant N10,000.00 as costs in this court, and N5,000.00 as costs in Court of Appeal all against the respondent.

This appeal emanated from the action filed by the plaintiff, the Traditional Ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community at the Orlu High Court following the withdrawal of his recognition by the Imo State Government. The plaintiff was sometime in 1978 duly and unanimously elected by the Ihitenensa Autonomous Community as their traditional ruler (Eze). He was subsequently issued with a certificate of recognition by the Government of Imo State as required by the Chieftaincy Edict No. 22 of 1978 (hereinafter simply referred to as the “Edict”), the law applicable at all material times to this action. Following allegations made in a petition written by certain individuals

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from the Ihitenensa Community, the Imo State Government set up a panel of Enquiry called the “Ojiako Panel”, to, amongst others, inquire into the allegations. Based on the recommendation of the Ojiako Panel, the recognition of the plaintiff was withdrawn by the Imo State Government.

Meanwhile, the Ihitenensa Community went ahead and appointed or selected the 4th defendant as a successor to the plaintiff. The 4th traditional ruler of Ihitenensa.
The plaintiff then took out a writ of summons against the defendants claiming as follows –
“(a) A declaration that the removal of the plaintiff as the traditional ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community and the withdrawal of his recognition as such by the Imo State Government is contrary to the Imo State Chieftaincy Law No. 22 of 1978 and the said withdrawal  is therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is still the recognised traditional ruler (Eze) of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community.
(c) A declaration that the subsequent recognition of Chief Lambert Okehi Akuneziri as the traditional ruler of Ihitenensa by the former Government of Imo State is contrary to Imo State Chieftaincy Edict (Law) of 1978 and Ihitenensa Chieftaincy Constitution and is therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) A declaration that the withdrawal of recognition of the plaintiff based on Justice Ojiako Panel’s recommendation was misconceived, irregular, unjust and unwarranted.
(e) A perpetual injunction restraining the fourth defendant from continuing to hold himself as the recognised Eze or traditional ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community or from performing the function of a recognised Eze or traditional ruler set out in the traditional rulers and Autonomous Communities Law of 1981.”
The learned trial Judge dismissed the claims in their entirety. The plaintiff then appealed to the Court of Appeal. His appeal was allowed and the reliefs claimed and granted.

The 4th defendant has now appealed to this court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Chief Williams, learned Senior Counsel for the 4th defendant has submitted five issues in his brief for resolution in this appeal. I only wish to comment on

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the first three which all relate to the powers of the Governor to withdraw recognition of a recognised Chief. The relevant provisions are sections 9 & 14 of the Edict which read –

“9. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8 of this Edict, the Military Administrator may suspend, or withdraw the recognition of a recognised Chief if the Military Administrator is satisfied that such suspension or withdrawal is –
(a) necessary having regard to persistent acts of violation of the code of conduct by the Chief as required by the customary law of the community he represents;
(b) necessary in the interest of peace, order and good government.”
“14 (1) Whenever there are allegations of grave misconduct against a recognised chief, the commissioner may cause an administrative enquiry to be held in respect of such allegations.
(2) Where the Commissioner, after such enquiry, is satisfied that such allegations are proved against the Chief, or that the Chief has ceased to enjoy the popular support of this community, the Commissioner may advise the Military Administration to withdraw the recognition of such a Chief.”
I think first of all, it is of vital importance to note that under the Edict, the appointment or selection of a chief is a matter left entirely in the hands of the Community while recognition is a matter for the Governor. Now, can the recognition be withdrawn? The answer is “yes” as provided under sections 9 & 14 above. I agree with Chief Williams that section 9 above should be construed as conferring power on the Governor to withdraw recognition from a traditional ruler if he is satisfied of the existence of any of the conditions stipulated under the section, while section 14 is confined to cases which arise whenever there are allegations of grave misconduct against a recognised Chief and the Commissioner decides to exercise his discretionary power to inquire into such misconduct. I have no doubt at all that on a plain and natural meaning of section 9, the Governor does have power to withdraw recognition from the plaintiff herein. And that meaning is in no way modified by the provisions of section 14 (supra). The Court of Appeal therefore fell into serious error when it purported to have read sections 9 & 14 together when what it in fact did was literally according to Chief Williams to strike out section 9 from the entire Edict. That was wrong (see Hill v. Williams Bill (Park Lane) Ltd. (1949) A.c. 530 at 546-547.My conclusion therefore is that the plaintiff was properly de-recognised as a chief and the 4th defendant was duly selected and recognised as his successor. It is for the above reasons and others ably

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set out in the lead judgment of my learned brother Mohammed, JSC, which judgment I read before now that I also allow the appeal. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is set aside while that delivered by the learned trial Judge dated 18th June 1987 is restored. I endorse the orders made in the lead judgment.

 The facts of this appeal are fully set out in the leading judgment of my learned brother, Mohammed, JSC with which I am in full accord.
The plaintiff’s claim ran as follows:
“(a) A declaration that the removal of the plaintiff as the traditional ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community and the withdrawal of his recognition as such by the Imo State Government is contrary to the Imo State Chieftaincy Law No. 22 of 1978 and the said withdrawal is therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is still the recognised traditional ruler (Eze) of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community.
(c) A declaration that the subsequent recognition of Chief Lambert Okehi Akuneziri as the traditional ruler of Ihitenensa by the former Government of Imo State is contrary to Imo State Chieftaincy Edict (Law) of 1978 and Ihitenensa Chieftaincy Constitution and is therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) A declaration that the withdrawal of recognition of the plaintiff based on Justice Ojiako Panel’s recommendation was misconceived, irregular, unjust and unwarranted.
(e) A perpetual injunction restraining the fourth defendant from continuing to hold himself as the recognised Eze or traditional ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community or from performing the function of a recognised Eze or Traditional ruler set out in the Traditional Rulers and Autonomous Communities Law of 1981.”
The learned trial Judge dismissed the claim altogether. Plaintiff successfully appealed to the lower court and all his reliefs were granted.
The 4th defendant then appealed to this court.
In this appeal, his learned counsel Chief Williams SAN postulated five issues for determination, to wit,
“1. Whether the Governor had power under the Imo State Chieftaincy Law to withdraw recognition from the plaintiff as traditional ruler of Ihitenensa.
2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, under which particular provisions of the Imo State Chieftaincy Law No. 22 of 1978 can the decision of

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the Governor to withdraw or to grant recognition be supported?.
3. Was the court below correct in making the declaration that the removal of the plaintiff/respondent as the traditional ruler of Ihitenensa Autonomous Community and the withdrawal of his recognition as such by the Imo State Government is contrary to the Imo State Chieftaincy Law No. 22 of 1978 and the said withdrawal is therefore null and void and of no effect whatsoever. 

4. Whether the court below was correct in making order for injunction against the 4th respondent.
5. Whether the court below was correct in law in its criticism of the constitution or contents of the Ojiako Panel.”
It is manifest that the serious bone of contention in this appeal is whether there was power in the Governor under the relevant law to withdraw recognition of the appellant as a traditional ruler of Ihitenensa. All other matters are either peripheral or such that would be inconsequential to the determination of the appeal.
To this extent therefore, this appeal will focus only on the first three issues postulated above.
The provisions of the prevailing Imo State law i.e. Chieftaincy Edict No. 22 of 1978 (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Edict appear to be) relevant in this regard. These are sections 9 and 14 of the Edict. They run as follows:
“9. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 8 of this Edict, the Military Administration may suspend or withdraw the recognition of a recognised Chief if the Military Administrator is satisfied that such suspension or withdrawal is –
(a) necessary having regard to persistent acts of violation of the code of conduct by the Chief as required by the Customary law of the community he represents;
(b) necessary in the interest of peace, order and good government.”
“14(1) Whenever there are allegations of grave misconduct against a recognised chief, the commissioner may cause an administrative enquiry to be held in respect of such allegations.

(2) Where the Commissioner, after such enquiry, is satisfied that such allegations are proved against the Chief, or that the Chief has ceased to enjoy the popular support of this community, the Commissioner may advise the Military Administrator to withdraw the recognition of such a Chief.”
The resume of these two provisions is first that the Edict by the provisions of section 9 vest on the Military Administrator, the power to suspend or withdraw recognition of a recongnised chief once he is satisfied that it is necessary so

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to do either because of persistent violation of the code of conduct by the Chief in relation to the customary law of his community or in the interest of peace, order and good government. And secondly, where there are allegations of grave misconduct, an administrative enquiry may be set up to look into the allegations and where the allegations are established, the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs would advice the Military Administrator to withdraw the recognition of the Chief.

It is manifest that section 9, as submitted by Chief Williams, confers power on the Governor to suspend or withdraw recognition of a Chief having regard to being satisfied of the conditions either under 9(a) or 9(b), while section 14 confers similar power on the Governor operating through his Commissioner after fulfilling the conditions in section 14(1) and 14(2). The wordings of the provisions of sections 9 and 14 do not admit of any ambiguity and should therefore be accorded their ordinary or literal meaning. There is no compelling reason for reading these two sections together when their ordinary meanings have not necessitated such communal reading. The lower court in reaching their decision have applied the harmonious reading of sections 9 and 14 and reached the bizarre conclusion that section 14(1) removed or neutralised the power of de-recognition vested in the Governor. I used the word ‘bizarre’ advisedly because I find it extremely difficult to appreciate the necessity of investing the Governor with certain express power under section 9, but under the same enactment, neutralise or withdraw the very same power so conferred in its section 14(1). As I had earlier stated, it has not been demonstrated that there is any ambiguity or conflict in reading sections 9 and I4(1) disjointly which would have warranted such harmonious approach. It seems to me that the approach by the lower court, with due respect, was beclouded by its failure to recognise the circumstances for the Governor to wield his powers to withdraw recognition conferred on a Chief are dissimilar and separate under the aforesaid sections. This is very crucial in order to ensure that the exercise of power under either section 9 is unnecessarily circumscribed by the provisions of the other section.
The sum total of what I have been saying is that the approach by the lower court in its harmonious construction of sections 9 and I4(1)in the circumstances of this case is insupportable. The appeal therefore deserves to succeed. I would allow the appeal and abide by the consequential orders made by my learned brother, Mohammed JSC in his leading judgment.

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I have had the privilege of reading in advance the judgment delivered by my learned brother, Mohammed, JSC. I agree with him that this appeal should be allowed and with the reasons he gave for arriving at that conclusion. I add some comments of my own on aspects of the appeal. The facts have been fully and carefully set out in the judgment of Mohammed, JSC.

There were four defendants in the action commenced in the High Court of Imo State by Chief P.D.C. Okenwa who is the plaintiff/respondent in this appeal, but will be referred to as “the plaintiff” in this judgment. Eze Lambert Okoye Akuneziri, the appellant in this appeal, who was the 4th defendant at the trial, will be referred to as “4th defendant” in this judgment. The first three defendants were, respectively, the Military Governor of Imo State, the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, and the Commissioner for Local Government of the State. For convenience, those defendants who are now respondents in the appeal of the 4th defendant are referred to in this judgment as “the 1st set of defendants”.
All the defendants strenuously defended the action. They filed their respective pleadings and called evidence. Their combined efforts resulted in the dismissal of the suit with costs to the defendants. On the plaintiff’s appeal to the Court of Appeal from the decision of the High Court, all the defendants, as respondents, defended the decision of the High Court and urged that the appeal be dismissed. The 1st set of defendants urged the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appeal for several reasons, which included the following:
“1. That the withdrawal of recognition of the appellant was proper and the Governor was validly and constitutionally entitled to set up Ojiako Panel of Enquiry as he did. Any decision or action based on the report of Ojiako Panel is valid”.
2. That the learned trial Judge properly evaluated the evidence of the appellant and rejected his story.”
Upon the Court of Appeal allowing the appeal of the plaintiff, the 1st set of defendants and the 4th defendant filed notices of appeal whereby they appealed to this court. However, the 1st set of defendants withdrew their appeal, which was then deemed to have been dismissed in terms of Order 8 rule 6(5) of the Rules of the Supreme Court (RSC) which provides that:
“An appeal which has been withdrawn under this rule, shall be deemed to have been dismissed.”

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The brief narration, of facts which are not related to the merits of the appeal, has been made because the plaintiff has raised a preliminary objection to the appeal of the 4th defendant on the ground that the issues in the case had been fully resolved by the dismissal of the appeal of the 1st set of defendants. Also, the 1st set of defendants, who now described themselves as “2nd set of respondents”, but are better described, so to say, as respondents pro forma, filed a brief in which they now urge: that this court should hold that the withdrawal of the recognition of the plaintiff was founded upon void grounds and was consequently void, that “the recognition of the appellant was founded upon his own fundamental breach of the applicable statue to the extent that he was put on the same throne while the 1st respondent was still on the throne – a void situation.”; and that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed. I cannot pretend to understand what counsel for the 1st set of defendants meant by the second of the submissions quoted above.

I now turn to the preliminary objection. Order 8, rule 6(1) permits an appellant at any time before the appeal is called on for hearing to serve on the parties to the appeal and file with the Registrar, a notice to the effect that he does not intend further to prosecute the appeal. By rule 6(5) of the Order, an appeal, which has been withdrawn under rule 6, shall be deemed to have been dismissed. Learned counsel for the plaintiff now argue that the dismissal of the appeal of the 1st set of defendants “terminates the dispute between the parties finally.” For his submission he relied on Ezomo v. A.Bendel (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt,36) 448, 462; Edozien v. Edozien (1993) 1NWLR
(Pt.272) 678, 700; Majekodunmi v. WAPCO Ltd. (1992) 1NWLR (Pt.219) 564, 577; and Orunlola v. Adeoye (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt,401) 338, 349. It was further argued that the dismissal of the appeal of the 1st set of defendants amounted to a decision of the issues raised therein on merits and was confirmation of the decision of the court below which had granted all the reliefs sought by the plaintiff. It was submitted that the court “cannot now revisit the issues, which have been settled between the parties on 9/11/98”
The principle enunciated in the cases relied on by the plaintiff’s counsel cannot be doubted. Those cases, however, as far as they are relevant to the present case, do not go further than deciding that as between the parties concerned in the appeal, the appeal ceased to exist after it had been withdrawn. That does not lead to a further proposition that any separate appeal brought by a party aggrieved by the decision of the lower court becomes terminated or, is, in effect, rendered nugatory or academic.

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When a party exercises his undoubted and constitutional right of appeal, that another and separate party to the proceedings in which the decision appealed against has been made, chose not to appeal from the decision, or having appealed, chose to withdraw his appeal, should have no effect on the appeal of the party who has appealed and is determined to pursue his appeal. As long as the party prosecuting the appeal has a standing to prosecute his appeal, his appeal is unaffected by the withdrawal of the appeal of a co-party.

The preliminary objection had been argued as if the 1st set of defendants and the 4th defendant have been defending the action and prosecuting the appeals in the same interest. That was not so. The description of the 4th defendant by the plaintiff as “a mere beneficiary of the wrong done by the Imo State Government” is not apt. The 4th defendant is the holder of the office of traditional ruler of Ihitenensa. As conceded by the plaintiff in his pleadings, he has been occupying that office since 1981. Besides, the Court of Appeal imposed an injunction on him. The High Court will not make a declaration of right where the right is uncontested. Where several parties to an action for declaratory judgment have, in their own several rights, contested the rights in respect of which declaration is sought, each of them has a separate and independent right to challenge by way of appeal, the grant of declaration. The 4th defendant who has a right to insist on the validity of his appointment and right to remain in office to which he has been appointed until validly and lawfully removed from that office, has a right to contest the validity of the declarations and injunction granted against him by the court below, even if the other defendants had accepted the decision.
In my judgment, interesting and ingenious as the preliminary objection may appear to be, it lacks merit.There is no provision in the Rules, as they now stand, enjoining a party who wishes to withdraw his appeal to seek leave of the court so to do. Where he withdraws the appeal without the consent of the other parties to the appeal, signified as provided in rule 6(2), the appeal shall remain on the list as provided for in rule 6(4), merely for hearing of any issue as to costs or otherwise remaining outstanding between the parties, and for making an order as to the disposal of any sum lodged in court as security for the costs of the appeal. There is no provision in rule 6 for hearing any issue other than those specified. There appears, also, to be no provision in rule 6 which enables a party to the appeal to oppose the withdrawal of appeal. In these circumstances, it will not only be absurd, but also, unjust to hold that the decision of the party withdrawing his appeal has any adverse effect on the

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appeal of another party who had no say in the decision of the party withdrawing his appeal. The next aspect of the appeal on which I now comment is also not related to the merits of the appeal, but is, nevertheless, deserving of comment. It is in regard to the nature of the participation of the 1st set of defendants in the 4th defendant’s appeal.
By their brief, these defendants sought to make a case on this appeal diametrically opposed to the case they strenuously espoused in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal.

In my opinion that is odd and should not be permitted. I refer with approval to the statement made in English Supreme Court Practice, 1993, para. 59/10/6 that a party may be precluded, by his method of conducting his case, from raising a different case on appeal. Wilson V. United Counties Bank (1920) AC 102 was cited in support of the view.
In the present case, the 1st set of defendants brazenly, had set out, by their brief to challenge the position they have taken in the two lower courts, even on issues of fact. Such unexplained volte-face by the 1st set of defendants tends to make a farce of judicial process and is capable of undermining the credibility of the legal profession. It deserves, in my opinion, condemnation. I venture to think that the wise course for persons in the position of the 1st set of defendants, who can appropriately be described as respondents, pro forma, should have been to be passive in the ensuing proceedings, instead of embarrassingly espousing a cause which they had all along strenuously opposed and challenged at the trial and in the Court of Appeal.
Notwithstanding what I have just said, I hasten to add that should there be anything in the brief of the 1st set of respondents that could be of assistance in the just resolution of the issues properly raised and arising on this appeal, such material should not be ignored. After all, courts do occasionally welcome the contribution of amici curiae when invited or permitted to contribute on questions of law. It transpired that the only contribution in the brief of the 1st set defendants of any relevance to the main issue in this appeal is the concession by counsel on behalf of the 1st set of defendants that the Government may act pursuant to section 9 without reference to section 14 “to determine the propriety or otherwise of the continued reign of a traditional ruler in Imo State.”
On the merits of appeal, it is evident that the main question is whether the Court of Appeal were right in the view they held that section 9 and 14 of the Chieftaincy Law of Imo State (No.22 of 1978) should be read together so as to qualify or modify the power granted to the Governor by section 9. Their

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Lordships of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in their view expressed by Rowland, JCA, as follows:
“Based on a combined reading of sections 9 and 14 of the Chieftaincy Law No. 22 of 1978, it seems to me that there are two main conditions for a legal withdrawal of recognition. They are:
(a) There must be allegations of some misconduct.
(b) The Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs must investigate such allegations and if satisfied that such allegations are proved against the chief, or that the chief has ceased to enjoy popular support of his communities, he may advise the Governor to withdraw the recognition of the Chief.

It is my view that any purported withdrawal of recognition of the appellant as a chief without the above conditions precedent having been met would be invalid, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.”
The purport of the view of the Court of Appeal is that the Governor could not act on his own initiative but must await the advice of the Commissioner before he could withdraw the recognition of a recognised chief. The central question on this appeal is whether the Court of Appeal was right, or, put another way, whether there is anything in sections 9 and 14 to justify that conclusion. The Chieftaincy Law vests the power to withdraw the recognition of a recognised chief in the Governor. By virtue of section 9, he could exercise such power when it is (a) necessary having regard to the persistent acts of violation of the code of conduct by the chief as required by the customary law of the Community; (b) necessary in the interest of peace, order and good government.
By virtue of section 14(1), he could exercise such power when advised by the Commissioner. It is the power of the Commissioner to advise the Governor that is circumscribed by conditions as follows: (i) There must be allegations of grave misconduct against the recognised chief; (ii) There must be an enquiry into such allegations; (iii) The Commissioner must be satisfied upon such enquiry that the allegations are proved against the Chief or that the Chief has ceased to enjoy the popular support of his community. These are limitations on the power of the Commissioner to advise the Governor to exercise his power of withdrawal of recognition of a chief and not a limitation on the power of the Governor. A reading together of section 9 and 14 can only produce three circumstances, and not one circumstance, in which the Governor can exercise his power of withdrawal of the recognition of a recognised chief. These are the two circumstances specified in section 9 and the one specified in section 14( 1) in which he can act on the advice of the Commissioner.

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It seems to me erroneous to interpret section 14(1) as removing the power vested in the Governor by section 9. Were that to have been the intention of the legislature, section 9 would not have been enacted as part of the law in the first place. Reliance on a passage in the judgment of Bairamian, JSC, in Akaigbe v. Idama (1964) 1 All NLR 322,327 by the Court of Appeal to justify reading sections 9 and 14 together was misconceived. Bairamian, JSC, had in that passage reiterated the well known guideline of interpretation: that the entire document or statute must be read as a whole and its part interpreted in that light and that an effort must be made to achieve harmony among its parts. That opinion cannot be faulted.

However, it is not in every case in which a document or the provisions of an enactment are relied on by a party that a court has to have resort to this particular guideline. Where the words of a document or an enactment are clear and not ambiguous, they should be given effect to. Where there is no conflict in one part of an enactment and another and the provisions of the part which is relied on are plain and unambiguous, those provisions should be applied without the need to call in aid, other parts of the enactment. In the present case, there is no conflict between sections 9 and 14(1) and the provisions of those sections are plain and not at all ambiguous. That several sections of the Chieftaincy Law had spelt out the circumstances in which the Governor could exercise the power of removal of a recognised chief does not lead to a reasonable conclusion that there was a conflict in those sections. The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeal is flawed because they completely ignored the circumstances in which the Governor is empowered to exercise the power of withdrawal of recognition of a chief under section 9 and elevated the additional circumstances mentioned in section 14(1) to the status of overriding and exclusive circumstances. The circumstances of the exercise of power in both sections are not the same. In section 9, it is for the Government to be satisfied that the withdrawal of the recognition of a chief is necessary having regard to the stated circumstances. He does not need to await the advice of the Commissioner, or anyone for that matter, before he is satisfied. Where an enactment empowers a person to exercise certain powers when he is satisfied that such exercise of power is necessary, it is not right to impose limitations on the exercise of the power where such was not provided for in the empowering enactment. In Adegbenro v. Akintola and Another (No.2) (1963) 2 SCNLR 216, (1963) 3 All ER 544, the Governor of Western Nigeria who was vested with some power to dismiss the Premier, acting under

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the provision of section 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria (contained in the Forth Schedule to the Nigerian Constitution) Order in Council, 1960, removed the Premier from office relying on a letter signed by 66 of the 124 members of the House of Assembly. Section 33( 10) of the Constitution provided that the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The removed Premier commenced an action against the Governor and the person appointed as premier in his place, claiming that the Governor had no right to remove him from office in the absence of a prior resolution of the House of Assembly reached on the floor of the House.

On a reference by the High Court to the Federal Supreme Court, that court held, by a majority, that the Governor could not validly exercise the power to remove the Premier from office under section 33(10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria except in consequence of proceedings on the floor of the House. On appeal to the Privy Council by the person appointed Premier in place of the removed Premier, with the removed Premier as respondent and the Governor as respondent pro forma, their Lordships of the Privy Council reversed the decision of the Federal Supreme Court. They held that there was nothing either in the scheme or provisions of the Constitution of Western Nigeria that legally precluded the Governor from forming his opinion on the basis of anything but votes formally given on the floor of the House. Viscount Radcliffe who delivered the judgment of their Lordships said in regard to the argument proffered on behalf of the removed Premier at p.549:
“The difficulty of limiting the statutory power of the Governor in this way is that the limitation is not to be found in the words in which the makers of the Constitution have decided to record their description of his powers. By the words they have employed in their formula, “it appears to him” , the judgment as to the support enjoyed by a premier is left to the Governor’s own assessment and there is no limitation as to the material on which he is to base his judgment or the contacts to which he may resort for the purpose. There would have been no difficulty at all in so limiting him if it had been intended to do so”.
The reasoning of that passage applies to this case. Had the makers of the Law intended to limit the power of the Governor in such a way as the conclusion of the Court of Appeal suggested, they would not have enacted section 9 as part of the Law.
It may well be noted that the power of withdrawing recognition from a chief

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contained in section 9 is wider than-that contained in section 14(1). A chief does not have to have misconducted himself for the Governor to be satisfied that withdrawal of his recognition as a chief is necessary in the interest of peace, order and good government pursuant to section 9(b).The entire reasoning of the Court of Appeal ran contrary to the principle in Adegbenro v. Akintola (supra). That case was not cited to the Court of Appeal. Had their attention been called to it, they may have been better guided. The approach of the court below is flawed by their erroneous interpretation, also flawed. Having regard to the plenitude of the powers vested in the Governor and under which he acted, the other issues discussed by the court below becomes inconsequential.
For the reasons, which I have stated, I too would allow the appeal. I adopt all the consequential orders and the order for costs made by my learned brother, Mohammed, JSC.

Appeal allowed.

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