LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE — Interference with Findings of Fact — Circumstances for Interference
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
An appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with a trial court's findings of fact unless the trial court failed to properly use the opportunity of seeing witnesses, drew wrong conclusions, took an erroneous view of evidence, or made perverse findings unsupported by evidence.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Agbeje & Ors v. Ajibola & Ors (2002) NLC-341996(SC) at pp. 15–16; Paras E–A.
"A trial court, such again as the Upper Area Court, having had the opportunity of hearing witnesses at the trial and watching their demeanour in the witness box is entitled to select witnesses to believe on facts established and an appellate court should not ordinarily interfere with such findings of fact except in certain circumstances. Such circumstances include where the trial court has not made a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted credible evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings of fact are perverse in the sense that they are unsupported by evidence or do not flow from the evidence accepted by it."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Appellate courts defer to trial court findings due to the advantage of seeing witnesses. Interference is justified only in specific circumstances: (1) failure to properly use the opportunity of seeing witnesses; (2) drawing wrong conclusions from accepted evidence; (3) erroneous view of evidence; (4) perverse findings unsupported by evidence. Perversity means no reasonable tribunal could have reached that conclusion. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating such defects. The principle respects the trial court’s primary role. The appellate court will not re-evaluate evidence simply because it might have reached a different conclusion. The rule promotes finality and respect for trial court findings.