Oladele Ayodele v. The State

I have read the judgment of my learned

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brother, UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC and I agree with his Lordship’s reasoning and conclusion that this appeal is devoid of merit and should be dismissed. This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Benin Division Coram: Philomena Mbua Ekpe, Mudashiru Nasiru Oniyangi and Ugochukwu Anthony Ogakwu JJCA delivered on 28th June, 2016 wherein the Court below dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial Court which had convicted and sentenced the Appellant to 5 years imprisonment without the option of fine for the offence of receiving stolen (robbed) property punishable under Section 5 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions) Act Cap R11, Volume 14, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

The facts that led to this appeal are that on the 13th day of August 2007, one Arthur Diden who owns a black Toyota Avensis car with the registration number (DT 755 WWR) was attacked at gunpoint by gunmen along Ugberikoko road, Delta State and his car was forcefully taken away. On the 15th day of August 2007, the Appellant received a phone call from one Yerindideke Moses and Osamudiamen Enahoro (co-defendants) that they had a car to sell.

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The Appellant then travelled from Lagos to Benin where he met the co-defendants at lyaro Park at about 8pm in the night following which the Appellant drove the car to Lagos that night. The stolen vehicle was recovered by the Police where it was parked along the road at Dolphin Estate, Lagos State. The Appellant pleaded not guilty.

At the trial, the Prosecution called two (2) witnesses (PW1 Arthur Diden – the owner of the car and PW2 – Inspector lyen Jerry, the Investigating Police Officer). The Appellant testified for himself and called no witness. After the hearing and conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge on the 24th day of June, 2014 found the Appellant guilty of the offence of receiving stolen property and the Appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.

The Appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court, appealed to the Court below but was unsuccessful in his appeal as the Court below on the 28th day of June, 2016 affirmed the judgment of the trial Court. Still dissatisfied with the decision of the Court below, the Appellant vide a Notice of Appeal lodged an appeal against the decision of

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the Court below on four (4) grounds seeking the following reliefs:
a) AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the judgment/decision of the Court of Appeal, Benin Division delivered on the 28th day of June 2016 dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and affirming the decision of the trial Court in this case.
b) An order discharging and acquitting the Appellant in this case on appeal to this Honourable Court.

The Appellant in his brief settled by A. O Ojekudo Esq., distilled a sole issue for determination to wit:
Whether the Court of Appeal was right in affirming the decision of the learned trial Judge and confirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant when all the ingredients for establishing the offence of receiving stolen (robbed) property have not been established by the prosecution as required by law in this case.

The Respondent in its brief settled by Olivia Agbajoh, Esq., distilled a sole issue for determination to wit:
Whether the Court of Appeal was right when it held that the prosecution has proved its case of receiving stolen property against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

I shall adopt the sole

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issue formulated by the Respondent and utilize same to determine this appeal.

Learned Appellant’s Counsel in his argument submitted that to establish the offence of receiving stolen (robbed) property, the prosecution must establish the following ingredients a) The proof of stealing the goods in question b) The proof that the person charged received the said goods dishonestly and; c) Evidence of guilty knowledge that at the time the stolen goods were received the recipient knew or had reason to believe that the goods were stolen property. Counsel in his argument conceded that indeed a black Toyota Avensis car was stolen which firmly established the first ingredient. Counsel submitted that the prosecution failed woefully and the two lower Courts were wrong when it held that the remaining two ingredients as listed above was established in this case. Counsel submitted that from the Appellant’s confessional statement and that of the 4th co-defendant, the prosecution had failed to prove that the Appellant acted dishonestly in “receiving” the stolen car (assuming he did which he denied). Counsel further submitted that the Appellant is known as a certified

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businessman who deals in buying and selling of used cars hence, there is nothing “dishonest” about the Appellant “receiving” the car more so, he was acting on the belief/ information that the 1st co-defendant was the real owner of the car.

Further, learned Appellant’s Counsel argued that the Appellant is a car dealer and is entitled to buy vehicles, if the Appellant had the intention of concealing the car he would not have parked it in an estate where anyone could easily locate/ identify the car also, due to the discrepancies of information on the particulars of the vehicle, the Appellant did not display the vehicle at his car stand for sale until he was able to ascertain the genuineness of the true ownership of the vehicle. Counsel submitted that the two lower Courts erred in law in their decision which have occasioned a miscarriage of justice on the Appellant.
Counsel cited DIBIE v. STATE (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 893), 257, BOZIN v. THE STATE (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8), BAKARE v. THE STATE (1987) 3 SC 1, AKINDIPE v. THE STATE, (2008) 15 NWLR (Pt. III) 560, USMAN v. K.S.H.A (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1044) 148, STATE v. NNOLIM (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 345) 394 at 410.<br< p=”” style=”box-sizing: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; scrollbar-color: var(–thumbBG) var(–scrollbarBG);”>

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In reply, Learned Respondent’s Counsel submitted that the essential ingredients in proving the offence of receiving stolen property is enshrined under Section 427 of the Criminal Code. Counsel submitted that the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 as recorded in the Record of Appeal have fully established the first ingredient of the offence of receiving stolen property. Counsel cited OSHODIN v. THE STATE (2002) FWLR (Pt. 90) Pg. 1336, ADEJOBI v. THE STATE (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1261) 347 @ 377 paras B-D.

On the second ingredient of the offence of receiving stolen property, Counsel submitted that as at 16/8/2007 and from the testimony of PW2, the Appellant was in possession of the stolen car. Counsel cited Section 167(a) of the Evidence Act, SADIKU v. STATE (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) Pg. 191 @ 21 paras C-E, EHIMIYEIN v. THE STATE (2016) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1538) 173 @ Pg. 200 paras D-E, G-H.

On the third ingredient of the offence of receiving stolen property, Counsel submitted that knowledge that the car was stolen can only be presumed under Section 167 of the Evidence Act. There was evidence that a car was stolen and found in the possession of the Appellant and there

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was no denial from the Appellant as to how he came in possession of the stolen car. Counsel submitted that there is evidence of guilty knowledge that the time, manner and actions of the co-defendants and the Appellant is enough rational for a reasonable man to know and ascertain that the was stolen. Counsel cited R. v. OLUJOMOYEE (1936) 3 WACA Pg. 71, UDOH v. STATE (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 295) Pg. 556.

OPINION
In order to prove the offence of receiving stolen or robbed property knowingly contrary to Section 5 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provisions Act) Cap. R11, Volume 14 LFN, 2004, the prosecution must establish the following:
a) That the property or item in question was stolen;
b) There must be proof that the defendant received the said property or goods dishonestly;
c) There must be evidence of guilty knowledge that at the time the stolen goods were received, the recipient/defendant knew or had reason to believe that the goods were stolen property.

My Lords, from the facts of this case, it is indisputable that a black Toyota Avensis car with registration number (DT 755 WWR) belonging to PW1 was stolen at gun point along

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Ugberikoko Road, Delta State on the 13th day of August, 2007 which settles the first ingredient for the offence of receiving stolen or robbed property. This fact was also conceded by both Counsel.

On the second and third ingredients of the offence of receiving stolen goods/property, PW2 in his testimony on oath as recorded on page 48 – 49 of the Record of Appeal testified thus:
“I know Arthur Eyetimi Diden. I recalled 15 August 2007 (sic). That day one Arthur Eyitemi Diden, PW1 came to the station and reported that on the 13 August 2007, along Ugberikoko Road he was driving his Toyota Reg. No AL 755 WWR, he packed (sic) to ease himself. Suddenly 5 men attacked him with gun and snatched his car at gunpoint.”

PW2 testified further on page 50 of the Record of Appeal as follows:
“The 3rd accused person took us to Lagos where the car was packed at Dolphin Estate. On 22nd August 2007, we went to Lagos with the 3rd accused and we recovered the car from where 3rd accused packed it. The car was released to the owner through his brother on bond.”

My Lords, the Appellant in his argument tried to put a defence that as a certified car dealer who

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has transacted several buying and selling of cars, he did not have any dishonest intent when he went to carry the stolen car in Benin City. In OLUWASEYI v. THE STATE (2018) LPELR-46359(SC) Per KEKERE-EKUN, JSC (Pp. 26-28, paras. B- A), held that the law is settled that guilty knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding circumstance such as: (a) The manner of receipt or delivery of the goods allegedly stolen; (b) The time of delivery (c) The actions upon delivery and (d) The price paid for the goods. See Okoroji v. The State (2002)5 NWLR (Pt. 759) 21 @ 48 D-E; Ekpo v. The State (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt.849) 392 @ 408 A-B.

On page 175 of the Record of Appeal, the Court below rightly held thus:
“During cross-examination at the trial Court, the Appellant had this to say:
“I met them at about 7:30 – 8 p.m. Yes we took the car to Lagos that night for purpose of selling. Yes I said the 1st accused actually told me the car belong to him. No, it is not true that it was the same night he told me the car belonged to his uncle. He told me the next day.”
From the aforesaid evidence, it can be easily inferred that the Appellant could not give a proper

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account of the origin of the car and he ought to have known at this point in time that the said car was stolen. Again, the manner and time the car was delivered is enough for a rational mind to ascertain the fact that the vehicle had been stolen. The above then corroborates the presumption of guilty knowledge on the part of the Appellant.”

The denial of the Appellant is merely an afterthought, the reasoning of the learned justices of the two Courts below is unassailable and in accordance with already established principle of law, I find no reason to upset the concurrent findings of the Court below and the trial Court. See OYEYEMI V. STATE (2022) LPELR-59547(SC) (Pp. 29-30 paras. E), KOLAWOLE V. STATE (2021) LPELR-58390(SC) (Pp. 15-16 paras. F), OLUGBEMI V. STATE (2023) LPELR-60331(SC) (Pp. 30 paras. A).

The decision of the Court below in CA/B/496C/2014 delivered on 28/6/2016 is hereby affirmed.

Appeal dismissed.

I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of my learned brother, Hon. Justice Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC, just delivered. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion that this appeal lacks

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merit and should be dismissed.

My learned brother comprehensively addressed the sole issue in the leading judgment. I shall therefore only add a brief comment in support. It is necessary to reiterate the settled position of the law that in criminal proceedings, the prosecution must establish its case against the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. While it is settled that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt, where there is any doubt in the case presented by the prosecution, such doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused person. See STATE V. AZEEZ (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 424) 1423, (2008) 14 NWLR (PT. 1108) 439 AT 483 PARAGRAPHS B – E, 501 D – F; CHUKWU V. THE STATE (1996) LPELR (856) 1, (1996) 7 NWLR (PT. 463) 686 AT 701.

What is important in this appeal is whether the explanation given by the Appellant as to how he came into possession of the stolen vehicle was not controverted by the Respondent and that same remained unchallenged. In BOTU V. STATE (2017) LPELR-47017(SC) (Pp 17 – 18 Paras E – D) this Court Per KUMAI BAYANG AKA’AHS, JSC held that:
“I am now left with the explanation which the

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appellant offered regarding his presence inside the stolen vehicle. The learned trial Judge doesn’t need to be convinced of the truth of the explanation before the presumption is rebutted. What is important is that the explanation was not controverted by the prosecution and so it remained unchallenged”.
In the instant case, the explanation of the Appellant as to how he came into possession of the stolen vehicle, though suspicious, was properly rebutted by the Respondent. I will rightly apply SECTION 167(A) EVIDENCE ACT 2011 relied on by the Respondent, which empowers us to presume that:
“ a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen unless he can account for his possession”.
See STATE V. NNOLIM (1994) 5 NWLR (PT. 345) 394, (1994) 4 SCNJ 48, EHIMIYEIN V. STATE (2016) LPELR-40841(SC) (PP. 34-35 PARAS. F). I am of the view that the explanation of the Appellant with regard to his possession of the stolen vehicle does not create any doubt to his guilty knowledge and therefore the presumption of recent possession of stolen

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goods is presumed against him.

For these and other reasons stated more comprehensively in the leading judgment, I find no merit in the appeal. I also dismiss it and affirm the judgment of the Lower Court.

I was privileged to read in draft the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC.

My learned brother has with all clarity analyzed the ingredients of the offence of receiving stolen (Robbed) property under Section 5 of the Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Act 2004 for which the appellant was convicted.

I am in complete agreement with the reasoning and the conclusion that the appeal is lacking in merit and should be dismissed.

The key ingredient of the offence of receiving stolen goods is that the prosecution among others must prove that the receiver knows or ought to know that the property he was receiving was a “stolen property.”
The prosecution in the instant case established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knew or had deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious that the Toyota Avensis with Registration No. DR 755 WWR was a stolen vehicle. In the

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circumstance of that strong case, the appellant would only escape conviction if he established a successful defence of being an innocent receiver which the appellant failed to do. It is the unquestionable position of our law that guilty knowledge may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See OLUWASEYI V. THE STATE (2018) LPELR – 46359 (SC). I must emphasise that the speed with which the appellant took to the road on receiving a call that there was a vehicle available at Warri for sale and the fact that the vehicle was brought to him at night and he moved in that late hour of the night to Lagos for the purpose of selling the vehicle among others are enough indication of his knowledge of the fact that the vehicle was a stolen vehicle.

I agree, therefore, that the finding of guilt and the concurrent conviction of the appellant is unassailable. I accordingly agree that his conviction and sentence are very much in order. I concur with the leading judgment of my learned brother that this appeal is lacking in merit and I too dismiss it. I abide by the order affirming the concurrent decisions of the lower Courts.

I read

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in advance a draft copy of the judgment of my learned brother, Abba Aji, JSC in which this appeal was dismissed. The issues arising for determination have been comprehensively considered and ably resolved. I am in total agreement, with the reasoning and conclusions therein and I adopt the same as mine. The concurrent finding of the lower Courts is faultless.

For the fuller reasons set out in the lead judgment, I join in dismissing the appeal for lacking in merit.

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