LEGAL PRINCIPLE: APPELLATE PRACTICE — Interference with Findings of Fact — Principles Governing
PRINCIPLE STATEMENT
An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with findings of fact made by a trial court except where the trial court has not made proper use of its opportunity to see and hear witnesses, has drawn wrong conclusions from accepted evidence, has taken an erroneous view of the evidence, or its findings are perverse.
RATIO DECIDENDI (SOURCE)
Per Iguh, JSC, in Ezeanya v. Okeke (1995) NLC-2651988(SC) at p. 32; Paras. A–C.
"An appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial court except in such circumstances as where the trial court has not made a proper use of the opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses at the trial or where it has drawn conclusions from accepted evidence or has taken an erroneous view of the evidence adduced before it or its findings of fact are perverse in the sense that they do not flow from the evidence accepted by it."
EXPLANATION / SCOPE
Appellate courts defer to trial court findings on credibility. Interference is justified only in specific circumstances. The appellant must demonstrate error. The principle respects the trial court’s advantage. The appellate court will not re-evaluate evidence. Perversity means no reasonable tribunal could have reached the conclusion. The rule applies to both civil and criminal appeals. The trial court’s findings are not sacrosanct. The appellant bears the burden of showing error.