LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE — Concurrent Findings of Fact — When an Appellate Court May Interfere
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
A trial court does not walk the principle in Kojo v. Bonsie on its head simply because it resolves conflicting traditional histories by reference to recent acts of possession; the criticism is not borne out by the record where the trial judge properly applied the principle.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Kutigi, JSC, in Ajukwara & Ors v. Izuoji & Ors (2002) NLC-151998(SC) at p. 6; Para E.
"The Court of Appeal was therefore clearly in error when it held that the trial Court appeared to have walked the principle in Kojo v. Bonsie (supra) on its head. That criticism is not borne out by the record. I have examined the record myself and the opinion I form is that the learned trial Judge properly applied the principle stated in Kojo v. Bonsie to the instant case and made his numerous findings of fact in favour of the Plaintiffs including numerous acts of possession and ownership enumerated in the judgment."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
The Kojo v. Bonsie principle allows a trial court to test conflicting traditional histories by reference to recent acts of possession. An appellate court errs in criticising this approach. The trial judge properly applied the principle by evaluating acts of ownership. The principle recognises that demeanour of witnesses is not the best guide for resolving traditional history conflicts. Recent facts are more reliable. The appellate court will not interfere where the trial court followed the correct approach. The appellant must show perversity or miscarriage of justice. The rule promotes respect for trial court findings. The court will examine the record to determine if the trial judge applied the correct principle.