LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE – Dismissal for Want of Prosecution – Inherent Jurisdiction May Be Exercised Where Delay Is Inexcusable
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
The exercise by the court of its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action is an answer to risks from trial of actions with inexcusable, inordinate delays; a hearing under such situations cannot be described as fair to the parties and cannot survive the test of fairness under section 33 of the 1979 Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"The exercise by the Court of its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action before it is an answer to the risks likely to result from trial of actions where there is inexcusable, inordinate delays… A hearing under such a situation as stated above cannot be described as fair to the parties, and cannot survive the test of fairness under section 33 of our Constitution 1979."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Courts possess inherent jurisdiction to dismiss actions suffering inexcusable, inordinate delay that prejudices fair hearing. Long delays cause: evidence deterioration (witnesses die, memories fade, documents are lost), prejudice to opponents, and proceedings that cannot meet constitutional fair hearing standards. “Inexcusable” delay lacks legitimate justification—not caused by court congestion or reasonable impediments. “Inordinate” delay is excessive beyond normal litigation timeframes. When such delays make fair trial impossible, dismissal protects both parties from unfair proceedings and serves public interest in efficient justice administration. Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution guarantees fair hearing; trials compromised by excessive delay violate this guarantee. Inherent jurisdiction is exercised cautiously, considering: length and reason for delay, prejudice to parties, whether fair trial remains possible, and conduct of parties