APPELLATE PRACTICE — Concurrent Findings of Fact — When Supreme Court Will Interfere
Ratio Decidendi
Per Onnoghen, JSC, in Ogedengbe & Ors v. Balogun & Ors (2007) NLC-123-273-2001(SC) at p. 24; Paras A–C (citing Abimbola v. Abatan (2001) 9 NWLR (pt. 717) 66 at 78–79):
"It is settled law that where there is concurrent findings of facts by the trial and appellate courts and there is sufficient evidence on record in support of same, unless the findings are found to be perverse or are not supported by evidence or were reached as a result of wrong approach to the evidence or as a result of wrong application of a principle of substantive law or of procedure, the Supreme Court, even if disposed to a different conclusion upon the printed evidence, cannot do so."
Explanation / Scope
This principle establishes the Supreme Court’s restrained approach to concurrent findings of fact by lower courts. Where two courts below have agreed on factual findings supported by sufficient evidence, the Supreme Court will not interfere. Interference is justified only where findings are perverse, unsupported by evidence, based on wrong approach to evidence, or result from wrong application of substantive law or procedure. Even if the Supreme Court would have reached a different conclusion on the printed record, it cannot substitute its view. The principle promotes finality and respect for trial courts’ advantage in assessing witnesses. The appellant must demonstrate one of the exceptions to succeed. The principle applies in all appeals involving concurrent factual findings.