LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE – Interference with Findings of Fact – Grounds for Interference with Trial Court’s Findings
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
It is not right for an appellate court to interfere with the trial court's finding of fact unless the finding is not supported by evidence, or is perverse, or is based on legally inadmissible evidence, or is fraught with error in law whereby it could lead to a miscarriage of justice.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
"It is not right for the appellate court to interfere with the trial Court's finding of fact unless the finding is not supported by evidence, or it is perverse or is based on legally inadmissible evidence or is fraught with error in law whereby it could lead to a miscarriage of justice."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
This principle establishes the limited grounds on which appellate courts may interfere with trial court factual findings, balancing appellate oversight against respect for the trial court’s fact-finding role. The general rule is deference to trial court findings because trial judges see and hear witnesses, assess credibility, and evaluate evidence firsthand—advantages appellate courts lack when reviewing written records. However, appellate courts may and must interfere when findings suffer from specific defects: (1) No evidentiary support—findings made without any evidence to support them are erroneous as a matter of law. Courts cannot make findings based on speculation, conjecture, or personal knowledge. (2) Perversity—findings so unreasonable that no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have reached such conclusions. This is a high bar requiring demonstration that findings defy logic or common sense given the evidence. (3) Legally inadmissible evidence—findings based wholly or substantially on evidence that should have been excluded (hearsay, prejudicial evidence, privileged matters, etc.) are tainted and cannot stand. (4) Error in law causing potential miscarriage of justice—findings infected by legal errors (wrong burden of proof, improper presumptions, misapplication of legal standards) that could produce unjust outcomes. These grounds are exhaustive and specific—generalized dissatisfaction with findings or alternative interpretations of evidence do not justify interference. The principle maintains appropriate division of labor between trial and appellate courts: trial courts find facts based on evidence presented; appellate courts ensure findings have proper evidentiary foundation, comply with legal standards, and meet basic rationality requirements. This framework prevents appellate courts from becoming courts of first instance re-trying cases while ensuring genuine errors are corrected.