LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE – Extension of Time to Appeal – Counsel’s Error as Good and Substantial Reason – When Pardonable
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
That counsel's error of judgment, if reasonable, is an acceptable explanation for delay to apply for leave to appeal or to appeal within the prescribed time is now undoubted. In Akinyede v. The Apprasier (1971) 1 All NLR 162 counsel's carelessness was held by this court to be good reason for failure to appeal within time, provided such carelessness is pardonable. In Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299 and Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 SC 143, pardonable inadvertence of counsel was accepted as good and substantial reason for the delay.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Ayoola, JSC, in Shanu v. Afribank Nigeria Plc (2000) NLC-1691997(SC) at p. 6; Paras B–D.
"That counsel's error of judgment, if reasonable, is an acceptable explanation for delay to apply for leave to appeal or to appeal within the prescribed time is now undoubted. In Akinyede v. The Apprasier (1971) 1 All NLR 162 counsel's carelessness was held by this court to be good reason for failure to appeal within time, provided such carelessness is pardonable. In Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299 and Bowaje v. Adediwura (1976) 6 SC 143, pardonable inadvertence of counsel was accepted as good and substantial reason for the delay."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Pardonable counsel error constitutes good and substantial reason for extending time to appeal. The error must be reasonable—not deliberate or grossly negligent. Carelessness is excusable if it does not evince disregard for the client’s interest. Courts distinguish between counsel’s strategic decision (binding on client) and honest mistake (excusable). This principle ensures litigants are not penalized for their counsel’s genuine errors, provided they acted diligently upon discovering the mistake. The overriding consideration is whether justice demands that the appeal be heard despite procedural delay.