Ganiyu Lawal Mosojo v. Thomas Adesola Oyetayo & Ors

In the High Court of Justice holden at Oshogbo, the plaintiff sued the defendants claiming as follows:
1. Declaration that the appointment and installation of Mr. Thomas Adesola Oyetayo (that is 1st defendant) by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th defendants, as the Obasinkin of Ila is contrary to the native law and custom of Ila-Orangun and is therefore null and void.
2. Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from acting and or parading himself as the Obasinkin of Ila-Orangun.
3. Perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th defendants from recognizing the 1st defendant as the Obasinkin of Ila-Orangun.
4. An order of the court setting aside the Chieftaincy Declaration in Ila as affecting the Obasinkin Chieftaincy in Ila Orangun and to declare the same as being contrary to native law and custom of Ila Orangun and therefore null and void.

Pleadings were ordered, filed and exchanged. The plaintiff with leave of court later filed an amended statement of claim. The 1st to 8th defendants filed a joint statement of defence. The 9th and 10th defendants also filed their joint statement of defence. The case then proceeded to trial. At the trial the plaintiff testified and called five other witnesses while seven witnesses gave evidence for the defendants.
Briefly put the plaintiff’s case is that he is a member of the Obasinkin Logun Kando family of Ila-Orangun and that he took the action on behalf of himself and the family. He said the Obasinkin Chieftaincy is exclusive to his family and that the appointment of the 1st defendant as the Obasinkin by the other defendants is contrary to native law and custom of Ila-Orangun, because the 1st defendant is not related to the Logun Kando family. He traced the history of all the eleven Obasinkins who reigned up to the last one who died in 1982 to his family.

P.1

The defendants on the other hand contended that although the 1st defendant was not a member of the plaintiff’s family, they relied on the Chieftaincy Declaration of 1960 (exhibit D in the proceedings) which added the family of the 1st defendant as a second ruling house in respect of the Chieftaincy. The plaintiff’s reaction to this 1960 Chieftaincy declaration (exhibit D), was that the family was not aware of it and that at any rate the Obasinkin Chieftaincy has been relegated to a minor Chieftaincy by virtue of THE RECOGNISED CHIEFTAINCIES (REVOCATION AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ORDER 1976 (W.S.L.N. 6 of 1976), that it was no longer subject to the provisions of Part 2 of the Chiefs Law of the former Western State and consequently the 1960 Chieftaincy Declaration was no longer applicable.

After the close of evidence on both sides, learned counsel for the parties addressed the court. In a reserved judgment, the learned trial Judge carefully evaluated and weighed the evidence led before him and found for the plaintiff. He concluded his judgment thus –
“In my considered judgment, the plaintiff has proved his case and he is entitled to the reliefs sought. I grant the following orders-
1. A declaration that the appointment and installation of Mr. Thomas Adesola Oyetayo (that is the 1st defendant) by the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th defendants, as the Obasinkin of Ila is contrary to the native law and custom of Ila-Orangun and is therefore null and void.
2. Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st defendant from acting or parading himself as the Obasinkin of Ila-Orangun.

P.2

3. Perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th defendant from recognising the 1st defendant as Obasinkin of Ila Orangun.
   4. An order setting aside the Chieftaincy Declaration in Ila as affecting the Obasinkin Chieftaincy in Ila Orangun in that it is contrary to native law and custom of Ila-Orangun and therefore null and void.Dissatisfied with the above judgment, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal, holden at Ibadan. In a unanimous judgment the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial High Court. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff has now appealed to this court. The parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument which were adopted and relied upon at the hearing of the appeal.
   Mr. Ajayi learned counsel for the plaintiff has identified in his brief the following issues as arising for determination in the appeal. They read –
   “1, What is the cause of action and when did it accrue in the matter?
   2. Whether as regards the Obasinkin Chieftaincy, the Chieftaincy Declaration of 1960 is still valid and subsisting having regard to the Recognized Chieftaincies (Revocation and Miscellaneous) Order, 1976 (W.S.L.N. 6 of 1976).
   3. Did the High Court (Court of first instance) in this matter have jurisdiction to entertain this matter as it did?”
   I ought to say at this juncture that this is a straight forward case. The facts are largely not in dispute. This is clearly a question of the application of the law to the facts as found or established in court.

   P.3

Issue (1)
The question here is simply whether the cause of action in this case arose in 1960 when the Chieftaincy Declaration (exhibit D) was made and the 1st defendant’s family made a second ruling house therein, or in 1983 when the 1st defendant was installed as the Obasinkin to the detriment of the plaintiff’s family.
The Court of Appeal clearly in my view came to an erroneous conclusion when it held that –
“It is therefore apparent that the act exhibit ‘D’ which constitutes the cause of action in the instant case arose in 1960 and not in 1982 on the demise of the Obasinkin Jekayinfa and I so hold” (see per Okunola, JCA on page 284).
The words “cause of action” have been defined by this court in a number of cases simply to mean the facts which when proved will entitle a plaintiff to a remedy against a defendant (see for example Savage v. Uwechia (1972) 3 SC 213; Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State (1986) 5 NWLR (Pt.45) 828; Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.47) 1).

It is obvious to me that the cause of action in this case arose in October 1983 when the 1st defendant was appointed the Obasinkin. The plaintiff instituted this action immediately thereafter in November 1983. The plaintiff could not have lawfully sued anyone in 1960 except perhaps the officials engaged in the making or preparation of exhibit D itself. But then there was a reigning Obasinkin (before exhibit D) who the evidence shows died in 1982. So the cause of action here is the appointment or installation of 1st defendant as the Obasinkin on the basis or authority of exhibit D, and nothing else.
I therefore resolve this issue in favour of the plaintiff.
Issues (2) & (3)
These issues are directly linked with themselves and with issue (1) above. Issue (1) is undoubtedly the mother of issues (2) & (3).

P.4

It is the time when the cause of action arises or occurs that decides in this case whether the trial High Court has jurisdiction or whether exhibit D is still valid and therefore subsists. There is no doubt that by the provisions of the Recognised Chieftaincies (Revocation and Miscellaneous Provisions) Order 1976 (W.S.L.N. 6 of 1976), the Obasinkin Chieftaincy became a minor chieftaincy and it is no more a recognized Chieftaincy. As such it is no longer subject to Part 2 of Chiefs Law and consequently any declaration in respect of the Chieftaincy, in this case exhibit D, can no longer be deemed to be the customary law regulating the selection of a person to be holder of that chieftaincy to the exclusion of other customary usage or rule (see for example Alese v. Aladetuyi (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.403) 527.
It is obvious having held above that the cause of action arose in 1983 (and not in 1960 as erroneously found by the Court of Appeal), the trial High Court has the undoubted jurisdiction to have tried the matter as it had done. The two issues are therefore resolved in favour of the plaintiff.
All the issues having been resolved in favour of the plaintiff, the appeal succeeds and it is hereby allowed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is accordingly set aside while that delivered by the trial High Court on 22nd March, 1990 is restored. The plaintiff is awarded costs of N10,000.00 in this court and N5,000.00 in the court below against the defendants.